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Abstract
This book is a contribution to the flourishing field of formal and philosophical work
on truth and the semantic paradoxes. Our aim is to present several theories of truth,
to investigate some of their model-theoretic, recursion-theoretic and proof-theoretic
aspects, and to evaluate their philosophical significance.
In Part I we first outline some motivations for studying formal theories of truth,
fix some terminology, provide some background on Tarski’s and Kripke’s theories of
truth, and then discuss the prospects of classical type-free truth. In Chapter 4 we
discuss some minimal adequacy conditions on a satisfactory theory of truth based on
the function that the truth predicate is intended to fulfil on the deflationist account.
We cast doubt on the adequacy of some non-classical theories of truth and argue in
favor of classical theories of truth.
Part II is devoted to grounded truth. In chapter 5 we introduce a game-theoretic
semantics for Kripke’s theory of truth. Strategies in these games can be interpreted
as reference-graphs (or dependency-graphs) of the sentences in question. Using that
framework, we give a graph-theoretic analysis of the Kripke-paradoxical sentences.
In chapter 6 we provide simultaneous axiomatizations of groundedness and truth,
and analyze the proof-theoretic strength of the resulting theories. These range from
conservative extensions of Peano arithmetic to theories that have the full strength
of the impredicative system ID1.
Part III investigates the relationship between truth and set-theoretic comprehen-
sion. In chapter 7 we canonically associate extensions of the truth predicate with
Henkin-models of second-order arithmetic. This relationship will be employed to
determine the recursion-theoretic complexity of several theories of grounded truth
and to show the consistency of the latter with principles of generalized induction. In
chapter 8 it is shown that the sets definable over the standard model of the Tarskian
hierarchy are exactly the hyperarithmetical sets. Finally, we try to apply a certain
solution to the set-theoretic paradoxes to the case of truth, namely Quine’s idea
of stratification. This will yield classical disquotational theories that interpret full
second-order arithmetic without set parameters, Z−2 (chapter 9). We also indicate a
method to recover the parameters.
An appendix provides some background on ordinal notations, recursion theory
and graph theory.
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Part I.
Truth as a logico-mathematical
notion

1. Introduction
In the nineteen-thirties, Tarski [89] showed how to give a rigorous definition of
truth for a range of interpreted formal languages. His truth definition involves two
languages: first, the language for which truth is defined (the object language), and
second, the language in which the definition is given (the metalanguage). The latter
must be ‘rich’ enough to talk about the expressions of the object language and
syntactic operations on them. Tarski took it as a minimal adequacy condition on a
satisfactory definition of truth that it implies all instances of the so-called T-schema
Tpϕq↔ ϕ,
where pϕq is a name of the sentence ϕ. Under fairly minimal conditions, object-
and metalanguage cannot coincide, on pain of contradiction. This is known as
Tarski’s undefinability theorem, which can be proved by formalizing the infamous
liar paradox. Consider the following sentence:
The sentence marked (1) is not true (1)
The assumption that (1) is true leads to the conclusion that (1) is not true and
vice versa. The Tarskian truth predicates are typed truth predicates, in the sense
that they provably apply only to sentences of the object language. If we want a
truth predicate for the metalanguage, we have to move up one level to a meta-
metalanguage, and so forth, thus creating the Tarskian hierarchy of languages and
truth predicates.
Tarski’s work was a huge success and paved the way for model theory. How-
ever, not everyone was content with Tarski’s semantics. Philosophers strive for the
absolute; if we say ‘All sentences of the form ‘If p then p’ are true’, we want the
quantifier to range over all sentences, even those that contain an occurrence of the
truth predicate. Since the mid-seventies, philosophical logicians have increasingly
tried to close the gap between object- and metalanguage, resulting in a variety of se-
mantic and axiomatic theories of type-free truth. Work in this area includes Kripke
[53], Friedman & Sheard [28], Feferman [19] [20] [21], Cantini [10] [11], Herzberger
[42], Gupta [31], and Belnap & Gupta [32].
On the semantic approach, one usually starts with a model for the language
without the truth predicate and then assigns an interpretation (extension) for the
truth predicate such that certain plausible principles of truth are satisfied (e.g.
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instances of the T-schema). On the axiomatic approach, such principles are studied
directly from a proof-theoretic point of view. Investigations in this area show that
the addition of a truth predicate to a language increases the expressive power of
that language in several ways. On the semantic side, we observe that new sets can
be defined, or that quantification over subsets of the domain becomes feasible. On
the axiomatic side, the truth predicate enables us to finitely axiomatize infinite sets
of sentences, shorten the proofs of theorems, or prove new theorems.
In this increase in expressive power, proponents of the deflationary account of
truth see the sole reason why we have a truth predicate in our language at all.
According to that view, once we have understood the function of the truth predicate,
we understand about everything there is to know about truth. No definition of the
form ‘x is true if and only if p’ is required. Deflationism is currently the most popular
philosophical account of truth, being “attractively demystifying” (Horwich [46, p.
5]). Although I do not fully endorse deflationism, I agree with Field that we should
be methodological deflationists:
[W]e should start out assuming deflationism as a working hypothesis; we should
adhere to it unless and until we find ourselves reconstructing what amounts to the
inflationist’s relation ‘[Sentence] S has truth conditions p’. (Field [22, p. 367])
Deflationists usually emphasize the role of the truth predicate for expressing gener-
alizations or ‘infinite conjunctions’, but philosophers have assigned other purposes
to the truth predicate too, for example, in the philosophy of mathematics. Russell
[80] observed that the notion of truth provides us with virtual classes, and thus can
be used for ontological reductions. Loosely speaking, the claim that x is an element
of the set {y|ϕ(y)} is intertranslatable (model-theoretically and proof-theoretically)
with the claim that ϕ(x) is true. This is the reason why the addition of a truth
predicate allows us to mimick second-order quantification.
The aim of this essay is to explore if, how and to what extent the truth predicate
can serve the purposes that philosophers have assigned to it in face of the semantic
paradoxes. Let us therefore have a closer look at some of the tasks that we want
the truth predicate to perform.
1.1. Deflationism
Deflationism seems to have originated with the writings of Frege [27], Ramsey [76]
and Quine [72]; its modern champions include Horwich [46] and Field [22], among
many others. Deflationists claim that the truth predicate exists solely for the sake
of certain logico-linguistic or logico-mathematical purposes and would otherwise be
entirely dispensable. According to that view, the truth predicate provides a means
of capturing a (possibly infinite) set of sentences by a single expression without
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exhibiting tokens of the original sentences. We can construct a single new statement,
closely related to the original sentences, either by applying the truth predicate to
definite descriptions or proper names of the original sentences or by subsuming a
predicate that applies exactly to these sentences under the truth predicate.
For example, instead of using the sentence ‘The universal proportionality fac-
tor between equivalent amounts of energy and mass is equal to the speed of light
squared’ we can choose a definite description of that sentence—such as ‘the most
famous formula of physics’—or a proper name—such as ‘Einstein’s mass-energy
equivalence’—and use the sentence ‘Einstein’s mass-energy equivalence is true’ in-
stead. Definite descriptions and proper names denote just one object. They enable
us to formulate what we may call singular truth ascriptions, expressions of the form
‘s is true’, where s denotes a sentence, without displaying that sentence.1
On the other hand, by supplying a property that all sentences in a certain set
share, we can capture all those sentences in a single phrase by formulating what we
may call a general truth ascription, or generalization for short. These are expressions
of the form ‘All Φs are true’. For instance, instead of repeating all of Newton’s three
laws of motion one by one, we can simply say ‘All of Newton’s law of motion are
true’.
Of course, singular truth ascriptions can be seen as a limit case of generalizations,
where the anteceding property is satisfied just by one sentence. It is always possible
to replace sentences of the form ‘s is true’ by their logical equivalents ‘All sentences
identical to s are true’. As a consequence, in what follows we will focus on general
truth ascriptions.
Capturing an infinite set of sentences by a single expression can be seen as a
version of finite axiomatizability. The insight that the truth predicate can be used
for finite axiomatizations is actually not a discovery of deflationists. It is well-known
that important mathematical theories like Peano arithmetic or Zermelo-Fraenkel
set theory are not finitely axiomatizable. Kleene [50] and later Craig & Vaught
[16] showed that almost any theory is finitely axiomatizable if additional predicate
symbols are allowed in the axiomatization. That is, if S is a theory with finite non-
logical vocabulary that has infinite models only, there is a conservative extension
of S that is finitely axiomatizable. Roughly, the strategy here is to introduce a
truth (or satisfaction) predicate governed by the Tarski-clauses and then add the
statement ‘All axioms of S are true’.
The reasons why it is convenient to have such an expressive device at our dis-
posal are well known. We can roughly divide them into three categories—epistemic,
rhetoric and logical—of which the last one is without question the most important
1Of course, the truth predicate can also be applied to the quote-name of a sentence, but this case
is rather uninteresting. For when using them we exhibit a token of the original sentence. As we
will see in what follows, the truth predicate becomes handy when we don’t want to or simply
cannot exhibit such tokens.
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one. First, we might want to adopt a certain attitude towards a set of sentences
without knowing which sentences exactly belong to that set. For example, suppose
yesterday you had a conversation with an expert in physics who convinced you of
something, but the matter was so complicated that you don’t remember exactly
what she said. Then the truth predicate allows you to express your agreement
with the expert by saying ‘Everything the expert said yesterday is true’. The truth
predicate allows us to make blind ascriptions.
Second, we might want to save time or space. For example, instead of repeating
all the claims made in the bible, which would take an awful lot of time, we just say
‘Everything the bible says is true’.
Finally, and most importantly, there are cases where it is simply impossible for
us to explicitly state all the sentences in a certain set, namely when the set is
infinite. We might want to affirm all theorems of Peano arithmetic, all propositional
tautologies, etc. In those cases where the sentences in question are definable by a
formula, we can assert them all at once by saying, e.g. ‘All theorems of arithmetic
are true’. Thus, Quine famously said:
We may affirm the single sentence by just uttering it, unaided by quotation or by the
truth predicate; but if we want to affirm some infinite lot of sentences then the truth
predicate has its use. ([72, p. 12])
Expressing generalizations can be useful for many purposes. Obviously, they are
helpful in stating the laws of logic (as in the above example), but they also enable
us, amongst other things, to express agreement2 with theories that cannot be finitely
axiomatized (except by using the truth predicate, that is) or to make commitments
explicit. For example, it is generally held that someone who believes all theorems
of Peano arithmetic (PA) should also believe that PA is sound. Since PA does
not contain its own truth predicate, this commitment is usually expressed by the
schematic local reflection principle
ProvPA(pϕq)→ ϕ
where ProvPA(x) is the standard provability predicate of PA. By adding a truth
predicate T to the language, we can express all the instances of the local reflection
principle in a single sentence, namely, a formalized version of ‘All theorems of PA
are true’, i.e.
∀x(ProvPA(x)→ Tx)
2Here, agreement is understood to be more than just the autobiographical assertion that e.g.
someone believes all the theorems of PA—the autobiographical claim ‘I believe all theorems
of PA’ might be true while some theorems of PA are false. As Field [26] puts it, expressing
agreement with PA is making a claim that is correct if and only if PA is correct.
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The latter is called global reflection principle for PA. It implies, under minimal
conditions, the consistency of PA.
Another important purpose of generalizations is that they allow us to express
disagreement with non-finitely axiomatizable theories. We often disagree with some
theory without knowing exactly where it goes wrong. If the theory in question is
finitely axiomatized, we can express our disagreement by disjoining the negations of
the individual axioms of the theory. But in the case of a theory with infinitely many
axioms the only way to express our disagreement is by saying: ‘Not everything in
the theory is true’ or ‘Something in the theory is false’.
At this point, it is important to remark, however, that the truth predicate can
serve the purpose of expressing agreement and disagreement only to a certain ex-
tent—even if the truth predicate is fully transparent (i.e. if a sentence and its truth
predication are intersubstitutable salva veritate in every transparent context). For
there are cases in which we can’t express our argreement or disagreement consis-
tently. Suppose, for example, that Jones says ‘The Liar sentence is not true’ (=the
Liar), and assume furthermore that Brown agrees with Jones. Now it seems that
Brown can express her agreement with Jones by saying ‘What Jones said is true’,
because (assuming transparency) the latter will be materially equivalent to what
Jones said. However, by the way that the Liar sentence is defined, Brown’s utter-
ance is also equivalent to the negation of what Jones said—Brown’s utterance is
equivalent both to the Liar and its negation.
One should not underestimate the importance of this example. For one argument
that has often been raised against classical truth theories (i.e. truth theories based
on classical first-order logic) is that they cannot accommodate the unrestricted T-
schema and therefore (so the argument goes) compromise the role of truth (e.g. Field
[26]). The above example shows, I hope, that the liar sentence will place certain
restrictions on any theory of truth, regardless of the background logic.
The discussion so far leaves open the question which principles the truth predicate
has to validate in order to fulfill the generalizing function. Adding truth as a primi-
tive predicate symbol to our language certainly allows us to syntactically formulate
expressions such as ∀x(ϕ(x)→ Tx), but this is completely useless if the truth pred-
icate is not governed by axioms that relate a generalization in an appropriate way
to the sentences that we want to capture with it.
The most popular view on deflationist theories of truth is disquotationalism, i.e.
the idea that all there is to say about truth is exhausted by the equivalence between
ϕ and Tpϕq for every sentence ϕ (and therefore, that the equivalence accounts for
all uses of the truth predicate, in particular for its generalizing function). If the
equivalence is expressed in the object language, we get the celebrated T-schema,
Tpϕq↔ ϕ
Its rule-form variant is called the Intersubstitutivity Principle, according to which
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ϕ and Tpϕq entail each other.3 While in classical logic these two principles are
equivalent, this is not the case for every non-classical logic. Some non-classical
theories of truth satisfy one of them but not the other. In logics with conditional
proof or the rule of introduction of the conditional, the Intersubstitutivity Principle
implies the T-schema, while if Modus Ponens holds the latter entails the former.
Systems in which the Intersubstitutivity Principle holds are usually called theories
of transparent truth.
For most disquotationalists, the equivalence between ϕ and Tpϕq has a more-
or-less analytic status. According to Field [22], the statement that ϕ is true is
cognitively equivalent to the statement ϕ itself. For Horwich [46], the instances of
the T-schema jointly exhaust or fix the meaning of the concept of truth.4
Most deflationists explicitly reject type-restrictions (cf. Horwich [46, p. 41], [47,
p. 81]). However, early discussions of deflationism proceeded mostly against the
background of typed theories of truth, usually an axiomatic system based on the
restricted Tarski-biconditionals; only in recent years attention has gradually shifted
to stronger, untyped theories of truth (cf. Halbach & Horsten [39], Halbach [38],
Horsten [45]). The main reason for the initial focus on typed theories seems to be
that philosophers wanted to avoid the intricacies posed by the liar paradox. Though
deflationists realized that the liar will force certain restrictions and exceptions, the
matter was not taken very seriously.
Because of the paradoxes, exceptions must be made for some utterances u that contain
‘true’; I won’t be concerned here with just how the exceptions are to be carved out.
(Field [22, p. 353, fn 1])
There is no reason to suppose that the minimalist answers that are advanced in
this essay could be undermined by any particular constructive solution to the para-
doxes—so we can temporarily set those problems aside. (Horwich [46, p. 42])
In recent years philosophers have come to acknowledge that the liar paradox might
pose a bigger threat to the deflationist (and in particular, the disquotationalist)
account than initially thought (as witnessed e.g. by the collection Beall & Armour-
Garb [2], which is wholly devoted to that problem). Disquotationalism is somewhat
3Field [26, p. 12] gives a more complicated formulation of the Intersubstitutivity Principle ac-
cording to which if two sentences are such that the former is the result of replacing all the
occurrences of the subsentence ϕ in transparent contexts with Tpϕq in the latter, then both
sentences entail each other. For simplicity reasons we will stick to our formulation. In most
cases it is enough and implies this more complex version.
4Field’s theory is also known as ‘pure disquotationalism’, while Horwich’s position is usually
referred to as ‘minimalism’. Horwich actually does not talk about the T-schema but about the
equivalence schema 〈p〉 is true iff p, where p ranges of propositions rather than sentences. This
difference won’t play a big role in our discussion.
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in tension with our desire to have a truth theory based on classical logic. As Tarski’s
undefinability theorem shows, no classical theory that can talk about its own syntax
can accommodate all instances of the T-schema. The desire to keep the unrestricted
T-schema led quite a few philosophers and logicians to propose theories of truth
based on some non-classical logic (e.g. Field [24], [25], [26], Beall [4], Priest [68],
Weir [91], Cobreros et al. [13]). On the other hand, disquotationalists like Horwich
who want to keep to classical logic have come under fire. One of the principal
aims of this thesis is to investigate if and to which extent disquotationalism (and
deflationism in general) is compatible with classical logic.
1.2. Virtual classes
Quine [74] famously argued that in accepting a theory, we accept its ontology; we are
committed to the existence of the objects postulated by the existential statements
of the theory. The truth predicate allows us to engage in class talk without thereby
committing us to the existence of classes. An early example can be found in the work
of Bertrand Russell, long before the first deflationist accounts have been formulated.
After discovering the set-theoretic paradox that now bears his name, Russell tried to
find a new foundation for mathematics. One radical solution, called the ‘no-classes
theory’, was to dispense with classes altogether.
According to the no-classes theory, talk about classes has to be viewed as a façon
de parler. Any statement involving classes must be rephrased in a way that does not
explicitly mention classes. For example, the statement that Socrates is a member of
the class of human beings might be expressed by saying that Socrates is human. The
statement that the class of humans is not empty might be rephrased as ‘There are
human beings’. Working along these lines one can develop the ordinary concepts of
Boolean class algebra (subset, intersection, union, complement etc.) and derive the
laws that govern them. But as Quine [71] observes, one does not get much further
than this, since quantification over classes cannot be mimicked in this way.
A more promising approach was explored by Russell [80] in his substitutional the-
ory of classes and relations from 1906,5 where classes are treated as incomplete and
non-denoting symbols, a method that has its roots in Russell’s analysis of definite
descriptions [78]. On the latter, the proposition ‘The present king of France is bald’
is not analyzed into ‘the present king of France’ (subject) and ‘is bald’ (predicate)
but rather into ‘There is exactly one man who is king of France and that man is
bald’. Assuming that the phrase ‘the present king of France’ has an independent
meaning leads to a “false abstraction”. Russell’s proposal is to treat expressions like
‘the number 1’, ‘the class of wise men’, and ‘the continuum’ as false abstractions
too.
5For a more thorough description of this theory, see Landini [54].
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Russell took the quaternary relation ‘q results from substituting b for a in p’
as primitive (where p, a, b, q are variables that can be bound by a quantifier)—in
symbols p/a; b!q. This might be written in a more transparent way as p(b/a) = q.
Furthermore, let us write p(b/a) for the unique q such that p(b/a) = q. On the
intended reading, the variables range over propositions and individuals. Now, the
proposition Plato is wise is the result of substituting Plato for Socrates in Socrates
is wise.6 Hence, that Plato is a member of the class of wise beings can be expressed
as follows:
The result of substituting Plato for Socrates in Socrates is wise is true.
The above expression is a special case of what we called a singular truth ascription.
The phrase ‘The result of substituting Plato for Socrates in Socrates is wise’ denotes
a proposition; but we need the truth predicate to assert it.
Russell realized that the class {x|x is wise} can be represented by the pair Socrates
is wise/Socrates (which Russell calls a ‘matrix’). More generally, we define
x ∈ p/a iff p(x/a) is true
and
p/a = q/b iff ∀x(x ∈ p/a↔ x ∈ q/b)
The matrix or ‘class’ p/a is an incomplete symbol, governed by contextual def-
initions. A proposition mentioning a matrix (class) is only significant if it can
be rephrased in the basic language, that is if it can be transformed into a state-
ment that does not mention any matrices at all. By using iterated substitutions,
we can also represent relations of higher arity. For example, the binary relation
{(x, y)|x is the father of y} can be represented by the matrix Philipp is the father
of Alexander/Philipp, Alexander. Russell calls a matrix of the form p/a a matrix
of the first type, p/a, b a matrix of the second type, p/a, b, c a matrix of the third
type etc. Membership between classes (of the first and second type) can now be de-
fined by setting p/a ∈ q/b, c iff q(p/b, a/c) is true, and accordingly for membership
between classes of higher types. Russell’s definition of elementhood creates in effect
a simple hierarchy of types. If α is a matrix of type i and β a matrix of type j, then
the expression α ∈ β is significant if and only if j = i + 1. This blocks Russell’s
paradox: the expression p/a /∈ p/a is not significant, as it cannot be reformulated
in the base language.
The usual concepts of set theory can now be developed in a straightforward way.
Russell defines the cardinal 0 as the class of all classes (of the first type) that do
6According to Russell, a proposition like Socrates is wise contains the object Socrates itself rather
than the name or concept Socrates.
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not contain an element, the cardinal 1 as the class of all singletons (of the first
type), 2 as the class of all pairs (of first type) etc. More precisely, choose p and
a such that for all x, p(x/a) is false. For example, let p be the proposition that
Socrates is not identical with Socrates, and let a be Socrates. Then the number
0 may be defined as the matrix {∀x(p(x/a) is false)}/p, a.7 Then for all q, r we
find that the class q/r belongs to 0 if and only if q/r has no members. For the
number 1, choose some matrix p/a that has exactly one member. Then we may
set 1 := {∃y∀x(p(x/a) is true ↔ x = y)}/p, a. One easily verifies that the class 1
contains exactly those classes (of the first type) that have exactly one element.
Russell showed how to reduce existence assumption about sets and propositional
functions to propositions and certain operations on them such as substitution. In-
stead of working with propositions, one can simply work with sentences and open
formulas. For example, suppose that we have a name pσq for every expression σ
of our language and function symbols corresponding to certain syntactic opera-
tions on them. In particular, assume that we have a function symbol s such that
s(pϕ(a)q, pbq) = pϕ(b/a)q. Finally, assume that there is a function (symbol) n that
maps every object x to some standard name n(x). Then, given the uniform T-
biconditional
∀x(Ts(pϕq, n(x))↔ ϕ(x))
the syntactic object pϕq can play the role of the class {x|ϕ(x)}—provided we have
the uniform T-biconditional for the formula ϕ at our disposal.
And here, of course, is where the trouble comes from. A theory that can express
its own syntax (or some relevant part of it) is able to formulate sentences that assert
their own untruth. The T-biconditionals for such sentences render the system incon-
sistent in classical logic. This is actually what happened to Russell’s substitutional
theory of classes and relations. Although it provides a ‘solution’ to the set-theoretic
paradoxes (in the sense that e.g. Russell’s paradox cannot be formulated in the
system), the theory is still inconsistent. The presence of the substitution function
together with a truth predicate and a term-forming operator renders Russell’s the-
ory subject to a liar-like paradox. One of the things that we will be interested in in
this book is the question how much set theory can be developed in a theory of truth
that contains only some instances of the T-schema. As we will see, questions about
the expressive power of truth are closely connected to the question about how much
set theory is encoded in the truth predicate.
Notice that a transparent theory of truth, i.e. a theory based on some non-classical
logic that accommodates all instances of the uniform T-schema in a non-trivial way,
will be able to derive (interpret) all axioms of type theory, by the method sketched
above. However, this ‘achievement’ is massively diminished by the fact that we
cannot reason classically with these axioms. Although we have all axioms of type
7Here, the brackets are a term-forming device that turn a well-formed formula into a term.
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theory available, we cannot even interpret very weak subsystems of second-order
arithmetic in these theories. This shows that the expressive power of a truth theory
does not depend solely on the truth-theoretic axioms but also on the underlying
logic.
1.3. Overview of the thesis
In chapter 2 we fix some preliminary technical matters. In order to study the notion
of truth we need a language that contains names for its expressions and function
symbols for certain operations on these expressions. We follow the tradition and
use the language of Peano arithmetic for that purpose. We assume that the reader
is familiar with that system and use section 2.1 only to fix some terminology. It
is convenient to assume that PA contains function symbols for certain primitive
recursive functions as primitives. The choice of the base language really matters. In
section 2.2 we will show that certain truth-theoretic axioms are inconsistent over PA
when the language contains symbols for some primitive recursive functions, while
they are consistent over PA when the language does not contain these function
symbols among its vocabulary.
As we have seen, any theory of truth has to deal in one way or the other with the
liar and its kind. In chapter 3, we briefly discuss (and argue against) two standard
ways of evading the semantic paradoxes, namely typing (Tarski) and weakening
classical logic (Kripke). Later on, Tarski’s theory will be used to measure the proof-
theoretic strength of type-free theories while Kripke’s theory will form the starting
point for our analysis of the semantic paradoxes. The latter will also serve as
an inspiration for certain axiomatic theories of truth that we will introduce later.
Again, we assume that the reader is familiar with most of the material and use this
chapter only to fix some terminology for later reference. Observation 3.1.2 (which
strengthens an important result by Halbach) should be new, though.
Chapter 4 deals with some problems that the liar poses for classical type-free
truth. We have seen that the main function of the truth predicate is to enable
us to express infinite conjunctions. Several authors claim that the truth predicate
can serve its expressive function only if it is fully disquotational—i.e. it satisfies the
general equivalence between a sentence and its truth predication, which is impossible
in classical logic. We put forward a concise formulation of what it takes for a theory
of truth to enable us to express infinite conjunctions and examine existing truth
theories in this light. We conclude (i) that there is no need to adopt a non-classical
logic—in fact, some non-classical theories of truth are clearly inadequate—and (ii)
that any reasonable classical truth theory should contain T-Out among its principles.
However, Hartry Field [26, chap. 7] has argued that T-Out theories have problems
with expressing agreement and disagreement. In particular, T-Out theories are
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inconsistent with their own global reflection principle (i.e. the statement that all
theorems of S are true), which is usually taken to express the soundness of a theory.
We argue that these problems can be overcome by adopting a revised version of
the global reflection principle, namely the statement that no theorem of S is false
(section 4.3).
Part II is largely devoted to the semantic paradoxes and grounded truth.
In chapter 5 we introduce a game-theoretic semantics for Kripke’s theory of truth.
Strategies in these games can be interpreted as reference-graphs of the sentences in
question. Using that framework, we give a graph-theoretic analysis of the Kripke-
paradoxical sentences. Our proposal is to identify the set of sentences that a sentence
refers to with its dependence set in the sense of Leitgeb [55]. In section 5.2 we first in-
troduce the basic concepts of Leitgeb’s paper on semantic dependence and then show
that Leitgeb’s theory can be treated within the framework of Kripke’s fixed-point
semantics. In section 5.3, we show how to define unique reference-graphs (called
‘sensitivity-graphs’) for those sentences that do possess a canonical dependence set
and prove some theorems concerning (ω-)consistent subsets of the T-schema in terms
of sensitivity. In section 5.4.1 we define a grounding game GG(ϕ, S) such that ϕ is
grounded in S if and only if player (∃) has a winning strategy in the game GG(ϕ, S).
We then show how the strategies available in this game can be used to define an infi-
nite family of reference-graphs for the sentence in question. These reference-graphs
can be seen as a generalization of the sensitivity-graphs of section 5.3. We then
use our machinery to show that a sentence is grounded if and only if it has a well-
founded reference-graph. In section 5.4.2 we define a verification (falsification) game
such that ϕ is true (false) in the fixed-point generated by the partial model F if and
only if player (∃) has a winning strategy in the verification (falsification) game for
ϕ and F . In section 5.4.3 we apply our machinery to obtain some graph-theoretic
descriptions of the Kripke-paradoxical sentences. We show, amongst others, that if
a sentence is Kripke-paradoxical, then each of its reference-graphs contains either a
directed cycle or infinitely many so-called double paths.
In chapter 6 we will search for axiomatizations of the Kripkean fixed points. In
addition to the truth predicate, we will introduce a new primitive predicate symbol
G, intended to express ‘x is grounded’, and provide simultaneous axiomatizations
of groundedness and truth for several Kripkean fixed points. We will provide a list
of grounding axioms that mirror the inductive process by which the fixed points are
generated, plus the T-schema and the compositional axioms for T restricted to G.
The idea is that instead of choosing between equally plausible but jointly inconsistent
truth axioms, we adopt all of them, but restrict them in a uniform manner. We also
introduce a disquotational theory of grounded truth that is inspired by an article of
Horwich. The main part of this section is the analysis of the proof-theoretic strength
of these theories. We will show that the axiom systems for the Weak Kleene, Strong
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Kleene and Leitgeb valuation scheme are able to define the truth predicates of the
Tarskian hierarchy up to (but excluding) level ε0, while the axiom system for the
supervalautional scheme has the full strength of the impredicative theory ID1. The
system based on Horwich’s notion of grounding is conjectured to be conservative
over Peano arithmetic, but I have no proof of this.
We have already seen that the truth predicate allows us to code up sets by formu-
lae, using the translation of Russell discussed in section 1.2. In Part III we investigate
this relationship in a more systematic manner, both from a model-theoretic and a
proof-theoretic point of view.
In chapter 7 we will first show how to canonically associate, with any extension
(interpretation) of the truth predicate (which we call a ‘truth-set’), a structure (in-
terpretation) for the language of second-order arithmetic. Second, we will give a
translation of the language of second-order arithmetic into the language of truth.
We will show that the translation of a second-order sentence is true relative to a
truth-set if and only if the original sentence is true relative to the second-order
structure associated with the truth-set. This correspondence can be used for quite a
few interesting recursion-theoretic and proof-theoretic purposes. We will show that
if S = (S+, S−) is the minimal Kripke fixed point under an appropriate valuation
scheme, then S+ is able to define fixed points of positive operators. This implies
that S+ is Π11-hard and that (N, S+) is a model of (the translation of) the theory
ID1. For the minimal fixed points under the Strong Kleene and the supervalua-
tional scheme, these results have already been shown by Cantini (cf. [10], [11]).
The main innovation here is that our proof also applies to Leitgeb’s theory of truth.
In addition, we relate the minimal Kripke fixed points to the collection of hyper-
arithmetical sets. Finally, we prove some interesting theorems about the theory of
positive disquotation.
In chapter 8 we will show, using techniques from the previous chapter, that the
sets definable over the standard model of the Tarskian hierarchy are precisely the
hyperarithmetic sets. This result has been established previously by Halbach [33].
We give a slightly different proof based on the methods of the previous chapter.
In chapter 9 we utilize the translation to establish the consistency of disquotational
theories of truth that are obtained by translating comprehension axioms into T-
biconditionals. These results show that disquotational theories of truth can be much
stronger than our best compositional theories of truth. In particular, we present
a disquotational theory of truth that interprets full second-order arithmetic, Z−2 .
The minus indicates that free set parameters are not allowed in the comprehension
axioms. Finally, we indicate a method to recover the parameters. In an appendix we
provide some background on ordinal notations, recursion theory and graph theory.
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In order to study the notion of truth, and to put it to use, we need a language that
contains names for its expressions and function symbols for certain operations on
these expressions. We follow the tradition and use the language of Peano arithmetic
for that purpose. We assume that the reader is familiar with that system and
use the next section only to fix some terminology. It is convenient to assume that
PA contains function symbols for certain primitive recursive functions among its
vocabulary. Some interesting effects of that decision are illustrated in the second
section of this chapter.
2.1. Peano arithmetic
The language of Peano arithmetic, LPA, is a first-order language that contains a
denumerably infinite set of individual variables v0, v1, v2, . . ., the connectives ¬,∨
and ∧, the quantifiers ∀ and ∃ and the identity symbol =. We assume that all
other connectives are defined in the usual way. The sole non-logical symbols are
the individual constant 0, the unary function symbol S for the successor function,
the binary function symbols + and · for addition and multiplication, respectively,
and function symbols for certain primitive recursive (p.r.) functions that we are
going to specify in the course of the book. If h is such a p.r. function, we write h.
for the corresponding function symbol. The language LT is obtained from LPA by
augmenting the latter with the unary predicate symbol T .
The theory PA contains the defining axioms for zero, successor, addition, mul-
tiplication and the other p.r. function symbols together with all instances of the
induction axiom scheme
ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x(ϕ(x)→ ϕ(Sx))→ ∀xϕ(x)
where ϕ(x) is a formula of LPA. The theory PAT is obtained from PA by extending
the induction axiom scheme to the full language LT . Notice that PAT is a conser-
vative extension of PA.
If n is a number, we write n for its numeral, i.e. the term that is obtained by
applying the symbol S n-many times to the constant 0. We assume some natu-
ral (standard) Gödelcoding of the expressions of LT . If σ is some expression, we
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write #σ for its code and pσq for the numeral of its code. We occasionally identify
expressions with their codes.
The formulation of the so-called uniform T-schema involves some subtleties, to
which we now turn. Let ski (m,n) = #ϕ(n/xj), provided that m = #ϕ is a formula
with exactly k free variables and xj is its i-th free variable (according to the index
ordering). The functions ski are primitive recursive and will be represented by the
symbols s.
k
i (with a subdot). Given ϕ := ϕ(x, y, z) with exactly x, y, z free and
index(x) < index(y) < index(z), we write pϕ(ẋ, ẏ, ż)q for s.
1
1(s.
2
2(s.
3
3(pϕq, z), y), x), and
similarily for formulae with n free variables. We often write s. instead of s.
1
1. Then
the uniform T-schema can be written as
∀x1 . . . ∀xn(Tpϕ(ẋ1 . . . ẋn)q↔ ϕ(x1, . . . , xn))
Furthermore, we assume that LPA contains the unary function symbols ¬. and T.
and the binary function symbols =. ,∧. ,∨. ,∀. such that the following is derivable for
all terms s, t and formulae ϕ, ψ:
` psq=. ptq = ps = tq
` ¬. pϕq = p¬ϕq
` pϕq∧. pψq = pϕ ∧ ψq
` pϕq∨. pψq = pϕ ∨ ψq
` ∀. (pviq, pϕq) = p∀viϕq
` T. t = pTtq
The evaluation function val that applied to (the code of) a closed term t gives the
value (denotation) of t is primitive recursive and will be represented by the formula
y◦ = x.
We let SentT (x) naturally represent the set of (codes of) LT -sentences, FmT (x)
the set of LT -formulae, ClTerm(x) the set of closed terms and V ar(x) the set of
variables. We let SentPA(x) represent the set of LPA-sentences and FmPA(x) the set
of LPA-formulae. We write ∀tϕ instead of ∀x(ClTerm(x)→ ϕ) and ∀vϕ instead of
∀x(V ar(x)→ ϕ). Furthermore, we write e.g. ∀tTpϕ(t.)q instead of ∀x(ClTerm(x)→
Ts.(pϕq, x)). Again, this definition is extended to multi-variable cases in an obvious
way. Then we can write a slightly stronger form of the uniform T-schema
∀t1 . . . ∀tn(Tpϕ(t1. , . . . , tn. )q↔ ϕ(t
◦
1, . . . , t
◦
n))
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For more details on this notation, I refer the reader to Cantini [11] or Halbach [38].
We assume some standard coding for ordinals < Γ0 and let OT (x) represent the
set (of codes) of ordinal terms. If α is an ordinal, we write α for the numeral of its
code. We write ∀αϕ for ∀x(OT (x) → ϕ). We let ≺ represent the ordering of the
ordinals in PA. PAT proves transfinite induction for every δ < ε0, i.e. for all ϕ ∈ LT
and all δ < ε0, PAT proves:
∀α(∀β ≺ αϕ(β)→ ϕ(α))→ ∀ζ ≺ δϕ(ζ).
Unless otherwise specified, all axiomatic theories in this book are classical. Thus
they are fully determined by specifying their non-logical axioms (and non-logical
rules).
Standard models of LT have the form (N, S), where N is the standard model
of PA and S ⊆ ω interprets the truth predicate T . Let V alS(ϕ) = 1 if and only
if (N, S)  ϕ, where  is the classical satisfaction relation, and let V alS(ϕ) = 0
otherwise. On occasion we also write ϕS for V alS(ϕ).
The most common way to compare axiomatic theories is by relative interpreta-
tions. Roughly, a theory T relatively interprets a theory S iff there is a translation
from LS to LT that preserves logical structure of the formulae, possibly relativizing
quantifiers, such that T proves the translations of all theorems of S. The defini-
tion of a relative interpretation becomes more complicated if languages containing
function symbols are considered; we omit an explicit definition and refer the reader
to Halbach [38, ch. 6]. In this book, we will further demand that relative inter-
pretations leave the arithmetical vocabulary untouched, with the possible exception
of renaming of variables. This implies that if T relatively interprets S, then all
arithmetical theorems of the latter will also be provable in the former theory.
Fujimoto [29] has given a more fine-grained notion of interpretability in order to
compare axiomatic theories of truth.
Assume that S and T are theories of truth (extending Peano arithmetic) formu-
lated in the languages LS and LT respectively. Assume that LS = LPA∪{Ti|i ∈ I},
where {Ti|i ∈ I} is the set of truth predicates of LS for some index set I. We
say that T defines the truth predicate(s) of S iff for every i ∈ I there is a formula
ϕi(x) ∈ LT such that the result of uniformly substituting ϕi(x) for Ti in a theorem
of S is a theorem of T .
More precisely, given a formula ϕi(x) of LT for each i ∈ I, we define a function
h~ϕ from LS to LT as follows:
h~ϕ(ψ) =

ψ, if ψ is an atomic formula of LPA
ϕi(x), if ψ = Ti(x)
¬h~ϕ(χ), if ψ = ¬χ
h~ϕ(χ1) ∧ h~ϕ(χ2), if ψ = χ1 ∧ χ2
∀xh~ϕ(χ), if ψ = ∀xχ
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Then we say that T defines the truth predicate(s) of S iff there are formulae ϕi(x)
of LT for each i ∈ I such that S ` ψ implies T ` h~ϕ(ψ) for all ψ ∈ LS .
If T defines the truth predicate(s) of S, then T relatively interprets S. Since
we assume that relative interpretations leave arithmetical vocabulary unchanged
(except for renaming variables), this means T will prove all arithmetical theorems
of S.
2.2. Weak and strong diagonalization
All recursive functions are strongly represented in Peano arithmetic, but the lan-
guage of Peano arithmetic (as we find it in most textbooks) does not contain function
symbols for most of these functions. However, in investigating truth-theoretic ax-
ioms, one often works in a definitional expansion of Peano arithmetic. For example,
in stating certain axioms it is often convenient to have in our language a symbol ¬.
for the function that sends the code of a sentence to the code of its negation. In
the present section we will show that the choice of the base language really matters.
More precisely, we will show that certain truth-theoretic axioms are inconsistent
over PA when the language contains symbols for some primitive recursive functions,
while they are consistent over PA when the language does not contain these function
symbols amongst its vocabulary.
The usual way of achieving a self-referential sentence in the language of Peano
arithmetic is by appeal to Gödel’s diagonal lemma.
Proposition 2.2.1 (Diagonal lemma). For every formula ϕ(x) of LPA− with exactly
x free, there exists a sentence ψ of LPA− such that PA− ` ψ ↔ ϕ(pψq).
Here, PA− is the theory of Peano arithmetic formulated in the language LPA− with
signature {0, S,+,×}.
Proof. Let f : ω → ω by defined as follows. f(n) = #ϕ(n), if n is the code of
ϕ(x), and f(n) = 0 otherwise. Then f is recursive. Thus f is represented in PA−
by a formula f ◦(x, y). Now let some formula ϕ(x) be given. Let θ be the formula
∃x(f ◦(y, x) ∧ ϕ(x)), and let ψ be the formula θ(pθq). Then f(#θ) = #θ(pθq) = #ψ.
Hence PA− proves f ◦(pθq, pψq). From this it follows that PA− ` ψ ↔ ϕ(pψq).
Intuitively, it is the sentence on the left-hand side of the biconditional that is self-
referential and not the one on the right-hand side. The right-hand side ϕ(pψq) refers
only to ψ (i.e. mentions it), but not to ϕ(pψq). The sentence on the left-hand
side refers to itself by way of definite description. For it is the only object that
satisfies the formula f ◦(pθq, x). One paragraph after introducing the sentence that
now bears his name, Gödel writes: “We are therefore confronted with a proposition
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which asserts its own provability.” This remark is accompanied by the following
footnote:
In spite of appearances, there is nothing circular about such a proposition, since it
begins by asserting the unprovability of a wholly determinate proposition [...], and
only subsequently (and in some way by accident) does it emerge that this formula is
precisley that by which the proposition was itself expressed. ([30, p. 41, fn 15])
Self-reference by way of definite description is therefore more similar to what peo-
ple sometimes call contingent self-reference in natural language. (As an example,
suppose that the only sentence written on the blackboard in room 223, Ludwigstr.
31, Munich, at 12 a.m. on August 31, 2014 is ‘The only sentence written on the
blackboard in room 223, Ludwigstr. 31, Munich, at 12 a.m. on August 31, 2014 is
false’.)
In his 2007 paper ‘Self-reference and the Language of Arithmetic’, Richard Heck
[40] observes that there are some intuitively inconsistent principles of truth that are
actually consistent in the standard language. He convincingly argues that true self-
reference can only be achieved by expanding the standard language of arithmetic
with function symbols for certain primitive recursive functions. Let us have a look
at his example. Consider the following two truth-theoretic principles:
• Tp¬ϕq↔ ¬Tpϕq (Neg)
• TpTtq↔ Tt (T-Sym)
Heck provides a standard model for both principles (taken together), but argues
that they should be inconsistent as follows. Suppose there were a term s such that
l = p¬T lq is provable. This would be a formal representative of the ordinary Liar
sentence
The Liar: The Liar is not true.
in our arithmetical language. Then we reach a contradiction as follows:
TpT lq↔ T l, (T-Sym)
↔ Tp¬T lq, substitution of identicals
↔ ¬TpT lq, (Neg)
Terms like l become available once we enrich the language of arithmetic with func-
tions symbols for certain primitive recursive functions (and appropriate axioms gov-
ering them). Let PA be the result of this expansion. Notice that PA conservatively
extends PA−. Then we get:
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Proposition 2.2.2 (Strong diagonal lemma). For every formula ϕ(x) of LPA with
exactly x free, there exists a term t of LPA such that PA ` t = pϕ(t)q.
Proof. Given ϕ(x), let t := s.(pϕ(s.(x, x))q, pϕ(s.(x, x))q), where s. is defined as in
section 2.1. Now observe that
s.(pϕ(s.(x, x))q, pϕ(s.(x, x))q) = pϕ(s.(pϕ(s.(x, x))q, pϕ(s.(x, x))q)q = pϕ(t)q
Heck concludes “[t]rue self-reference is possible only if we expand the language to
include function symbols for all primitive recursive functions. This language is
therefore the natural setting for investigations of self-reference.” ([40, p. 1])
The strong diagonal lemma seems to have made its first appearance in Jeroslow
[48]. There he shows that one of Löb’s derivability conditions can be dropped in
the proof of Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem once we work in the expanded
language LPA.
The example presented by Heck is not an isolated case. Cain & Damnjanovic [9]
have shown (fifteen years prior to the publication of Heck’s paper) that the mini-
mal Kripke fixed point under the Weak Kleene scheme (see section 3.2) is reached
already after ω-many steps resp. only after ωCK1 -many steps, depending on which
Gödelcoding is chosen (and that therefore, the recursion-theoretic complexitiy of
the fixed points depends essentially one the chosen Gödelcoding). Here is another
example that I have found.
Proposition 2.2.3. The scheme
(†) Tp¬Ttq↔ ¬Tt
is inconsistent over PA.
Proof. By strong diagonalization, there is a term l such that
PA ` l = p¬T lq.
Now we instantiate (†) to l. Thus we get
Tp¬T lq↔ ¬T l.
By substitution of equals
Tp¬T lq↔ ¬Tp¬T lq,
a contradiction. Hence (†) is inconsistent over PA.
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Next we show the consistency of (†) over PA−. Let L−T be the language of Peano
arithmetic with signature {S,+, ·, 0}∪{T}. The logical vocabulary comprises ¬,∨,∀
and =. All other connectives are defined in the usual way. Let 〈n1, . . . , nk〉 :=
pn1+11 · . . . p
nk+1
k , where pi is the i-th prime number. Let t
N be the denotation of the
term t in the standard model. Notice that the denotation function for terms of L−T
is primitive recursive.
Let g be some p.r. Gödelcoding (for L−T ). Define the Gödelcoding g+ by recursion
as follows:
g+(t) :=
{
〈tN, g(t)〉, if t is a closed term
〈0, g(t)〉, otherwise
g+(s = t) := 〈0, g+(s), g+(t)〉
g+(Tt) := 〈1, g+(t)〉
g+(¬ϕ) := 〈2, g+(ϕ)〉
g+(ϕ ∨ ψ) := 〈3, g+(ϕ), g+(ψ)〉
g+(∀xϕ) := 〈4, g+(x), g+(ϕ)〉
Proposition 2.2.4. 1. tN < g+(t), where t is a closed term.
2. g+(t) < g+(Tt) < g+(¬Tt), where t is a closed term. Thus, it follows that
there are no term fixed points under g+.
Proposition 2.2.4 is immediate from the construction of g+. Notice that g+ is prim-
itive recursive. Let e be an enumeration of {¬Tt|t is a closed term} such that i < j
iff g+(ei) < g
+(ej). Let ¬Tti := ei.
Proposition 2.2.5. If i 6 j, then ti cannot denote ¬Ttj, i.e. tNi 6= g+(¬Ttj).
Proof. Case 1: i = j. By proposition 2.2.4 we have tNi < g
+(ti) < g
+(¬Tti).
Case 2: i < j. We have g+(¬Tti) < g+(¬Ttj) by definition of e. The claim follows
because tNi < g
+(¬Tti) by Proposition 2.2.4.
Proposition 2.2.6. The scheme (†) is consistent over PA−.
Proof. Let e and g+ be as above.
Let Γ0 = ∅.
Let Γi+1 =
{
Γi ∪ {g+(¬Tti)}, if (N,Γi)  ¬Tti
Γi, otherwise
Finally, let Γ =
⋃
i∈ω Γi
We show that (N,Γ)  Tp¬Ttiq↔ ¬Tti for all i ∈ ω.
Assume (1) (N,Γ)  ¬Tti in order to show (2) (N,Γ)  Tp¬Ttiq. Since the Γn are
monotone, it follows that (N,Γn)  ¬Tti for all n. In particular we have (N,Γi)  ¬Tti.
Thus by definition g+(¬Tti) ∈ Γi+1 ⊆ Γ. Thus (2) is proved.
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Converse direction: Let (3) (N,Γ)  Tp¬Ttiq and assume for the sake of contra-
diction that (4) (N,Γ)  Tti. From (3) and the definition of the Γj we conclude that
(5) (N,Γi)  ¬Tti. From (4) and the construction we conclude that tNi = g+(¬Ttj)
and (N,Γj)  ¬Ttj for some j < ω. Thus g+(¬Ttj) ∈ Γj+1. But by Proposi-
tion 2.2.5 we have j < i, hence j + 1 6 i and Γj+1 ⊆ Γi by construction. Thus
(N,Γi)  Tg+(¬Ttj). But this contradicts (5), since tNi = g+(¬Ttj).
This completes the proof.
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Most philosophers view the T-schema as capturing something very important about
the concept of truth. Disquotationalist make an even stronger claim:“the basic facts
(i.e. the axioms of the theory that explains every other fact about truth) will all be
instances of the above schema.”1 Let NT be the theory consisting of the axioms of
PA plus all instances of the T-schema, Tpϕq↔ ϕ, where ϕ is a sentence of LT . The
acronym NT stands for ‘naive truth’.
Proposition 3.0.7. The theory NT is inconsistent.
Proof. By the diagonal lemma, there is a sentence λ—a liar sentence—such that PA
proves λ↔ ¬Tpλq. By classical logic, the latter is equivalent to ¬(Tpλq↔ λ). This
contradicts the T-biconditional for λ, which is an axiom of NT.
In order to block the derivation of the contradiction we are basically faced with two
options. First, we can reject some inference rules of classical logic. It is known that
weakening classical logic to intuitionistic logic is not enough (cf. Feferman [19])—so
this option will have severe costs. Second, we can reject some instances of the T-
schema. Both routes subdivide. An important subdivision of the second path is
typing, which we discuss first.
3.1. Typing. Tarski’s hierarchy
A very cautios way of restricting the T-schema, going back to Tarski, is to eschew
all sentences that contain an occurrence of the truth predicate. This results in the
theory TB (for ‘Tarski-biconditionals’, or sometimes DT for ‘disquotational theory’).
TB is the classical theory whose axioms are those of the base theory PAT plus all
instances of the T-schema, Tpϕq ↔ ϕ, where ϕ is a sentence of the base language
LPA (i.e. a T-free sentence). It is not hard to prove that TB is consistent; in fact,
it is conservative over PAT. TB is a typed theory of truth: it cannot prove the truth
of a single sentence containing the truth predicate itself.2
1Horwich [47, p. 76]. Horwich actually does not talk about the T-schema but about the equiv-
alence scheme—〈p〉 is true iff p, where p ranges of propositions rather than sentences. This
difference won’t play a big role in our discussion.
2Cf. Halbach [38, chap. 10] for a short discussion of how to classify truth theories into typed and
untyped (type-free) ones.
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One of the main purposes of a truth theory is to facilitate the expression of
generalizations. Does TB help us here? That question is taken up in Halbach [36]
(see also Halbach [38, chap. 7]). His main result is the following:
Proposition 3.1.1 (Halbach). Let ϕ(x) be a T -free formula and let S be the set
of all sentences of the form ϕ(pψq) → ψ, where ψ is a T-free sentence. Then the
theories S + PAT and TB + ∀x(ϕ(x)→ Tx) have the same T-free consequences.
Halbach remarks: “I take the result to be an exact formulation of the disquotation-
alist claim that infinite conjunctions can be expressed in a language containing a
truth predicate which is characterized by the Tarskian equivalences. The infinite set
ϕ(pψq)→ ψ of axioms replaces the infinite conjunction; therefore it can be avoided
in order to introduce a formal system for a language comprising infinite conjunc-
tions.” ([36, p. 14]) Halbach’s result shows that infinite conjunctions understood
as sets of sentences of the form ϕ(pψq)→ ψ can be replaced by a single sentence of
the form ∀x(ϕ(x)→ Tx) in the presence of the restricted T-schema. Of course, TB
only allows us to express infinite conjunctions of sentences that do not contain the
truth predicate itself.
Proposition 3.1.1 can be strengthened. Let TO be the result of augmenting PAT
with all instances of T-Out,
Tpψq→ ψ,
where ψ is again a sentence not containing the truth predicate. We will show that
the above proposition still holds when the theory TB is replaced by the weaker
theory TO. The observation is important in so far as it shows that, contrary to
what most people might expect, the full T-biconditionals are not needed to express
generalizations (at least so long as we understand ‘express generalizations’ in the
way Halbach suggests): the left-to-right direction suffices.
Observation 3.1.2. Let ϕ(x) be a T -free formula and let S be the set of all sentences
of the form ϕ(pψq) → ψ, where ψ is a T-free sentence. Then the theories S + PAT
and TO + ∀x(ϕ(x)→ Tx) have the same T-free consequences.
Proof. Clearly, if χ is a T-free consequence of TO + ∀x(ϕ(x) → Tx), then χ is
also a consequence of TB + ∀x(ϕ(x) → Tx), because TO is a subtheory of TB.
Thus, by proposition 3.1.1, χ is also a consequence of S + PAT. Now let χ be a
consequence of S + PAT. Then only finitely many sentences in S have been used
in the proof. Clearly, all of them follow from ∀x(ϕ(x) → Tx) plus the relevant
instances of T-Out.
A common complaint about TB, dating back to Tarski [89, p. 257], is that TB does
not allow us to prove any non-trivial generalizations. For many philosophers, the
deductive weakness has been a motivation to embrace a compositional theory truth
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such as CT. The theory CT is obtained by turning the inductive clauses of Tarski’s
truth definition into axioms.
Definition 3.1.3. The system CT is given by the axioms of PAT plus the following
five axioms:
1. ∀s∀t(T (s=. t)↔ s◦ = t◦)
2. ∀x(SentPA(x)→ (T (¬. x)↔ ¬Tx))
3. ∀x∀y(SentPA(x∧. y)→ (T (x∧. y)↔ T (x) ∧ T (y)))
4. ∀x∀y(SentPA(x∨. y)→ (T (x∨. y)↔ T (x) ∨ T (y)))
5. ∀x∀v(SentPA(∀.vx)→ (T (∀.vx)↔ ∀tT (x(t/v))))
CT does prove certain generalizations; for example, it proves the global reflection
principle for PA, i.e. the claim that all theorems of Peano arithmetic are true. The
latter implies the consistency statement for PA. Therefore, by Gödel’s second incom-
pleteness theorem, CT is not conservative over PA. CT is actually much stronger
than the consistency statement for PA: CT relatively interprets the second-order
theory ACA.3 The system ACA, in turn, is able to define the truth predicate of CT
(cf. Takeuti [88]).
CT is still a typed theory of truth: the compositional axioms are restricted to
sentences of the base language LPA. For example, CT proves that 1 = 1 is true, but
it does not prove that ‘1 = 1 is true’ is true. At this point, we could either move to an
untyped theory that allows us to apply the truth predicate to sentences containing
the truth predicate. Or we stick to the Tarskian solution and introduce a second
truth predicate, T1, together with axioms that allow us to apply T1 to sentences
containing the original truth predicate T but that do not license the application of
T1 to sentences containing the new predicate. Such a theory would allow us e.g. to
prove Tp1 = 1q and T1pTp1 = 1qq, but, again, not that the latter is true. In order to
prove the latter, we might introduce a third truth predicate, T2, with corresponding
axioms that allow us to prove T2pT1pTp1 = 1qqq. There is, of course, no need to stop
here. We can introduce a predicate Tn for every natural number n; and once we
have done this, we can iterate this construction into the transfinite. Of course, since
we want to be able to reason about the syntax of this theory within PA, we should
only expand this hierarchy along some computable well-ordering and probably only
along well-orderings whose well-foundedness can be proved within the base theory
(or within any of the theories that we have already added on top of the base theory).
3A definition of ACA can be found in the Appendix. For a proof of the claim we refer the reader
to Halbach [38].
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In chapter 8 we will consider Tarski hierarchies of height ωCK1 (=the least non-
recursive ordinal, called the ‘Church-Kleene ordinal’), but in our proof-theoretic
investigations we will only consider hierarchies of height (at most) Γ0 (=the least
strongly critical ordinal, called the ‘Feferman-Schütte ordinal’). More details on
the coding of ordinals can be found in the appendix. The formalization of Tarski’s
hierarchy presented below is, to my knowledge, due to Halbach [34]. The acronym
RT stands for ‘ramified truth’. Let LγT be the language of Peano arithmetic aug-
mented with truth predicates Tα for every α ≺ γ, and let Sentγ(x) be a formula
that naturally represents the sentences of LγT .
Definition 3.1.4. The system RTγ is given by the axioms of PA with full induction
in the language LγT plus the following axioms, for all α ≺ γ:
1. ∀s∀t(Tα(s=. t)↔ s◦ = t◦)
2. ∀x(Sentα(x)→ (Tα(¬. x)↔ ¬Tαx))
3. ∀x∀y(Sentα(x∧. y)→ (Tα(x∧. y)↔ Tα(x) ∧ Tα(y)))
4. ∀x∀y(Sentα(x∨. y)→ (Tα(x∨. y)↔ Tα(x) ∨ Tα(y)))
5. ∀x∀v(Sentα(∀.vx)→ (Tα(∀.vx)↔ ∀tTα(x(t/v))))
6. ∀t(Sentβ(t◦)→ (Tα(Tβ. (t))↔ Tβ(t
◦))) for β ≺ α
7. ∀t∀β ≺ α(Sentβ(t◦)→ (Tα(Tβ. (t))↔ Tα(t
◦)))
The theory CT is just RT1. RT has some proof-theoretic power. Let RAα be the
system of ramified analysis up to level α (cf. Feferman [18]).
Theorem 3.1.5 (Feferman [20]). RTα and RAα are proof-theoretically equivalent.
The systems RAα are ‘semi-formal’ systems, containing infinitary limit generalization
rules, and are therefore not very attractive. Halbach [34] has given a match up
between the systems RAα and the systems (Π
0
1 − CA)ω·α.
The Tarskian solution of the paradoxes has been critizised on several grounds. One
complaint is that typing is ad hoc and only motivated by the desire to evade the
paradoxes. A second objection is that truth is a univocal concept that is fragmented
in the Tarskian approach, or that typing (indexing) is not found in natural language.
I do not find these arguments very compelling. As Carnap has taught us, “The
explicatum is to be similar to the explicandum in such a way that, in most cases in
which the explicandum has so far been used, the explicatum can be used; however,
close similarity is not required, and considerable differences are permitted” ([12, p.
7]), namely when the divergence is justified by the fruitfulness and simplicity of
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the explicatum. An explication or regimentation does not have to respect all the
features that an idiom exhibits in natural language. Naturalness is something that
we cherish, of course, but as long the solution is fruitful and satisfies our needs, we
should be content with it. (Moreover, intuitions about the paradoxical statements
differ widely.)
The problem with the Tarskian solution, then, is not that it is artifical or ad hoc;
the problem is that typed truth predicates simply do not satisfy our needs. RTΓ0
does not allow us to express certain generalizations that we would like to express.
Let Φ ⊆ LΓ0T be some set of theorems of RTΓ0 , represented in PA by the formula
ϕ(x); and assume that the truth predicates (i.e. their indices) occurring in Φ are
unbound in Γ0. (For example, let Φ be the set of all sentences of the form ψ → ψ.)
Then no matter which index α we choose, the sentence ∀x(ϕ(x)→ Tα(x)) will fail to
express the infinite conjunction of the members of Φ. But one of the main reasons
why we want to have a truth predicate in the first place is our desire to capture
infinite sets of sentences by a single sentence. In particular, we would like to express
agreement with our own theory. In order to formulate a global reflection principle for
the Tarskian hierarchy of, say, level α, we have to move one level up in the hierarchy.
Of course, we can go still a bit beyond Γ0, but there will be a point at which the
hierarchy becomes unmanagable (if we want a boundedly recursive hierarchy (cf.
Appendix), i.e. a hierarchy along a well-ordering such that all ots initial segments
are recursive, then ωCK1 is the halting point).
3.2. Non-classical solutions. Kripke fixed points
The most influential approach to break the binds of the Tarskian hierarchy is
Kripke’s ‘Outline of a theory of truth’ [53], to which we now turn. Although we will
argue that non-classical solutions are ultimately unsatisfactory, we present Kripke’s
approach in some detail because his models will be very helpful in providing an
analysis of the paradoxes, as a guidance in devising axiomatic truth theories, and
in giving consistency proofs for them.
Kripke follows the widely shared view that the liar sentence does not succeed
in expressing a proposition, or lacks a definite truth value. If we do not ban such
sentences from our language, we need a framework for reasoning with them. Partial
models provide such a framework.
Definition 3.2.1. A partial model for LT is a pair S = (S+, S−), where S+, S− ⊆
SentT . S
+ is called the extension and S− is called the anti-extension of the truth
predicate under S. We write (slightly abusing notation) S1 ⊆ S2 iff S+1 ⊆ S+2 and
S−1 ⊆ S−2 . A partial model is consistent iff S+ ∩ S− = ∅. A partial valuation is a
function from SentT → {0, 1, 12}. A valuation scheme V is a function from partial
models to partial valuations.
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Let us introduce some of the valuation schemes that will be important later on. The
Strong Kleene valuation scheme VSK is defined by induction as follows.
1. VSK(S)(s = t) =
{
1, if sN = tN
0, if sN 6= tN
2. VSK(S)(Tt) =

1, if tN ∈ S+
0, if tN ∈ S−or tN /∈ SentT
1
2
, otherwise
3. VSK(S)(¬ϕ) = 1− VSK(S)(ϕ)
4. VSK(S)(ϕ ∧ ψ) = min{VSK(S)(ϕ), VSK(S)(ψ)}
5. VSK(S)(∀xϕ) = min{VSK(S)(ϕ(t/x))|t is a closed term}
Under the Strong Kleene scheme, the value 1
2
can be interpreted as ‘indeterminate’
or ‘unknown’.
The Weak Kleene valuation scheme VWK is defined exactly as the Strong Kleene
scheme, except that one uses the non-standard order (1
2
, 0, 1) for the computation of
the minimum in the clauses for the conjunction and the quantifier. Under the Weak
Kleene scheme, the value 1
2
is best understood as ‘meaningless’ or ‘non-sense’.
Call a set P ⊆ ω consistent iff #ϕ ∈ P implies #¬ϕ /∈ P . The supervaluational
valuation scheme VFV is defined as follows.
VFV (S)(ϕ) =

1, if for all consistent P ⊇ S+ : (N, P )  ϕ
0, if for all consistent P ⊇ S+ : (N, P )  ¬ϕ
1
2
, otherwise
.
A valuation scheme V is monotonic iff for all partial models S1, S2 with S1 ⊆ S2 we
have: if V (S1)(ϕ) = 1, then V (S2)(ϕ) = 1 and if V (S1)(ϕ) = 0, then V (S2)(ϕ) = 0.
All of the valuation schemes introduced above are monotonic. The classical valuation
Val, on the other hand, is not.
Definition 3.2.2. Let S be a partial model and V a valuation scheme. The Kripke-
jump of S (relative to V ) is defined as follows: JV (S) = (JV (S)+,JV (S)−), where
JV (S)+ = {#ϕ|V (S)(ϕ) = 1}
JV (S)− = {#ϕ|V (S)(ϕ) = 0} ∪ {n|n /∈ SentT}
In the Kripke-jump of S, every sentences that receicves value 1 in S is declared true,
and every sentences that receives value 0 in S is declared untrue.
Theorem 3.2.3 (Kripke). If V is a monotonic valuation scheme then the operator
JV is monotone, i.e. S1 ⊆ S2 implies JV (S1) ⊆ JV (S2).
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This is proved by induction on the complexity of formulae. The monotonicity of
JV implies that there are fixed points, i.e. partial models S with S = JV (S). This
follows from a simple cardinality argument. These fixed points can be ‘reached from
below’ as follows:
Definition 3.2.4. For each ordinal α and partial model S = (S+, S−) we inductively
define the partial model J αV (S) by transfinite recursion as follows.
1. J 0V (S) = S
2. J α+1V (S) = JV (J αV (S))
3. J γV (S) = (
⋃
α<γ J αV (S)+,
⋃
α<γ J αV (S)−), if γ is a limit ordinal
Call a partial model S sound iff S ⊆ JV (S). The partial model (∅,∅) is trivially
sound.
Theorem 3.2.5 (Kripke). If V is a monotonic valuation scheme and S is sound
then there is an α such that J αV (S) = J α+1V (S). We denote this fixed point by
J∞V (S).
The minimal Kripke fixed point of JV is the pair J∞V ((∅,∅)), which (by slight
abuse of notation) we simply denote by J∞V (∅). Accordingly, the extension (anti-
extension) of the truth predicate in the minimal fixed point is denoted by J∞V (∅)+
(J∞V (∅)−).
Much of the interest that we have in fixed-point models derives from the following
property:
Theorem 3.2.6 (Kripke). If S = JV (S), then
V (S)(Tpϕq) = V (S)(ϕ)
for all ϕ ∈ LT .
In a fixed point, the sentences with value 1 are exactly those sentences that are in
the extension of the truth predicate and the sentences with value 0 are exactly those
sentences that are in the anti-extension of the truth predicate. In a certain sense,
then, Kripke provides us with a model theory for languages, based on a non-classical
logic, that can represent their own truth predicate.
Besides that, Kripke also gave very useful definitions of groundedness and para-
doxicality. We will study these concepts extensively in Part II of this book.
Definition 3.2.7. A sentence ϕ is grounded (relative to V ) iff ϕ has a definite truth
value in the minimal fixed point of JV , i.e. iff V (J∞V (∅))(ϕ) ∈ {0, 1}. A sentence
ϕ is Kripke-paradoxical (relative to V ) iff there is no fixed point S of JV such that
ϕ has a definite truth value in S.
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Definition 3.2.8. A valuation scheme V is classically sound iff for all consistent
partial models S = (S+, S−) and all sentences ϕ the following holds: if V (S)(ϕ) ∈
{0, 1}, then V (S)(ϕ) = V alS+(ϕ).
The classical model (N,J∞V (S)+) is called the ‘close off’ of the partial model J∞V (S).
Proposition 3.2.9. If V is monotone and classically sound and S is a sound partial
model, then
(N,J∞V (S)+)  Tpϕq↔ ϕ
for all ϕ ∈ S+ ∪ S−.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 3.2.6 and the definition of a classically sound
evaluation scheme.
In particular, Proposition 3.2.9 implies that the T-schema for all grounded sentences
is ω-consistent in classical logic. We will return to that later.
Philosophers have paid much attention to the ‘internal’ theory of the minimal
Strong Kleene fixed point, KFS ([26], [86]). KFS is the theory consisting of all the
sentences that have value 1 in the minimal Strong Kleene fixed point, i.e. KFS =
JSK(∅)+. It is a paracomplete theory; it is based on the logic K3 in which the law of
exluded middle does not hold. By the compositionality of the Strong Kleene scheme
and Theorem 3.2.6, KFS satisfies the Intersubstitutivity Principle.
KFS has been critizised for several reasons. First, although it satisfies the Inter-
subsitutivity Principle, it does not satisfy the unrestricted T-schema. In fact, it does
not satisfy any of its two directions: From Tpϕq→ ϕ we would get, by Intersubsti-
tutivity, ϕ→ ϕ. But this is equivalent to ¬ϕ ∨ ϕ, which does not hold in K3.4 For
the same reason, ϕ → Tpϕq does not hold. But keeping the unrestricted T-schema
seems to be the raison d’être for abandoning classical logic. A second weakness of
KFS is that it lacks a decent conditional. As already remarked, we don’t have ϕ→ ϕ
in K3. In Feferman’s [19] words, “nothing like sustained ordinary reasoning can be
carried on in [this] logic.” Third, KFS is unable to express that the liar sentence is
‘gappy’ (neither true nor false) or otherwise defective. Fourth, KFS is not a theory
in the true sense of the word. From a recursion-theoretic point of view, the theory
KFS is very complex:5
Theorem 3.2.10 (Kripke, Burgess [8]). The set J∞SK(∅)+ is Π11-complete.
4Notice that supervaluational fixed points do not satisfy Intersubstitutivity, albeit they satisfy
Theorem 3.2.6! This is because all classical tautologies hold under the supervaluational scheme.
5See the appendix for some background on recursion theory. A proof of the result is given in
chapter 7.
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The theory KFS is therefore not recursively axiomatizable. There is now a lively
research activity, initiated by Hartry Field [26], that tries to improve KFS by adding a
conditional that is not defined in terms of negation and disjunction (these approaches
are even more complex than Kripke’s fixed points). I won’t go into the details of
these approaches, but sketch three reasons why I think that non-classical truth
theories are ultimately unsatisfactory.
One difference between classical and non-classical truth theorists is with respect
to the acceptance of the T-schema. Classical truth theorists have to reject—in fact,
accept the negation of—certain instances of the T-schema: if λ is a liar sentence,
then ¬(Tpλq ↔ λ) will already be provable in PA. Non-classical truth theorists,
on the other hand, will accept the unrestricted T-schema—keeping the unrestricted
T-schema (or the general equivalence between a sentence and its truth predication)
is the raison d’être for abandoning classical logic. One reason against adopting all
instances of the T-schema is the so-called revenge phenomenon.6
Consider, again, the liar paradox, i.e. a sentence that says of itself that it is not
true. A common response to the antinomy is to declare that the liar sentence is
neither true nor false. But then there is an obvious problem: since the liar is neither
true nor false, it is in particular not true. But this is just what the liar sentence
says. Thus, if we accept the equivalence of any sentence and its truth predication,
then the assumption that the liar sentence is neither true nor false leads us to the
conclusion that the liar sentence is true after all. A truth theory based on rejection
of bivalence is therefore either bound to be inconsistent or it won’t be able to express
the defectiveness of the liar within the object language. Now, a common reaction is
to introduce a new predicate—say, ‘defective’—and declare that the liar falls under
that predicate. But then a new paradox will emerge: consider a sentence that says
of itself that it is either untrue or defective. The latter is a so-called revenge-liar.
The existence of revenge liars is usually taken to show that the original liar paradox
has not been solved properly. As far as I can see, the revenge phenomenon is a
problem that pertains exclusively to non-classical solutions: it is generated by the
adherence to the general equivalence of a sentence and its truth predication. There
is no problem with saying ‘The liar is not true’, unless this forces me to say “The
liar is not true’ is true’. And I am only forced to say the latter if I adhere to
the unrestricted equivalence of a sentence and its truth predication. Classical truth
theorists, on the other hand, do not face this problem. They can consistently declare
the liar to be neither true nor false, using the very same vocabulary which was used
to formulate the liar sentence. And the reason why the assumption that the liar
sentence is neither true nor false won’t lead to a contradiction lies simply in the fact
that by rejecting the T-biconditional for the liar, the classical truth theorist is not
forced to conclude that the liar is thereby true after all.
6For more on the revenge phenomenon, see the essay collection Beall [5].
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Here is another argument against non-classical truth theories. The main reason for
having a truth predicate in the first place is that we want to increase our expressive
power—and weakening classical logic seems to have quite the opposite effect. For
example, all theories in which the unrestricted T-schema holds are able to derive
all comprehension axioms of second-order arithmetic—in fact, all axioms of n-th
order arithmetic, for arbitrarily large n (by Russell’s trick, cf. section 1.2 and
Part III of this thesis). However, though derivable, these comprehension axioms
cannot be used to establish (many) facts about arithmetic. For example, the model-
theoretic constructions underlying most non-classical approaches can already be
carried out in proper subsystems of second-order arithmetic. (For example, the
minimal Strong Kleene fixed point can be defined using only Π11-comprehension.)
But if these theories are consistent, they cannot prove their own consistency, by
Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem. Thus, although these theories can prove
quite a few comprehension axioms, their underlying logic does not allow them to
reason properly with them. We will see later that there are classical truth theories,
based on some subset of the T-schema, that do prove the consistency of these non-
classical theories. Although such theories contain fewer instances of the T-schema
than the non-classical ones, and thereby fewer instances of comprehension, they
can prove more arithmetical facts because they can reason classically with these
comprehension axioms.
Of course, one might object that the expressive power gained by a truth predi-
cate should not be measured (solely) on the basis of their proof-theoretic strength.
For example, the Tarskian hierarchy RTΓ0 is remarkable in its deductive power (cf.
Theorem 3.1.5), but it does not allow us to express all the generalizations that we
want: if Φ is a set of theorems the truth indices of which are unbound in Γ0, then we
cannot express (within RTΓ0) that all members of Φ are true. So the proponents of
non-classical solution will claim that they fare better at expressing generalizations.
This brings us to the most important point. The truth predicate is used in many
areas of philosophy. If truth obeys non-classical laws, non-classicality will spread
over to other concepts that are defined in terms of truth, e.g. knowledge.7 Although
Quine [70] has taught us that no sentence is immune to revision, it is clear that we
should not revise the basis of our web of believe unless there is no other way out.
The main reason for having a truth predicate at all is that it enables us to express
generalizations that we could not express otherwise, namely, generalizations that
serve as a proxy for infinite conjunctions. Quite a few authors have argued that
the unrestricted T-schema is a necessary condition in order to fulfill this function:
this seems to be the main argument against classical truth theories. But if the
generalizing function could be fulfilled in classical logic, there would be no reason at
all why we should move to a non-classical logic. We have already seen (Observation
7This example has in particular been stressed by Volker Halbach.
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3.1.2), in the case of the typed theory TB, that only one direction of the T-schema
is needed in order to express infinite conjunctions. As we will show in the next
chapter, a similar point can be made when one considers untyped theories of truth.
The argument that the T-schema is necessary for the generalizing function of truth is
unsound, and thus the main argument against classical truth theories breaks down.
There is no reason for weakening classical logic.
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A classical truth predicate cannot validate the Intersubstitutivity Principle nor the
unrestricted T-schema, on pain of contradiction. This, however, is on itself hardly
a convincing argument against classical truth theories. What we demand from the
logician is a regimentation (in the Quinean sense) of a certain fragment of our
language. Such a regimentation does not have to respect all the features that an
idiom exhibits in ordinary language. On that view, whether the concept of truth is
“at bottom disquotational” or whether the T-biconditionals “fix its meaning” is only
of secondary importance—in particular for deflationists that do not grow tired of
claiming that “the truth predicate exists solely for a certain logical need” (Horwich
[46, p. 2]).
The job of the logician is to provide us with a device that serves our needs—a
device that allows us to express agreement or disagreement with an infinite bunch
of sentences, that enables us to express our commitment to a theory like PA, etc. A
convincing argument against classical truth theories would have to show that this is
not possible in classical logic.
Hartry Field ([24], [25], [26]) has given arguments that are supposed to establish
that classical truth predicates cannot fulfill the functions that we want it to fulfill.
In this chapter we will try to refute these arguments.
4.1. Expressing infinite conjunctions
It is common (cf. Armour-Garb [1]) to distinguish between the expressibility and the
provability of generalizations (viewed as infinite conjunctions). Any decent theory
of truth should at least allow for the expression of generalizations; whether such
generalizations ought to be provable too is a more difficult question. Clearly, there
are generalizations that we do not expect a theory of truth to prove—e.g. ‘Everything
that Einstein said about relativity is true’. Moreover, there are generalizations that
we certainly do not want our theory to prove—e.g. ‘All sentences of the form ‘A→ ⊥’
are true’. But even if we reject such generalizations, we might nevertheless want to
be able to assert them hypothetically in the course of some argument. Therefore,
we will focus on the task of expressing generalizations.
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4.1.1. What does it take to express an infinite conjunction?
The generally accepted picture of how the notion of truth allows us to express
generalizations or ‘infinite conjunctions’ is nicely embodied in the following passage
of Horwich ([46, p. 3]):
Consider, for example,
(1) What Oscar said is true.
Here we have something of the form
(2) x is F ,
whose meaning is such that, given further information about the identity of x—given
further premises of the form
(3) x =the proposition that p
—we are entitled to infer
(4) p.
And it is from precisely this inferential property that propositions involving truth
derive their utility. For it makes them, in certain circumstances, the only appropri-
ate object of our beliefs, suppositions, desires, etc. Suppose, for example, I have great
confidence in Oscar’s judgment about food; he has just asserted that eels are good but
I didn’t quite catch the remark. Which belief might I reasonably acquire? Well, obvi-
ously not that eels are good. Rather what is needed is a proposition from which that
one would follow, given identification of what Oscar said—a proposition equivalent to
If what Oscar said is that eels are good then eels are good, and if he said that milk is
white then milk is white, ... and so on;
and the raison d’etre of the concept of truth is that it supplies us with such a propo-
sition: namely (1).
Thus, according to Horwich and many other deflationists, a generalization such as
‘What Oscar said is true’ is, by virtue of the disquotational nature of truth, somehow
equivalent to the infinite conjunction∧
ψ∈L If Oscar said pψq then ψ,
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and therefore implies—given an identification of what Oscar said—the proposition
asserted by Oscar, namely, that eels are good. And it is this inferential property that
makes generalizations involving the truth predicate useful. Of course, this purported
explanation raises a couple of important questions that we should clearly separate
from each other:
1. In what sense can a generalization
∀x(ϕ(x)→ Tx) (4.1)
and an infinite conjunction ∧
ψ∈L
(ϕ(pψq)→ ψ) (4.2)
be said to be equivalent (relative to some theory of truth)? Or: In what sense
can a generalization express an infinite conjunction?
2. What conditions does a theory of truth have to satisfy in order to yield this
equivalence? In particular: Does the equivalence presuppose the T-schema or
the Intersubstitutivity Principle?
3. Does the equivalence between generalizations and infinite conjunctions yield
the inferential properties from which generalizations derive their utility? Do
the inferential properties from which generalizations derive their utility pre-
suppose the equivalence?
In [36], Halbach attempts to answer the first of these questions as follows. First, the
infinite conjunction (4) is replaced by the infinitely many sentences
ϕ(pψq)→ ψ (4.3)
(Here, in order to avoid problems with liar-like sentences, Halbach considers only
sentences ψ and predicates ϕ(x) that do not contain the truth predicate.) Now, given
all instances of the (typed) Tarski-biconditionals, all instances of (5) follow from (3).
Of course, there are many other sentences which imply all instances of (5); every
contradiction does the job. However, as Halbach observes, (3) only implies sentences
in the truth-free language that are implied by the instances of (5). That is, given
the typed Tarski-biconditionals, (3) has exactly the same truth-free consequences as
the infinitely many premises (5). (Cf. Proposition 3.1.1.) Generalising on Halbach’s
observation, we start our discussion with the following proposal.
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Definition 4.1.1 (temporarily). Let Γ be some (typed) theory of truth extend-
ing PA. We say that Γ enables us to express infinite conjunctions over truth-free
sentences if, and only if, for every T -free predicate ϕ(x), the theory
PA + {ϕ(pψq)→ ψ|ψ is T-free}
has exactly the same T -free consequences as the theory
Γ + ∀x(ϕ(x)→ Tx)
In the above definition, Γ might be any (typed) theory of truth, disquotational or
otherwise. Γ does not have to be an axiomatic theory of truth but might be a
semantic theory of truth, i.e. a set of sentences true in some model, and therefore
does not have to be recursively enumberable. Moreover, the consequence relation
might be non-classical or given by some restricted class of models and therefore
not effective (as is the case with the revision theory of truth or Kripke’s family of
fixed-point models).
Given this definition, we can answer our three questions (partly) as follows. First,
generalizations and infinite conjunctions are equivalent with respect to their truth-
free consequences. Second, as is easily seen, the typed Tarski-biconditionals are
sufficient for ensuring this equivalence (at least in classical logic). (We will point out
a necessary condition below.) Whether all uses of generalizations can be explained
on the basis of their equivalence with infinite conjunctions can only be answered
if we are given a complete list of all their uses, but we can see that at least some
of the most important uses are explained. If Γ is recursively enumerable and the
consequence relation is effective, then generalizations allow us to finitely axiomatize
the infinitely many premises with a single sentence (relative to the truth theory Γ,
anyways).
Unfortunately, the above definition has some counterintuitive consequences. Ob-
serve that, according to the above definition, any truth theory that enables us to
express infinite conjunctions must be conservative over its base theory. That is, if
ϕ is a T-free sentence that follows from the truth theory Γ then ϕ must already
be a consequence of the base theory PA. Although some authors (e.g. Horsten [44],
Shapiro [84], Ketland [49]) have argued that a deflationary truth theory ought to
be conservative over its base theory, this is controversial. But even if a deflationary
theory ought to be conservative over its base theory, it should not be implied by a
criterion on the expressibility of infinite conjunctions.
First of all, a good criterion should also work for non-deflationary or substantial
theories of truth. It is not clear why such theories ought to satisfy some conserva-
tiveness requirement. Substantial truth theorists do not necessarily deny that truth
has expressive functions; they argue that truth is not merely an expressive device.
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And a good definition should also make us understand under which conditions a
substantial theory of truth allows us to express infinite conjunctions.
Secondly, and more importantly, if Γ is a truth theory that enables us to express
infinite conjunctions and Γ∗ is a truth theory that extends Γ, then intuitively Γ∗
should also enable us to express infinite conjunctions. However, the conservativity
restriction precludes this. For example, consider the (typed) compositional theory of
truth, CT. This theory contains TB as a subtheory. According to Proposition 3.1.1,
the theory TB enables us to express infinite conjunctions. But then we should expect
that CT enables us to do the same, because it contains TB. However, the theory
CT is not conservative over its base theory. Thus, according to definition 4.1.1, the
compositional theory of truth does not enable us to express infinite conjunctions. We
may try to remedy this defect by replacing the occurrence of ‘PA’ in the definition
by ‘Γ’. Thus:
Definition 4.1.2 (temporarily). Let Γ be some (typed) theory of truth. We say
that Γ enables us to express infinite conjunctions over truth-free sentences if, and
only if, for every T -free predicate ϕ(x), the theory
Γ + {ϕ(pψq)→ ψ|ψ is T-free}
has exactly the same T -free consequences as the theory
Γ + ∀x(ϕ(x)→ Tx)
However, although this definition does not imply that the truth theory is con-
servative over its base theory, it is still possible to find pairs of theories Γ ⊆ Σ
such that Γ satisfies the criterion but Σ doesn’t. Here is an example. Let Γ
be TO and let Σ be TO + ¬Tpχq, where χ is some arithmetical statement such
that neither χ nor ¬Prov(pχq) are derivable from TO + {Prov(pψq) → ψ|ψ ∈ L}.
It follows from proposition 3.1.2 that TO satisfies definition 4.1.2. However, Σ
doesn’t. Observe that TO + ¬Tpχq + ∀x(Prov(x) → Tx) proves ¬Prov(pχq) while
TO + ¬Tpχq+ {Prov(pψq)→ ψ|ψ is T-free} doesn’t.
Of course, TO+{Prov(pψq)→ ψ|ψ is T-free} proves all instances of ∀x(Prov(x)→
Tx), but a generalization usually has more force than its instances, so we cannot
expect them to have the same (T-free) consequences. We may attempt to improve
the last definition by proposing that the two theories should have the same con-
sequences given some infinitary rule such as the ω-rule. Some semantic theories
of truth are actually closed under the ω-rule. For example, it is not hard to see
that over Kripke’s theory with the Strong Kleene valuation scheme, generalizations
and infinite conjunctions (understood as an infinite set of premises) have the same
consequences (have the same truth conditions). Moreover, it is easily seen that ax-
iomatic theories like TB or CT satisfy the equivalence between generalizations and
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infinite conjunctions if the equivalence is interpreted as equivalence with respect to
their consequences given the ω-rule. But while the last proposal seems to provide a
plausible answer to our first question—in what sense can we say that an infinite con-
junction and a generalization are equivalent?—it is by no means clear why a theory
satisfying the definition would be useful in actual reasoning. For finite reasoners like
us, the fact that generalizations are equivalent to infinite conjunctions with respect
to their consequences in some infinitary logic (or over the standard model of arith-
metic) seems rather futile. We can neither employ the ω-rule in actual reasoning
nor do we have a full grasp of the standard model of arithmetic.
There are two possible responses. The first one is to reject the proposed expli-
cation of the equivalence between generalizations and infinite conjunctions. The
second one is to conclude that the inferential properties that make a generalization
useful in actual reasoning do not presuppose the full equivalence between general-
izations and infinite conjunctions. In order to clarify this, we would like to propose
another explication of the alleged equivalence between generalizations and infinite
conjunctions. The idea, this time, is that they should be equivalent with respect to
their inferential behavior.
Deflationists claim that the truth predicate is a quasi-logical device, comparable
to a connective. The use of a connective is commonly characterized by introduction
and elimination rules. In the case of infinite conjunctions, the following two rules
are the most natural candidates: to infer Ai from
∧
j∈I Aj (elimination) and to infer∧
j∈I Aj from {Ai|i ∈ I} (introduction). We will discuss both rules in turn, starting
with the elimination rule. Given the elimination rule for infinite conjunctions, we can
infer ϕ(pψq) → ψ from
∧
ψ∈L ϕ(pψq) → ψ. Since the generalization ∀x(ϕ(x) → Tx)
is supposed to be equivalent to the infinite conjunction, we should be able to infer
ϕ(pψq)→ ψ from it, for every ψ. That much seems uncontroversial and we therefore
propose it as a first condition on the expressibility of infinite conjunctions. While
earlier we restricted our attention to infinite conjunctions over truth-free sentences,
the following definitions will be more liberal: we allow that the sentences to be
generalised may contain the truth predicate themselves.
Definition 4.1.3 (1st condition on expressibility of infinite conjunctions). For all
predicates ϕ(x) ∈ LT and sentences ψ ∈ LT the following must hold:
Γ,∀x(ϕ(x)→ Tx) ` ϕ(pψq)→ ψ
Assuming that the truth theory and its underlying consequence relation are effec-
tive, it is immediately clear why a theory satisfying the above condition is useful
in actual reasoning: Under minimal assumptions (namely, transitivity of the conse-
quence relation), the above condition implies that relative to the truth theory every
infinite conjunction
∧
ψ∈LT (ϕ(pψq)→ ψ) is reducible or ‘finitely axiomatized’ by the
corresponding generalization ∀x(ϕ(x)→ Tx) in the sense that, whenever a sentence
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χ follows from the infinitely many sentences ϕ(pψq) → ψ, then χ also follows from
the generalization ∀x(ϕ(x)→ Tx).
So far we have looked upon the generalization ∀x(ϕ(x) → Tx) as expressing the
infinite conjunction
∧
ψ∈LT (ϕ(pψq)→ ψ), but it would be equally natural to think of
the generalization as expressing the infinite conjunction of the ϕs, i.e. the conjunction
of all sentences ψ such that ψ satisfies the predicate ϕ(x). From this point of view,
what the truth predicate should allow us to do is to derive all the ϕs from the
assumption that all ϕs are true, given an identification of the ϕs—the generalization
∀x(ϕ(x) → Tx) ought to ‘capture’ all the ϕs. If the deduction theorem (or its
semantic counterpart) holds for `, our first condition is actually equivalent to this
second condition:
Definition 4.1.4 (2nd condition on the expressibility of infinite conjunctions). For
all predicates ϕ(x) ∈ LT and sentences ψ ∈ LT we require the following:
Γ,∀x(ϕ(x)→ Tx), ϕ(pψq) ` ψ (TE)
It is precisely this inferential property that Horwich has emphasized in the Oscar
example. If one wants to assert a sentence or a set of sentences by availing oneself of
the truth predicate, then the sentence containing the truth predicate should better
imply (relative to the background theory, anyways) all the sentences one initially
wanted to assert—otherwise one’s assertion fails to serve its purpose. If Jones says
that everything that Oscar said is true, we want—given an indentification of what
Oscar said—to be able to derive all the statements that Oscar made. Thus Horwich
says: “[the generalising] function of truth requires mereley that the generalizations
permit us to derive the statements to be generalized...” ([46], p. 124)
The assertion ‘All ϕs are true’ commits us to all the ϕs. Now suppose that one of
the ϕs is refutable. Then clearly the claim that all ϕs are true should be refutable
too. For example, if one of the things that Oscar said is ‘2+2=5’, then the assertion
that everything that Oscar said is true should be refutable too. Thus, we take
it as a third minimal adequacy condition for a truth predicate to express infinite
conjunctions that the assertion that all ϕs are true is refutable, given that one of
the ϕs is refutable and provided that we can identify it as a ϕ.
Definition 4.1.5 (3rd condition on the expressibility of infinite conjunctions). For
all predicates ϕ(x) ∈ LT and sentences ψ ∈ LT we require the following:
Γ, ϕ(pψq),¬ψ ` ¬∀x(ϕ(x)→ Tx) (TEC)
In a classical context, the third requirement on the generalising function of truth
is equivalent to the second requirement, which, given the deduction theorem, is
equivalent to the first. However, there might be (and in fact there are) some non-
classical logics where this fails to be the case. Therefore, we demand that all three
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criteria are satisfied. Finally, we say that Γ has the elimination property if and only
if Γ satisfies the first three conditions on the expressibility of infinite conjunctions.
We hope that the precedeeing discussion makes it clear why a theory of truth having
the elimination property is useful for finite reasoners: if the truth theory and the
consequence relation are effective then generalizations allow us to finitely axiomatize
every definable set of sentences by subsuming the predicate defining that set under
the truth predicate.
4.1.2. Some observations
Before we have a look at the introduction rules for infinite conjunctions, let us
first investigate what features a truth theory needs to posses in order to have the
elimination property. For that purpose it is convenient to split the T-schema resp.
the Intersubstitutivity Principle into two halfs:
Tpψq ` ψ (T-Elim)
Tpψq → ψ (T-Out)
ψ ` Tpψq (T-Intro)
ψ → Tpψq (T-In)
The first observation is not very surprising:
Observation 4.1.6. Let Γ ⊆ LT be some classical theory of truth where T-Out (or,
equivalently, T-Elim) holds. Then Γ has the elimination property.
Therefore, in classical contexts, T-Out or, equivalently, T-Elim, is sufficient for the
elimination property. Actually, it is not hard to see that under minimal conditions
T-Elim—and, if conditional proof holds, T-Out too—is also a necessary condition.
Observation 4.1.7. Let Γ ⊆ LT be a theory of truth where identity behaves clas-
sically,1 conditional expressions are true if both antecedent and consequent are true
or the former gets a non-designated value, and universal statements are true when
all instances are true. If Γ has the elimination property, then T-Elim holds in Γ.
Moreover, if conditional proofs hold, then T-Out holds too.
The conditions imposed on Γ are satisfied in classical logic and in many non-classical
ones (the only logic we are aware of that does not satisfy these conditions is Weak
Kleene logic, where one of the requirements on the conditional is violated).
1This is, the inference from s = t and ϕ(s) to ϕ(t) holds for every formula ϕ(x) and pair of terms
s, t.
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Proof. Let M be a model of Γ and let Tpψq be true in M. Given the conditions
imposed on identities, conditional and universal expressions, we know that both
pψq = pψq and ∀x(x = pψq→ Tx) are true in M. Thus, by (TE), we have that ψ is
true in M too.
What is a bit surprising, however, is that certain non-classical truth theories—in
fact, transparent truth theories—do not have the elimination property. In order to
see how they might fail, we briefly point out what classical inference rules are needed
beyond T-Out/T-Elim. The following shows how to derive (TE) in a classical T-Out
theory.
1. ∀x(ϕ(x)→ Tx) premise 1
2. ϕ(pψq) premise 2
3. ϕ(pψq)→ Tpψq 1, ∀-E
4. Tpψq 2, 3, Modus Ponens
5. Tpψq→ ψ (T-Out)
6. ψ 4, 5, Modus Ponens
(TEC) can be derived as follows:
1. ϕ(pψq) premise 1
2. ¬ψ premise 2
3. Tpψq→ ψ (T-Out)
4. ¬Tpψq 2, 3, Modus Tollens
5. ϕ(pψq) ∧ ¬Tpψq) 2, 4, ∧-I
6. ¬(ϕ(pψq)→ ¬Tpψq) 5, De Morgan
7. ∃x¬(ϕ(x)→ Tx) 6, ∃-I
8. ¬∀x(ϕ(x)→ Tx) 7, quantor negation
One does not have to look far to find examples of non-classical theories of disquo-
tational truth in which some of those inferences are invalid. As a consequence, such
truth theories actually do not have the elimination property. Since weakening of
classical logic is not something that is done lightly, the following observations cast
severe doubt on the adequacy of these non-classical logics. For what is the point
of weakening classical logic if the resulting truth theory does not enable the truth
predicate to serve its purpose?
As a first example, let us consider Kripke’s fixed-point theory with the Weak
Kleene scheme. Although it satisfies the Intersubstitutivity Principle, this theory
does not allow us to infer ∃xχ from χ(t) unless all instances of χ(x) have a definite
truth value. (Under the Weak Kleene scheme, conjunction and universal quantifier
take the minmum of their arguments, with the ordering 1
2
< 0 < 1.) Thus, the step
from 6 to 7 in the derivation of (TEC) is invalidated in that theory. One can show
that there is no way of repairing the proof:
43
4. Classical untyped truth
Proposition 4.1.8. Kripke’s fixed-point theory with the Weak Kleene scheme does
not have the elimination property.
Proof. Let ψ be 0 = 1 and ϕ(x) be the predicate x = p0 = 1q. The valuation VWK for
any model of the family assigns 0 to the sentence 0 = 1, thus VWK(¬0 = 1)=1. By
definition of ϕ, VWK(ϕ(p0 = 1q)) = 1 as well. Therefore, the premises of (TEC) are
true in every fixed-point model. However, that’s not so in the case of the conclusion.
To see this, note that one of the instances of the universal statement ∀x(ϕ(x)→ Tx)
is the conditional ϕ(l)→ T l (where l = pT¬. lq), whose truth value is given by
1−min{1− VWK(ϕ(l)), VWK(T l)}
which is 1
2
, since VWK(T l) is
1
2
(recall that under VWK ,
1
2
< 0 < 1). Since the
truth value of a general statement is the minimum of the values of its instances,
∀x(ϕ(x)→ Tx) gets value 1
2
, and so does ¬∀x(ϕ(x)→ Tx).
As another example, it is well-known that Priest’s LP (the acronym stands for ‘logic
of paradox’) does not satisfy Modus Ponens. LP is a paraconsistent logic in which
Explosion (and therefore Modus Ponens and Disjunctive Syllogism) does not hold.
Thus, the steps from 3 to 4 and from 5 to 6 in the derivation of (TE) are not valid
in that logic. The logic of LP is based on the Strong Kleene scheme VSK , but with
designated values not just 1 but also 1
2
. Thus, in LP 1
2
is to be understood as both
true and false. An argument is valid in LP if it preserves designated values.
Proposition 4.1.9. Let Γ be the theory consisting of the T-schema and the Inter-
substitutivity Principle formulated over LP. Then Γ does not have the elimination
prperty.
Proof. As is well known, by a fixed-point construction we can show there is a model
(N, S) of Γ such that VLP (Tpχq) = VLP (χ) for every sentence χ.2 Let ψ be ⊥—a
formula that always gets value 0—and ϕ(x) be the predicate T (x↔. l), where again
l = pT¬. lq. We first show that ϕ(pχq) is true in (N, S) for every χ.
l = pT¬. lq and the clause for negation imply that in (N, S) VLP (T¬. l) = 12 . Thus,
for any formula χ, by the clause for the conditional it follows that VLP (χ → T¬. l),
VLP (T¬. l → χ) > 12 , which means that VLP (χ ↔ T¬. l) >
1
2
too, by the semantic
clause for conjunction. Since (N, S) is a model of transparent truth, T (pχ↔ T¬. lq)
also gets value 1 or 1
2
for every χ, which by the identity between pχ ↔ T¬. lq
and pχq↔. l means that T (pχq↔. l) is true in (N, S) for every χ. In particular,
VLP (T (p⊥q↔. l)) = 12 .
Moreover, ∀x(T (x↔. l)→ Tx) is true in (N, S) as well. Since VLP (T (pχq↔. l)) > 12
for every χ, the clause for the conditional implies that VLP (T (pχq↔. l)→ χ) > 12 and,
2These are the Kripke fixed-point models based on the Strong Kleene valuation. See Kremer [52]
for a general presentation and Beall [6] for a more specific one.
44
4.1. Expressing infinite conjunctions
by transparency, VLP (T (pχq↔. l) → Tpχq) > 12 . Thus, the clause for the universal
quantifier gives us that VLP (∀x(T (x↔. l)→ Tx)) = 12 .
Therefore, both premises—∀x(T (x↔. l)→ Tx) and T (p⊥q↔. l)—of condition (TE)
hold in (N, S) while the conclusion, namely, ⊥, doesn’t.
The failure of Modus Ponens in LP pushed many paraconsistent-minded philoso-
phers (e.g. Priest [68], Beall [6]) to focus on the search for a ‘suitable conditional’,
i.e. a conditional-like connective that could be added to LP, satisfying not only
Modus Ponens but also other prima facie desirable principles. The task is far from
being trivial, due to Curry paradoxes. Priest [68] adopts a non-contraposible con-
ditional with which he formulates the T-schema. We will call this theory PTT, for
‘Priest’s Truth Theory’. Since the new conditional satisfies Modus Ponens, Modus
Tollens does no longer hold and condition (TEC) isn’t satisfied.
PTT can be somehow extracted from [68]. There, Priest fully endorses the T-
schema and argues that it must hold without restriction for the sake of the gener-
alizing function of truth (cf. Priest [68, chap. 4]). Although he works over LP, in
order to avoid the problems stated in proposition 4.1.9—viz. the failure of Modus
Ponens—he supplements the logic with a new, non-extensional conditional with
which he formulates his version of the T-schema. Furthermore, this new condi-
tional, he argues, must be non-contraposible, i.e. ϕ→ ψ does not necessarily imply
¬ψ → ¬ϕ. In his own words, “There seems to be no reason why, in general, if ϕ is
a dialetheia [both ϕ and ¬ϕ are true in a model], Tpϕq is too. If ϕ is a dialetheia,
Tpϕq is certainly true, but it might be simply true, and not also false” (Priest [68,
p. 79]). As a consequence, PTT won’t be a theory of transparent truth.
Let us call Priest’s logic ‘PL’. Its standard models are quadruples of the form
(N, S,W,R), where W is a set of possible worlds and R a binary relation over W .
We assume that each world in W is related to another one by R, R is surjective.
PL’s valuation scheme VPL behaves exactly like VLP for the extensional connectives,
now relativized to a world w. The conditional, instead, is defined in the following
way:
• V wPL(ϕ→ ψ) > 12 iff, for all w
′Rw, if V w
′
PL(ϕ) >
1
2
, then V w
′
PL(ψ) >
1
2
This clause leaves a lot of room for falsifying conditionals. A sentence is true in a
model if and only if it gets value equal or greater than 1
2
in every world of the model,
and logical consequence is defined as in LP.
Let PTT be PA formulated over PL plus the T-schema.
Proposition 4.1.10. PTT does not have the elimination property.
Proof. Let ϕ(x) be x = l and ψ be T¬. l. Since the identity statement pT¬. lq = l
is true in every model and, by the T-schema and the clauses for negation and the
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conditional, both T¬. l and ¬T¬. l get value 12 . Thus, both premises of condition (TE
C)
are true in every model. We now show that the conclusion—¬∀x(x = l→ Tx)—fails
to be true in some models.
Given any standard model of PTT, the T-schema implies that at every world w,
vwPL(T l ↔ T¬. l) > 12 , which together with the semantic clause for the conditional
in turn gives us that, at every world w′Rw, V w
′
PL(T l) >
1
2
iff V w
′
PL(T¬. l) > 12 . Since
the latter holds at every world, the former must hold too, and so T l must get
either value 1 or 1
2
in every world. But then, for every term t and every world w,
V wPL(t = l → Tt) > 12 too, for if at some world w
′Rw V w
′
PL(t = l) >
1
2
, then t = l
(recall we are working with a standard model), which means that Tt is true at every
world, since T l is so.
Let (N, S,W,R) be a model of PTT such that, at every world w, V wPL(t = l →
Tt) = 1 for every term t. Then, by the clause for the universal quantifier, V wPL(∀x(x =
l → Tx)) = 1, which means that V wPL(¬∀x(x = l → Tx)) = 0 at every w ∈ W , by
the clause for negation. Therefore, the conclusion of condition (TEC) is false in the
model; (N, S,W,R) is a counter-model for (TEC).
Finally, we cast some doubts on the capacity of the truth predicate of Ripley’s STTT
(Stric-Tolerant Transparent Truth) to serve its expressive purpose.
One of our elimination conditions is the derivability of ψ from the premises that
all ϕs are true and that ψ is a ϕ. Clearly, we wish to be able to derive ψ not
only from the hypothesis that all ϕs are true but also—and even more so—if we
categorically assert that all ϕs are true (for example, if we add such an assertion as
an axiom to our overall truth theory or if that claim happens to be a theorem of
our theory). That is, we not only demand (TE) to hold but we would also like to
be able to derive Γ ` ψ from Γ ` ∀x(ϕ(x)→ Tx) and Γ ` ϕ(pψq) (and the same for
(TEC)).
In classical theories and in most non-classical ones both requirements are equiva-
lent. However, a new kind of non-classical truth theories has been under the spot-
light lately, viz. those that instead of dropping principles governing logical operators
choose to abandon structural rules that shape the very notion of logical consequence
(cf. Paoli [63]). One of the main lines of investigation is given by the rejection of the
transitivity of the consequence relation. In natural deduction calculi, transitivity is
automatically given by the fact that we can put any two proofs together to form a
new one. In sequent calculi, however, transitivity might fail, depending on the other
rules that are available.
Such is the case of Ripley’s transparent theory of truth STTT—which contains
both T-Intro and T-Elim—and its underlying logic ST (Strict-Tolerant). The logic
ST is given by the valuation scheme VLP of LP (now called VST ), and the truth values
keep their meaning. The consequence relation, however, is defined in a different
manner: an inference from the members of a set Γ ⊆ LT to ϕ is valid (Γ ST ϕ) if
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and only if, in every model where all formulae in Γ have value 1, ϕ gets value 1 or
1
2
. STTT consists of PA plus the Intersubstitutivity Principle formulated over ST.
We will show that, though
Γ,∀x(ϕ(x)→ T (x), ϕ(pψq) ⇒ ψ
is satisfied in STTT,3 the failure of transitivity of the consequence relation yields
some formulae ϕ(x) and ψ such that
Γ ⇒ ∀x(ϕ(x)→ Tx)
and
Γ ⇒ ϕ(pψq)
but it isn’t the case that
Γ ⇒ ψ
Analogously, (TEC) fails to hold too, i.e. it only holds when premises are hypothet-
ically but not categorically asserted.
Proposition 4.1.11. The truth predicate of STTT doesn’t satisfy conditions (TE)
and (TEC) when premises are categorically asserted.
Proof. Let ϕ(x) and ψ be as in the proof of proposition 4.1.9. Assume we cate-
gorically assert ∀x(T (x↔. l) → Tx) and T (p⊥ ↔ T¬. lq), i.e., we reason in a theory
Th that extends STTT with these two axioms. Then, Th ∀x(T (x↔. l) → Tx) and
Th T (p⊥ ↔ T¬. lq), but 2Th ⊥, the resulting system isn’t trivial.
To see this, let (N, S) be a model of STTT. As for LP theories of transparent
truth, VST (∀x(T (x↔. l)→ Tx)) = VST (T (p⊥ ↔ T¬. lq)) = 12 in every model of STTT.
Thus, every model of STTT is also a model of Th. But not every model of STTT is
the trivial model (where all formulae are true). Thus, at least one of these models is
such that VST (⊥) = 0. The proof of the failure of condition (TEC) for categorically
asserted premises is analogous.
We have now seen that neither the Intersubstitutivity Principle nor the unrestricted
T-schema are by themselves sufficient for the truth predicate to serve its purpose.
There are non-classical truth theories that enjoy a disquotational truth predicate
that, none the less, do not have the elimination property. In some cases, this flaw
can be overcome by developing a decent conditional that is not defined in terms of
negation and disjunction. However, observation 4.1.6 indicates that there might be
no reason to embrace a non-classical logic in the first place.
3⇒ stands for the sequent arrow here.
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4.2. More on infinite conjunctions
Let us now discuss if, in addition to the elimination property, we can also define a
sensible introduction property, this time corresponding to the introduction rules for
infinite conjunctions. Then we could say that a truth theory enables us to express
infinite conjunctions if and only if it has both the elimination and the introduc-
tion property. Given the introduction rule for infinite conjunctions, we can infer∧
ψ∈L ϕ(pψq) → ψ from {ϕ(pψq) → ψ|ψ ∈ L}. Obviously, we cannot expect that a
corresponding rule holds for a truth theory unless we allow some infinitary rule (or,
in case we are dealing with a semantic theory of truth, that the theory is already
closed under some infinitary rule).
Definition 4.2.1 (4th condition on the expressibility of infinite conjunctions). For
all predicates ϕ(x) ∈ LT we require the following:
Γ, {ϕ(pψq)→ ψ|ψ ∈ LT} `ω ∀x(ϕ(x)→ Tx) (T I)
There is a similar, but weaker rule that we can define without invoking the ω-
rule. Recall that the 2nd condition on the expressibility of infinite conjunctions
requires that the generalization ∀x(ϕ(x)→ Tx) captures all the ϕs, in the sense that
whenever we assume that ψ is a ϕ, then ψ must be derivable from the generalization
(relative to the truth theory). Thus, if Jones says ‘Everything that Einstein said
is true’ then, given an identification of what Einstein said, Jones statement must
imply everything that Einstein said. Conversely, assume that what Einstein said was
exactly A1, . . . , An and assume furthermore that A1, . . . , An hold indeed. Then we
might expect that our truth theory allows us to derive that everything that Einstein
said is true. Of course, this only works if the predicate ϕ applies only to finitely
many sentences.
Definition 4.2.2 (5th condition on the expressibility of infinite conjunctions). For
all predicates ϕ(x) ∈ LT and all sentences A1, . . . , An ∈ LT we require the following:
Γ, A1, . . . , An,∀x(ϕ(x)↔
∨
i6n
x = pAiq) ` ∀x(ϕ(x)→ Tx), (T I)
Let us say that Γ has the introduction property if and only if it satisfies the fourth
and the fifth condition on the expressibility of infinite conjunctions. And let us say
that Γ enables us to express infinite conjunctions, or satisfies the full equivalence
between generalizations and infinite conjunctions, if and only if Γ has both the
elimination and the introduction property.
The following is easily seen:
Observation 4.2.3. In classical logic, T-In (or equivalently, T-Intro) is necessary
and sufficent for the fourth and fifth requirement on the expressibility of infinite
conjunctions.
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Since T-Out and T-In taken together are inconsistent within classical logic, there is
no classical truth theory that satisfies the full equivalence between generalizations
and infinite conjunctions. Does this spell doom for classical truth theories?
Our answer to the last question is a clear ‘No’. In a nutshell, our argument is that
all the features that make generalizations useful in actual reasoning are accounted
for by the elimination property. In other words: T-Out acconts for all the uses that
make the truth predicate indispensable.
A theory that has the elimination property enables us to finitely axiomatize infinite
sets of premises by a single expression. What would be the advantage of having a
theory that has, in addition, the introduction property? Horwich, in adressing the
problem of the paradoxes, points to the following:
[T]he need to restrict instantiation of the [T-schema] is somewhat in tension with
the minimalist thesis about the function of our concept of truth—namely that it
enables us to capture schematic generalizations. For, in so far as ‘p’ is not invariably
equivalent to ‘〈p〉 is true’, then a generalization of the form ‘Every instance of schema
S is true’ will not invariably entail every instance of S; nor will it always be justified
or explained on the basis of those sentences. [...] However, such problematic cases
are few and far between; so the utility of truth as a device of generalization is not
substantially impaired by their existence.([46, p. 42, fn 21])
Horwich mentions two reasons why the T-schema is needed: first, given the T-
biconditionals the generalization ‘All ϕs are true’ entails every member of ϕ; sec-
ondly, given the T-biconditionals, we can justify or explain the generalization on
the basis of the ϕs. The first point corresponds to our elimination property; and we
have seen that for that purpose T-Out suffices. Horwich’s second point corresponds
to our introduction property; and it is here where we need T-In. Given T-In, we can
justify or explain the generalization ∀x(ϕ(x) → Tx) on the basis of the infinitely
many premises {ϕ(pψq)→ ψ|ψ ∈ LT}.
Let us first deal with the case that ϕ(x) applies only to finitely many sen-
tences. For example, assume that the pope said exactly A1, . . . , An and assume
that A1, . . . , An does indeed hold. Now if our truth theory satisfies the fifth con-
dition on the expressibility of infinite conjunctions, i.e. if it contains T-In, we can
conclude that everything the pope said is true.
First, we would like to point out that if generalizations are employed to replace
finite conjunctions then they are in principle dispensable—we can equally use the
finite conjunction itself. The main use of a generalization involving the truth predi-
cate is to ‘finitely axiomatize’ an infinite set. Of course, it is true that in practice we
sometimes find ourselves in circumstances where the use of finite generalizations is
of value—be it that we are too lazy to repeat the finitely many sentences or that we
have problems remembering them. However, one might wonder whether this gives
us strong reasons for weakening classical logic.
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That being said, classical T-Out theorists are of course free to adopt instances
of T-In for quite a large number of sentences. (Many parts of this thesis will be
concerned with the question of how far we can push the T-schema in classical logic.)
If ϕ(x) applies only to such sentences, the generalization can be dervied in an ap-
propriate classical truth theory. Thus, as Horwich said, “such problematic cases are
few and far between; so the utility of truth as a device of generalization is not sub-
stantially impaired by their existence.” Moreover, if ϕ(x) applies to a paradoxical
sentence, one may in fact doubt whether the generalization would be justified or
ought to be justifiable. To repeat our earlier example, suppose that ϕ(x) applies
(amongst others) to the liar sentence. Are we really justified to say that all ϕs are
true eventhough we know that one of them is equivalent to its own untruth?
But maybe there are other cases where we would like to have the equivalence of
a generalization and a finite conjunction. Consider the following scenario by Field
[26, p. 210]. Suppose you do not remember exactly what Jones said, but you believe
that it entails a certain proposition B. Thus, you might say
∀x(ϕ(x)→ Tx)→ B, (4.4)
where ϕ(x) applies exactly to the sentences uttered by Jones. Then, relative to the
assumption that what Jones said is exactly A1, . . . , An, we want the above to imply
that
A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An → B. (4.5)
Field uses this example as an argument against classical truth predicates. He points
out that, in order to derive (4.5) from (4.4), Ai and “Ai’ is true’ need to be inter-
substitutable, which won’t be the case in general on any consistent classical truth
theory.
Again, we would first like to point out that in such cases, the use of the truth
predicate is in principle dispensable and therefore does not justify weakening classical
logic. Secondly, we would like to point out the classical T-Out theorist has some
means to deal with Field’s problem. It is true that in general (4.4) won’t get us
to (4.5) unless we have the T-In instances for the Ais at our disposal. But there is
no need to use (4.4) as a way of expressing (4.5). The latter can be captured by a
simple generalization of the form
∀x(ψ(x)→ Tx) (4.6)
Namely, let ψ(x) express that x is the unique sentence obtained by concatenating
the conjunction of the ϕs with the expression ‘→ B’.4 Then, in any classical T-Out
4More precisely, let ψ(x) be the formula ‘for all (finite) sequences of sentences y and all sentences
z, w, if (z is a member of y iff ϕ(z)) and w is the conjunction of the members of y, then
x = (w→. pBq).’
50
4.2. More on infinite conjunctions
theory, (4.5) is derivable from (4.6) and the assumption that ϕ applies exactly to
A1, . . . , An. This strategy can be generalised to cases of arbitrary complexity.
Our suggestion might seem slightly ad hoc, but we rather think of it as a pro-
posal for some new form of regimentation. At any rate, we think a little adhocness
outweights the costs of meddling with classical logic.
The above strategy extends to examples of a rather different character. Take,
for instance, a definition of knowledge. Epistemologists usually turn to the truth
predicate to define knowledge in a non-schematic way. An agent is said to know a
sentence just in case she believes it, she is justified in doing so, and, moreover, the
sentence is true (and some Gettier condition is satisfied). Formally, epistemologists
assert
∀x(K(a, x)↔ C(a, x) ∧ Tx) (4.7)
instead of the infinitely many instances of the following schema
K(a, pAq)↔ C(a, pAq) ∧ A (4.8)
where C(x, a) resumes all conditions for knowledge except truth.
Suppose now there is an agent a and a sentence A such that C(a, pAq) ∧ A. We
would like to be able to conclude that a knows A, but without the corresponding
instance of T-In, (4.7) does not get us there. It seems that a disquotational truth
predicate is required. However, as before, there is no need to generalise on the
instances of (4.8) by (4.7). We may well do so by a generalization of the form
∀x(ϕ(a, x)→ Tx) (4.9)
where ϕ(a, x) is true exactly of all instances of (4.8). As expected, any classical
T-Out theory will allow us to infer that a knows A from (4.9).
We concede that the above ‘definition’ of knowledge has it shortcomings. The
predicate K is no longer eliminable, and the definition does not satisfy the condi-
tion of being non-creative. But again, one should weight the costs of this against
introducing a non-classical truth predicate into the definition of knowledge. The
non-classicality of truth is contagious: its non-classicality would spread out and
make knowledge a non-classical predicate too.
Let us now deal with the justification of generalizations ∀x(ϕ(x) → Tx), where
ϕ(x) applies to infinitely many things. Obviously, ‘justification’ here cannot mean
‘provability’. Horwich writes ([47, p. 84, fn 14]):
As for the minimalist, he needs to show how general facts about truth could be
explained in terms of what he alleges to be the basic facts about truth—i.e. facts
of the form, [Tpϕq ↔ ϕ]. But he is licensed to cite further explanatory factors
(as long as they do not concern truth). And this license yields a solution. For
it is possible to suppose that there is a truth-preserving rule of inference that will
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take us from a set of premises attributing to each proposition of a certain form
some property, G, to the conclusion that all propositions have property G. And
this rule—not logically valid, but none the less necessarily truth-preserving given
the nature of propositions—enables the general facts about truth to be explained by
their instances. [...] The idea comes from Tarski himself that generalizations about
truth may be deduced from their instances by means of some such rule (“infinite
induction”).
Thus, the idea is that we can justify a generalization by deriving it with the help of
some ω-rule. Assume, for example, that we want to justify a generalization such as
‘All sentences of the form A → A are true’. Presumably, our base theory already
proves all sentences of the form A → A. Thus, given T-In, we get TpA → Aq and,
assuming the ω-rule, we can derive the generalization ‘All sentences of the form
A → A are true’. But obviously, we never use the ω-rule. So why the trouble of
first going through T-In in order to justify the generalization? Is it not enough to
say: “The generalization ‘All sentences of the form A → A are true’ captures or
finitely axiomatizes the infinite set {A→ A|A ∈ LT}. We are justified in believing
the latter, so we are justified in adopting the generalization.”?
4.3. Reflecting on classical truth
In the previous sections we have established T-Out as an attractive—in fact, a
necessary—principle for classical truth theories. Notice, however, that any T-Out
theory decides the liar.
Proposition 4.3.1. PA + T-Out ` λ.
Proof. Let λ be such that λ↔ ¬Tpλq.
1. Tpλq→ λ T-Out
2. ¬Tpλq→ λ def. of λ
3. λ 1, 2, logic
Notice also that PA + T-Out ` ¬Tpλq.
This means that any T-Out theory will have theorems (such as λ) that the theory
itself declares untrue. One reason one might think that this poses a problem is
that the usual way of expressing agreement with a theory is to say ‘All theorems of
the theory S are true’. This is also known as the global reflection principle for S,
formally
∀x(ProvS(x)→ Tx) (GRPS)
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where we assume that S is a recursively axiomatized theory. Now the problem is
that any theory that has untrue consequences will be inconsistent with its own global
reflection principle.
Proposition 4.3.2. Suppose that S is a r.e. theory extending PA. If S ` λ, then
S +GRPS is inconsistent.
Proof. Assume S ` λ and therefore, by definition of the liar, also S ` ¬Tpλq. Since
S is r.e. we have S ` ProvS(pλq) and by GRPS it follows that S + GRPS ` Tpλq.
Thus S+GRPS is inconsistent.
In particular, we have:
Corollary 4.3.3. Any theory extending PA + T-Out is inconsistent with its own
global reflection principle.
Field [26] notices that T-Out theorists might not only have problems with expressing
agreement but also with expressing disagreement.
[Assume that Jones] puts forward a quite elaborate gap theory involving T-Out. And
suppose that I disagree with this theory overall, but can’t quite decide which specific
claims of the theory are problematic. It is natural for me to express my disagreement
by saying ‘Not everything in Jones’ theory is true’. But this doesn’t serve its purpose:
since Jones himself, as a gap theorist, believes that important parts of his own theory
aren’t true, I haven’t succeeded in expressing disagreement.
Alternatively, suppose that Jones himself thinks that Brown’s theory is wrong, but
isn’t quite sure which claims of it are wrong. Then he certainly can’t express his
disagreement by saying ‘Not everything in Brown’s theory is true’, since by his own
lights that doesn’t differentiate Brown’s theory from his own. ([26, p. 140])
I do not find these arguments very compelling. Frankly, there is no reason why we
should express our agreement by saying ‘Everything in Jones’ theory is true’ or our
disagreement by saying ‘Not everything in Brown’s theory is true’. If Jones disagrees
with Brown’s theory, Jones will suspect that Brown’s theory is false, i.e. that there
is some sentence ϕ such that ϕ is part of Brown’s theory, but ¬ϕ. And this can
be expressed by saying ‘Something in Brown’s theory is false’—and that claim does
differentiate Brown’s theory from Jones. Similarily, Jones can express agreement
with her own theory by saying ‘Nothing in my theory is false’ or ‘Everything in my
theory is non-false’, formally
∀x(ProvS(x)→ ¬T¬. x) (GRP∗S)
I call this the modified global reflection principle; it states that no theorem of S
is false. The following shows that the modified global reflection principle can be
consistently added to any T-Out theory that has a standard model.
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Proposition 4.3.4. If S ⊇ PA contains T-Out and has a standard model, then
S +GRP ∗S has a standard model too.
Proof. Assume otherwise. Then there must be a standard model M such that
M  S and M  ∃x(ProvS(x) ∧ T¬. x). Since M is standard, there must be a ϕ
such that M  ProvS(pϕq) ∧ Tp¬ϕq. By T-Out, M  ¬ϕ. But since M is standard,
M  ProvS(pϕq) implies S ` ϕ and therefore M  ϕ. This contradicts M  ¬ϕ.
One attractive feature of the ordinary global reflection principle is that it implies
the consistency of the system in question. The modified GRP does the same job.
Proposition 4.3.5. If PA ⊆ S and S ` Tp¬0 = 1q, then S +GRP ∗S ` Con(S).
Proof. By universal instantiation, S+GRP ∗S ` ProvS(p0 = 1q)→ ¬Tp¬0 = 1q. But
since S ` Tp¬0 = 1q, it follows that S +GRP ∗S ` ¬ProvS(p0 = 1q).
Asserting untrue sentences is something that seems to be in conflict with our or-
dinary norms of assertion and denial—norms that are built around principles like
‘Assert only sentences that are true and deny only sentences that are false’. Notice
that this is not only a problem for T-Out theorists but a problem that concerns all
classical truth theorists. A classical logician is committed to accept:
λ ∨ ¬λ
Although a classical logician may remain agnostic between both disjuncts, she can-
not reject both. A little computation shows that the above disjunction actually
implies
(λ ∧ ¬Tpλq) ∨ (¬λ ∧ Tpλq)
But it seems that, if we have committed ourselves to a disjunction, then we should
be prepared to embrace one of its disjuncts. Even if we remain agnostic between
boths disjuncts, our overall theory should be compatible with at least one of the
disjuncts. From a classical point of view, it therefore must be possible either to
assert a sentence that is not true or to deny a sentence that is true. Accordingly,
classical logic is incompatible with the principle ‘Only assert sentences that are true,
only deny sentences that are false’ (if by denying a sentence we mean asserting its
negation).
Asserting that the Liar is not true requires that we change our norms of assertion.
Tim Maudlin [57] [58] has argued long since that we can avoid revenge by changing
the norms of assertion. We have to reject the principle ‘Assert only sentences that
are true and deny only sentences that are false’ and instead lay down principles
that allow us to assert (some) sentences that are not true. Then we can express
the defectiveness of the Liar just by saying ‘The Liar is neither true nor false’. Of
course, we cannot truly say so: saying ‘It is true that the Liar is neither true nor
false’ yields a contradiction. Maudlin proposes the following principles:
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• Any true sentence is assertible.
• No false sentence is assertible.
• For any sentence ϕ: not both ϕ and ¬ϕ are assertible.
• For any sentence ϕ: either ϕ or ¬ϕ is assertible.
The third item states that the rules of assertion and denial are pragmatically coher-
ent, while the fourth item states they are complete. Maudlin speaks of the above set
of rules as an ideal, albeit one that can never be achieved. Consider the following
sentence:
The sentence marked (1) is not assertible (1)
Maudlin argues for the inconsistency of the above rules of assertion as follows. Sup-
pose that (1) is assertible; then the above rules would allow the assertion of a
falsehood. Suppose (1) is not assertible; then the rules forbid the assertion of a
true sentence. If the rules allow the assertion of both (1) and its negation, or forbid
the assertion of either (1) or its negation, then the rules are either pragmatically
incoherent or incomplete. Thus the above rules express an ideal that can never be
achieved.
However, this reasoning depends on the equivalence of (1) and ‘(1) is true’. If we
stay classical, we can just reject the T-biconditional for (1) and its negation, and
thus we can avoid this revenge problem altogether. Classical T-Out is consistent
with the above norms of assertion.
A classical truth theorist cannot adopt the normative rule ‘Only assert sentences
that are true, only deny sentences that are false’. Thus it is inevitable that she
embraces rules of the sort described above. Horsten, however, has argued against
them as follows:
The trouble with [...] Maudlin’s assertion rules [is that they] are not closely related
to any rules of assertion that are proposed in the literature. They do not belong
to the usual candidates, such as ‘assert only what is true’, ‘assert only what you
know’, or ‘assert only what you rationally believe’. A proposal of extraordinary rules
of assertion such as Maudlin’s seems to be badly in need of independent support.
Otherwise, this proposal has an air of ad hockery around it. ([45, p. 128])
Frankly, I assume that the rules of assertion usually proposed in the literature differ
from those of Maudlin precisely because they do not take self-referential sentences
into account. I think it is fair to say that once we take self-referentiality into account,
none of our traditional rules will survive. For example, Moore’s principle (cf. [43])
states that
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It is incoherent to assert ‘ϕ, but I don’t believe ϕ’
This principle seems uncontroversial as long as we are dealing with ordinary sen-
tences. How can you honestly assert ‘Snow is white’ while denying to believe that
snow is white? But consider a sentence ϕ that says of itself that I don’t believe it.
Now because I sincerely reject ϕ (being suspicious of self-referential statements), I
say so (and in fact, truly say so): ‘I don’t believe ϕ’. But then I have asserted a sen-
tence while simultaneously denying that I believe that sentence. I don’t see how this
would make me an irrational person. There is no problem with violating Moore’s
principle, simply because its formulation didn’t take self-referential sentences into
account—sentences that ‘diagonalize out’ of the principle.
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Part II.
Grounded truth

5. A graph-theoretic analysis of the
semantic paradoxes
If we want a classical theory of untyped truth, we need to know which axioms we can
consistently assume. We have already seen that T-Out should be part of our theory,
but T-Out alone is not enough. We want e.g. some instances of T-In (the converse
of T-Out), so that we have some T-biconditionals, and hence we need to know which
instances of the T-schema we can safely assume, and which are paradoxical. This
is not an all-or-nothing affair. There are certain pairs of sentences ϕ, ψ such that
we can consistently assume the T-biconditional either for ϕ or for ψ but not for
both. In fact, for every sentence ϕ there is a pair ψ1, ψ2 such that our theory will be
inconsistent if the T-biconditionals for both ψ1, ψ2 is assumed. This is a consequence
of McGee’s trick:
Proposition 5.0.6 (McGee [59]). For every sentence ϕ ∈ LT , there is a sentence
ψϕ such that the PA + Tpψϕq↔ ψϕ proves ϕ.
Proof. By the diagonal lemma, there is a sentence χ such that
χ↔ (Tpχq↔ ϕ)
Propositional logic yields
(Tpχq↔ χ)↔ ϕ
Let ψϕ be such a χ.
Thus, the T-biconditionals for ψϕ, ψ¬ϕ are jointly inconsistent. If ϕ is provable in our
theory, then the T-biconditional for ψϕ will automatically be a consequence of our
theory too while that for ψ¬ϕ will be refutable. But if ϕ is undecidable, we probably
ought to be cautious and assume the T-biconditional for neither ψϕ nor ψ¬ϕ. One
has the feeling that all potentially dangerous sentences involve some kind of self-
reference or circularity, as obtained by the diagonal lemma or some similar device,
such as Kleene’s recursion theorem, but it is really hard to pin that idea down in
syntactical terms. One natural idea would be to say that a sentence is self-referential
if and only if it is equivalent to a sentence that contains the Gödelnumber of that
sentence within the scope of the truth predicate. According to that definition, both
ψϕ and ψ¬ϕ are self-referential. This definition, however, is trivialized by the fact
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that every sentence is equivalent to a sentence containing its code in the scope of the
truth predicate. For every sentence ϕ is logically equivalent to (Tpϕq ∨ ¬Tpϕq) ∧ ϕ.
In the present chapter, we therefore try to characterize the safe and the potentially
paradoxical sentences by semantic (i.e. model-theoretic) means. Our aim is not to
give an explanation of ‘what is going wrong’ in the liar reasoning. Rather, our goal
is to demarcate—in terms of semantically defined notions such as self-reference and
circularity—a set of sentences for which it is dangerous to assume the corresponding
T-biconditionals.
5.1. Reference and paradox
Self-reference is certainly not sufficient for paradox. For example, the T-biconditional
for the truth-teller τ with PA ` τ ↔ Tpτq is not only consistent over PA, it is in fact
a theorem of PA. But is self-reference necessary for paradox? In 1993, Yablo [96]
argued that this is not the case, drawing on the now famous example of an infinite
sequence of sentences each of which says that all the sentences appearing later in
the sequence are false.
Y (1) : ∀x > 1 ¬TpY (ẋ)q
Y (2) : ∀x > 2 ¬TpY (ẋ)q
Y (3) : ∀x > 3 ¬TpY (ẋ)q
etc.
There has been an extensive debate about whether there may be hidden forms of cir-
cularity or self-reference in Yablo’s paradox or not (Priest [67], Sorensen [87], Beall
[3], Cook [15], Picollo [64]). Clearly, formalizing Yablo’s paradox in arithmetic usu-
ally invokes some fixed point construction, as obtained by Gödel’s diagonal lemma
or Kleene’s recursion theorem. Thus, as some authors have argued (e.g. Priest
[67]), the whole sequence is endowed with some kind of circularity being inherent to
such fixed-point constructions. But there also seems to be a sense of ‘circularity’ in
which the Yablo sentences are clearly not circular—namely, when we think of what
the Yablo sentences are about (or refer to).
In 1970, about two decades before Yablo’s discovery, Hans Herzberger [41] argued
that there are referential patterns other than circularity that should be counted as
pathological. According to his approach, any sentence has a domain, the set of
objects it is about. For example, the Liar is about itself; a sentence of the form
‘All Φs are true’ is about the Φs. Of course, a sentence may contain objects in its
domain that are sentences themselves and which are about further sentences etc.
Herzberger concedes that ‘the general notion of a domain is more readily indicated
than explicated’. But let us assume for the moment that we have a method of
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assigning to each sentence its domain. Say that ϕ is about ψ iff ψ is in the domain
of ϕ. Let us call a sentence ϕ directly self-referential iff ϕ is about ϕ and call a
sentence ϕ indirectly self-referential iff ϕ is about ψ1 and ψ1 is about ψ2,..., and
ψn is about ϕ. Finally, call a sentence circular if it is either directly or indirectly
self-referential.
Clearly, our intuition tells us that the liar sentence is about itself while each
member of Yabo’s sequence is about all the sentences appearing later in the sequence:
The liar sentence and all liar cycles are circular while no member of the Yablo
sequence is circular. (This judgement depends on a basic intuition we have about
the aboutness relation. It can be expressed by the following rule: a sentence of the
form ∀x(ϕ(x) → ¬T (x)), where ϕ does not contain the predicate symbol T, is not
about ψ unless ψ satisfies the formula ϕ(x).) We can depict our intuitions as follows:
λ
The liar graph
γδ
Graph of a liar cycle of arity 2
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 ...
The Yablo graph
An interesting answer to the question ‘Why are some sentences paradoxical while
others are not?’ thus might look like:
• Some sentences are paradoxical because of their position in the reference-graph
of our language, i.e. in the directed graph whose vertices are the sentences of
the language, two sentences ϕ and ψ being joined by an arc iff ϕ bears the
relation of reference (aboutness) to ψ.
But which are the paradoxical nodes of the reference-graph? And can they be charac-
terized in graph-theoretic terms? We shall call any approach to semantic paradoxes
that is concerned with identifying paradoxical reference patterns a reference-based
theory of semantic paradoxes. In order to develop a reference-based account we have
to
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1. give a rigorous definition of the reference (aboutness) relation,
2. give a rigorous definition of paradoxicality, and
3. specify a graph-theoretic property that determines what nodes in the reference-
graph are paradoxical.
A good reference-based theory of semantic paradoxes should make us better un-
derstand how these concepts are interconnected: The notion of aboutness between
sentences; a graph-theoretic property defining a class of critical reference patterns;
the notion of a (potentially) paradoxical sentence. Any intuitions we have about
any of these notions can shed some light on the others. An explication of any one
of them always depends on explicating the others.
There have been several, quite interesting approaches to characterize the notion
of a paradoxical sentence for infinitary propositional languages by graph-theoretic
means (cf. Cook [14], Rabern, Rabern and Macauley [75]). A natural question then
is whether such a characterization is also available for first-order languages such as
the language of Peano arithmetic. The problem, of course, is that it is far from
clear how to define an aboutness relation (equivalently, to explicate the notion of a
domain) for arbitrary sentences containing quantifiers. Our proposal is to identify
the domain of a sentence of the language LT with its dependence set in the sense of
Leitgeb [55].
Outline of the remainder of the chapter
In section 5.2 we introduce the basic concepts of Leitgeb’s paper on semantic depen-
dence. It will be shown that Leitgeb’s theory can be treated within the framework
of Kripke’s fixed-point semantics. In section 5.3, we show how to define unique
reference-graphs (called ‘sensitivity-graphs’) for those sentences that do possess a
canonical dependence set. All of the paradoxes that are usually discussed in the
literature—e.g. the liar, liar cycles, Curry’s and Yablo’s paradox—fall under that
category. We also prove some theorems concerning (ω-)consistent subsets of the
T-schema in terms of sensitivity.
In section 5.4 we introduce a game-theoretic semantics for Kripke’s theory of
truth. In section 5.4.1 we define, for any sentence ϕ and set of sentences S, a
grounding game GG(ϕ, S) such that ϕ is grounded in S (i.e. is an element of the
fixed point generated by S) if and only if player (∃) has a winning strategy in the
game GG(ϕ, S). We then show how the strategies available in this game can be used
to define an infinite family of reference-graphs for the sentence in question. These
reference-graphs can be seen as a generalization of the sensitivity-graphs of section
5.3. In case ϕ has a least dependence set, there will be a canonical reference-graph
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among the infinite familiy, and that canonical reference-graph will coincide with
the sensitivity-graph of that sentence. We then use our machinery to show that a
sentence is grounded if and only if it has a well-founded reference-graph.
In section 5.4.2 we define, for any sentence ϕ and partial model F , a verification
(falsification) game such that ϕ is true (false) in the fixed-point generated by F if
and only if player (∃) has a winning strategy in the verification (falsification) game
for ϕ and F .
In section 5.4.3 we apply our machinery to obtain some graph-theoretic descrip-
tions of the Kripke-paradoxical sentences. We show, amongst others, that if a sen-
tence is Kripke-paradoxical, then each of its reference-graphs contains either a di-
rected cycle or infinitely many double paths. We conclude with a conjecture that
states, roughly, that every paradox is reducible either to the liar or Yablo’s paradox.
5.2. Semantic dependence. Leitgeb (2005)
In [55], Leitgeb aims to give a definition of truth for those sentences that are
grounded or, in other words, that depend (directly or indirectly) on non-semantic
states of affairs only. What distinguishes his approach from Kripke’s is that, first,
Leitgeb is more interested in a notion of truth for classical languages and, second,
that the notion of groundedness comes first and truth is derived, whereas on Kripke’s
approach, the order is reversed. The central notion for the construction of the set
of grounded sentences is the notion of dependence (or determination):
Definition 5.2.1. ϕ depends on Φ iff for all Ψ1,Ψ2: if Ψ1 ∩ Φ = Ψ2 ∩ Φ, then
(N,Ψ1)  ϕ iff (N,Ψ2)  ϕ.
Thus, a sentence ϕ is determined by a collection of sentences Φ iff for all Ψ1,Ψ2: if
Ψ1,Ψ2 agree on Φ, then they assign the same truth-value to ϕ. Leitgeb has given
the following equivalent definition of dependence.
Proposition 5.2.2 (Leitgeb). ϕ depends on Φ iff for all Ψ:
(N,Ψ)  ϕ⇔ (N,Ψ ∩ Φ)  ϕ
Thus, intuitively, a sentence ϕ depends on a set of sentences Θ iff all the objects
that are relevant for the evaluation of ϕ are among Φ.
Theorem 5.2.3 (Leitgeb). The operator D (Φ) = {ψ|ψ depends on Φ} is monotone:
If Φ ⊆ Ψ, then D (Φ) ⊆ D (Ψ).
Let us call a set Φ D-sound iff Φ ⊆ D(Φ). The monotonicity of the operator D
implies the existence of fixed points. Leitgeb identifies the sentences that depend
on non-semantic states of affairs only with the sentences in the minimal fixed point
of D.
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Definition 5.2.4. We inductively define: D0(S) = S, Dα+1(S) = D(Dα(S)) and
Dγ(S) =
⋃
α<γ Dα(S) for limit ordinals γ. We call G(S) :=
⋃
α∈On Dα(S) the set of
sentences that are grounded in S. A sentence is called grounded (simpliciter) iff it is
grounded in the empty set. We write G instead of G(∅) and Gα instead of Dα(∅).
Dependence is monotone: if ϕ depends on Φ, then ϕ also depends on any superset
Ψ ⊇ Φ. Some sentences have a least dependence set:
Definition 5.2.5. A sentence ϕ has essential dependence iff there is a set Φ such
that ϕ depends on Φ but ϕ does not depend on any proper subset Ψ ⊂ Φ. Otherwise
we say that ϕ lacks essential dependence.
Examples of sentences with and without essential dependence sets will be given in
the next section. The set of grounded sentences has some nice closure properties:
Proposition 5.2.6 (Leitgeb). 1. All arithmetical sentences are grounded.
2. All classical tautologies and falsehoods (in the language LT ) are grounded.
3. ϕ is grounded iff Tpϕq is grounded.
4. ϕ is grounded iff ¬ϕ is grounded.
5. If ϕ, ψ are grounded, then ϕ ∧ ψ is grounded.
6. If ϕ, ψ are grounded, then ϕ ∨ ψ is grounded.
7. If, for all n, ϕ(n) is grounded, then ∀xϕ is grounded.
8. The set of grounded sentences is closed under PAT-equivalence.
In fact, the sentences mentioned under (1) and (2) come in at the first stage of the
hierarchy; (3)-(8) provide closure conditions. We will give some concrete examples
of (un)grounded sentences in the next section. Now an interesting extension for the
truth predicate can be defined as follows:
Definition 5.2.7. By transfinite recursion define Θα for α ∈ ON by:
1. Θ0 = ∅
2. Θα+1 = {ϕ ∈ Gα+1|(N,Θα)  ϕ}
3. Θβ =
⋃
α<β Θα, when β is a limit ordinal.
Theorem 5.2.8 (Leitgeb). Θα ⊆ Θβ for all α < β.
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Consequently, there is an α such that Θα = Θα+1. We denote this fixed point
simply by Θ∞. This fixed point is a model for the T-biconditionals for all grounded
sentences:
Corollary 5.2.9 (Leitgeb). For all ϕ ∈ G: (N,Θ∞)  Tpϕq↔ ϕ.
In chapter 7 I will show that Θ∞ is Π
1
1-complete. This was independently established
by Welch [94] using a quite different argument. In what follows, I will give a very
simple proof (different both from Welch’s and our own in chapter 7) that the first
level Θ1 of Leitgeb’s truth hierarchy is a Π
1
1-complete set of integers. Stanislav
Speranski demonstrated to me that my argument can be generalized to show that
for each α > 0, Gα and Θα are Π
1
1-complete. We need the following preliminary
lemma.
Proposition 5.2.10. Θ1 = A := {ϕ ∈ LT |∀S ⊆ ω : (N, S)  ϕ}
Proof. By definition,
Θ1 = {ϕ ∈ LT |ϕ depends on ∅, (N,∅)  ϕ}
We first show Θ1 ⊆ A. Let ϕ ∈ Θ1. Then
1. ϕ depends on ∅
2. (N,∅)  ϕ
By (1) and Proposition 5.2.2, we have for all S ⊆ ω
(N, S)  ϕ⇔ (N, S ∩∅)  ϕ
⇔ (N,∅)  ϕ, because S ∩∅ = ∅.
So by (2) and the above equivalence, (N, S)  ϕ for all S, so ϕ ∈ A.
Conversely, let ϕ ∈ A. So (N, S)  ϕ for all S. In particular, (N,∅)  ϕ, so (2)
is satisfied. But (1) is also satisfied: since ϕ has the same truth value under any
interpretation, (N, S)  ϕ iff (N, S ∩∅)  ϕ, so ϕ depends on the empty set.
Theorem 5.2.11. The set Θ1 is Π
1
1-complete.
Proof. By the previous proposition, Θ1 is simply the set of all LT -sentences that are
true under any interpretation of the truth predicate, i.e.
Θ1 = {ϕ ∈ LT |∀S ⊆ ω : (N, S)  ϕ}
For any ϕ ∈ LT let ϕ̂ be the result of replacing all occurrences of the predicate T
by the second-order variable X. (Observe that ϕ̂ is an arithmetical L2-formula with
exactly X free.) Then observe that Θ1 is recursively isomorphic to the set of all
true Π11-sentences, i.e. ϕ ∈ Θ1 iff ∀Xϕ̂ is true in the structure (N, ℘(ω)), where the
second-order quantifer ranges over the elements of ℘(ω). It is well-known that the
set of true Π11-sentences is a Π
1
1-complete set.
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Notice that Θ1 = J 1FV (∅)+, so the above proof also establishes that the first level of
the minimal Kripke fixed point under the supervaluational scheme is Π11-complete.
Despite the different conceptual intuitions behind both approaches, it is obvious
that Leitgeb’s theory has a lot in common with Kripke’s fixed-point theory. Leitgeb
[55] has shown that Θ∞ ⊆ J∞FV (∅)+. In fact, the inclusion is proper. For example,
the sentence Tp1 = 1q ∨ λ, where λ is the Liar, enters J∞L (∅)+ at stage 2, but
it never enters G, because the dependence set of the disjunction contains the liar.
However, since we know that 1 = 1 is true, we can also determine the truth value
of Tp1 = 1q ∨ λ. As another example, we may take the sentence Tp1 6= 1q ∧ λ,
which is easily seen to be false (since 1 6= 1 is false). This sentence is not in G, but
it is again a part of J∞FV (∅)+. A variation of the first example shows that Θ∞ (in
contrast to J∞FV (∅)+) invalidates the claim that Modus Ponens preserves truth:
Proposition 5.2.12. (N,Θ∞) 2 ∀x∀y(Sent(x→. y)→ (T (x→. y)→ (Tx→ Ty)))
Proof. Notice that (N,Θ∞)  TpTp1 = 1q→ Tp1 = 1q∨λq and (N,Θ∞)  TpTp1 = 1qq
but (N,Θ∞) 2 TpTp1 = 1q ∨ λq, because Tp1 = 1q ∨ λ is not grounded.
However, by a little modification we can make Θ∞ equal to J∞FV (∅)+.1 This can be
done by introducing the notion of conditional dependence, and by further restricting
the quantifiers in the definition to consistent supersets.2
Definition 5.2.13. We say that ϕ c-dependsΣ on Φ iff for all consistent Ψ1,Ψ2 ⊇ Σ:
if Ψ1 ∩ Φ = Ψ2 ∩ Φ, then (N,Ψ1)  ϕ iff (N,Ψ2)  ϕ.
Definition 5.2.14. We define by simultaneous transfinite recursion:
1. G′0 = ∅
2. G′α+1 = {ϕ|ϕ c-dependsΘ′α on G
′
α}
3. G′β =
⋃
α<β G
′
α, when β is a limit ordinal.
4. Θ′0 = ∅
5. Θ′α+1 = {ϕ ∈ G′α+1|(N,Θ′α)  ϕ}
6. Θ′β =
⋃
α<β Θ
′
α, when β is a limit ordinal.
Proposition 5.2.15 (Meadows, Bonnay & Vugt). Θ′α = J αFV (∅)+ for all α ∈ ON .
This relationship between Leitgeb’s construction and the minimal supervaluational
fixed point is interesting (and will play a role in chapter 6), but still leaves us
wondering what the exact relation between Leitgeb’s and Kripke’s theory is.
1Cf. Bonnay & Vugt [90] or Meadows [60].
2Conditionality takes care of the first example, consistency takes care of the second example.
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Definition 5.2.16. Let S = (S+, S−) be a consistent partial model. Define the
Leitgeb valuation scheme by
VL(S)(ϕ) =

1, if ϕ depends on S+ ∪ S− and (N, S+)  ϕ
0, if ϕ depends on S+ ∪ S− and (N, S+) 2 ϕ
1
2
, if ϕ does not depend on S+ ∪ S−
It is easily seen that VL is a monotonic valuation scheme.
Proposition 5.2.17. For all α, Θα = J αL (∅)+ and Gα = J αL (∅)+ ∪ J αL (∅)−.
Proof. By simultaneous transfinite induction on α. We only show the first part of
the claim, the other one can be proved similarly. For α = 0, we have G0 = Θ0 = ∅ =
J 0L(∅)+ = J 0L(∅)+∪J 0L(∅)−. If α is a limit, apply the induction hypothesis. So let
α = β+1. Assume as I.H. that Θβ = J βL (∅)+ and that Gβ = J
β
L (∅)+∪J
β
L (∅)−. Let
ϕ ∈ Θβ+1. By defintion of Θ, this means (N,Θβ)  ϕ and ϕ ∈ Gβ+1, i.e. ϕ depends
on Gβ. So by definition of VL, VL(J βL (∅))(ϕ) = 1, which implies by definition of
Kripke jump that ϕ ∈ JL(J βL (∅))+ = J
β+1
L (∅)+. The other direction is proved
similar.
Thus, Leitgeb’s theory of truth can be treated within the Kripke framework. There
is not only a minimal fixed point of JL, but also (many) maximal fixed points,
a largest intrinsic fixed point etc. Moreover, we also have the notion of Kripke-
paradoxicality for VL (cf. section 3.2): a sentence ϕ is Kripke-paradoxical iff ϕ
does not receive a definite truth value in any fixed point of JV . Our aim in the
next sections is to characterize the Kripke-paradoxical sentences (relative to VL) in
graph-theoretic terms.
5.3. Sensitivity-graphs
In this section we first assign reference-graphs to those sentences of LT that have
essential dependence. Then we show how information about the sensitivity-graphs of
certain sets of sentences provides us with sufficient conditions for the consistency of
certain subsets of the T-schema. In the next section, we provide a method to assign
reference-graphs to any sentence of LT . This method will assign infinitely many
reference-graphs to each sentence. In case a sentence has essential dependence, it is
possible to single out a canonical reference-graph which will be isomorphic to the
sensitivity-graph of that sentence.
We will first introduce a relation, called ‘sensitivity’, that holds between single
sentences. This notion will provide us with a better grasp on which sentences have
essential dependence.
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Definition 5.3.1. Let S ⊆ ω and ϕ ∈ LT . Define
Sϕ =
{
S \ {ϕ}, if ϕ ∈ S
S ∪ {ϕ}, if ϕ /∈ S
So Sϕ is exactly as S—except for ϕ. If S contains ϕ, then Sϕ won’t, and if S does
not contain ϕ, then Sϕ will. In algebraic terms, Sϕ is the symmetric difference of S
and {ϕ}, i.e.
Sϕ = (S ∪ {ϕ}) \ (S ∩ {ϕ})
It should be clear that S = Sϕϕ , i.e., applying the operation a second time undoes
the effect of the first application. In what follows, ϕS denotes the truth-value of ϕ
relative to the model (N, S), i.e. ϕS = 1 if (N, S)  ϕ, and ϕS = 0 otherwise. We
also write V alS(ϕ) instead of ϕ
S.
Definition 5.3.2. We say that ϕ is sensitive to ψ iff there is an S ⊆ ω such that:
ϕS 6= ϕSψ
We write ψSϕ if ϕ is sensitive to ψ. (Notice that we switched the order of the
relata!)
We say that ϕ is insensitive to ψ iff ϕ is not sensitive to ψ, i.e., iff for all S ⊆ ω we
have:
ϕS = ϕSψ
So if ϕ is insensitive to ψ, then we cannot change the truth-value of ϕ by adding/removing
ψ to/from the extension of the truth-predicate, not matter with which model we
start.
Definition 5.3.3. Let Dom (ϕ) be the set of sentences to which ϕ is sensitive, i.e.,
Dom (ϕ) = {ψ|ψSϕ}.
Whereas the notion of dependence relates sentences and sets of sentences, the notion
of sensitivity has only single sentences as relata. Moreover, while the notion of
dependence involves a universal quantifier ranging over subsets of ω, the notion
of sensitivity only involves an existential quantifier. The fundemantal connection
between dependence and sensitivity is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.3.4. Let ϕ be an LT -sentence and Φ ⊆ LT . Then the following are
equivalent:
1. ϕ depends essentially on Φ.
2. ϕ depends on Φ and Φ = Dom(ϕ).
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A proof of this important result can be found in Beringer & Schindler [7]. Leitgeb
calls a sentence ϕ self-referential iff ϕ is contained in every set on which it depends.
Of course, self-reference implies ungroundedness. Checking whether ϕ is contained
in each of its dependence sets can sometimes be laborious; the sensitivity relation
provides us with an easier criterion of self-referentiality.
Theorem 5.3.5. A sentence ϕ is self-referential iff ϕ is sensitive to itself.
Proof. We only show the right-to-left direction. Let ϕ be sensitive to itself and
assume that ϕ dependsL on Φ. We have to show that ϕ ∈ Φ. Since ϕ is sensitive
to itself, there is an S such that ϕS 6= ϕSϕ . Since ϕ dependsL on Φ, we find that
S ∩ Φ 6= Sϕ ∩ Φ. This implies ϕ ∈ Φ.
Corollary 5.3.6. The predicate ‘x is self-referential’ is ∆11.
Analogously, we may say that ϕ is circular (or indirectly self-referential) iff there
is a ψ (distinct from ϕ) such that ψSϕ and ϕSψ. The following list provides some
examples of grounded, ungrounded, self-referential and circular sentences.
Example 5.3.7. 1. The truth-teller τ with PA ` τ ↔ Tpτq is sensitive to itself,
and therefore self-referential and ungrounded.
Proof: V al∅(τ) = 0 6= 1 = V al{τ}(τ) = V al∅τ (τ).
2. Let A,B be such that PA ` A ↔ ¬TpBq, B ↔ TpAq. Then A is sensitive to
B and B is sensitive to A. Thus both A and B are circular.
3. The completeness axiom (Comp) ∀x (Tx ∨ T ¬̇x) is sensitive to any sentence
whatsoever, and therefore ungrounded.
Proof: Let ϕ be arbitrary. Let S = ω \{ϕ,¬ϕ}. Then V alS(Comp) = 0 6= 1 =
V alS∪{ϕ}(Comp) = V alSϕ(Comp).
4. The claim ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ is not sensitive to any sentence, and therefore grounded.
Proof: Let ϕ be arbitrary. Then V alS(ϕ) = V alSψ(ϕ) for all sentences ψ.
5. Let the Yablo sequence {Y (n)|n ∈ ω} with PA ` Y (n) ↔ ∀x > n¬TpY (ẋ)q be
given. Then for all n, Y (n) is sensitive to all Y (m) with m > n. However, no
Y (n) is circular.
Proof: V al∅(Y (n)) = 1 6= 0 = V al{Y (m)}(Y (n)) = V al∅Y (m)(Y (n)).
6. The sentence ϕ
.
= (1 = 1 ∧ Tpλq) is sensitive to λ, where λ is the Liar.
Proof: V al∅(ϕ) = 0 6= 1 = V al{λ}(ϕ) = V al∅λ(ϕ).
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Now we are in a position to define reference-graphs for those sentences that have
essential dependence.
Definition 5.3.8. The sensitivity-graph of the language LT is the directed graph
defined by the sensitivity relation S, and the sensitivity-graph of a sentence ϕ is the
smallest (with respect to the subgraph relation) induced subgraph of the sensitivity-
graph of LT that contains ϕ and contains with each ψ any sentence χ such that ψ
is sensitive to χ (i.e. such that χSψ).3
Loosely speaking, the sensitivity-graph of ϕ is the relation defined by the sensitivity
relation restricted to the transitive closure of {ϕ} w.r.t. S. It follows from our
definitions (and the proofs in the example list given above) that the sensitivity-
graph of the liar sentence is isomorphic to the graph shown in picture 1 and that
the sensitivity-graph of the Yablo sequence is isomorphic to the graph in picture 3
(at the beginning of this chapter).
Which sets of T-biconditionals can be added to PA without generating a paradox?
We state some useful results in terms of sensitivity.
For given S and ψ1, . . . , ψn, let S1 = Sψ1 , Si+1 = (Si)ψi+1 . Hence, given S, S1
results from adding/removing ψ1 to/from S, S2 results from adding/removing ψ2
to/from S1 and so on. Notice that Sn is identical to the symmetric difference of S
and {ψ1, . . . , ψn}. The following proposition shows that if ϕ is insensitive to every
member of Φ (where Φ is finite), then the truth-value of ϕ relative to some extension
S remains constant under varying the extension S with respect to members of Φ.
The result does not obtain in general if Φ is infinite.
Proposition 5.3.9. Assume ϕ is insensitive to ψ1, . . . , ψn. Then for any S, ϕ
S =
ϕS1 = . . . = ϕSn.
Proof. By an easy induction.
T  S denotes the theory whose axioms are those of PAT plus all T-biconditionals
for all members of S.
Proposition 5.3.10. Let S ⊆ LT . Assume there is a function f : S → ω such that
(*) ψSϕ⇒ f (ψ) < f (ϕ), for all ψ, ϕ ∈ S;
then T  S has a model. Moreover, if S is finite, then there is an ω-model.
Proof. By Proposition 5.3.9 and the compactness of first-order logic. So let A ⊆ S
be finite. Let Fn = {ϕ ∈ A|f (ϕ) = n}. Let Γ0 = ∅ and Γn+1 = Γn ∪ {ϕ ∈
Fn| (N,Γn)  ϕ}. It follows from (*) and Proposition 5.3.9 that this sequence is
monotone. Hence (N,Γk+1) is a model of the T-schema restricted to A, where k =
max{n|∃ϕ ∈ A. f (ϕ) = n}.
3See the appendix for definitions of the graph-theoretic notions used in this chapter.
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Theorem 5.3.11. If S ⊆ LT contains no S-cycle, then T  S has a model.
Proof. We will apply the compactness of first-order logic. So let A ⊆ S be finite.
Define f : A→ ω as follows: If ϕ ∈ A is not sensitive to any ψ ∈ A, then f (ϕ) = 0.
For any other ϕ ∈ A, let f (ϕ) = max{f (ψ) + 1|ψSϕ, ψ ∈ A}. Since S contains no
S-cycle and A is finite, it follows that f satisfies (*). So the T-schema restricted to
A has a model by Proposition 5.3.10.
Theorem 5.3.12. If every member of S ⊆ LT depends essentially on some set and
S is well-founded on S, then T  S has an ω-model.
Consider some infinite sequence of sentences ϕ1, ϕ2, . . ., where each ϕi is equivalent
to the assertion that ϕi+1 is not true. Although this sequence (i.e. its members) is
ungrounded, its set of T-sentences has a standard model. Does the same hold when
we are confronted we an infinite sequence in which, say ϕ1 refers to ϕ2, ϕ3, ϕ4 and
ϕ2 refers to ϕ3, ϕ4, ϕ5 etc. The following proposition, which was jointly proven with
Lavinia Picollo, shows that any variation of such a sequence has an acceptable truth
assignment.
Theorem 5.3.13. Let Θ = {ϕ1, ϕ2 . . .} be an infinite set of sentences each of which
has a finite dependence set, and assume that the sensitivity-graph of Θ contains no
cycle. Then there is an ω-model of T  Θ.
Proof. Let Θn = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} (for n > 0). Let Φi be the least dependence set of ϕi.
For n > 0 let
Γn = {S ⊆ ω|S ⊆
⋃
i6n
(Φi ∪ {ϕi}); (N, S)  T  Θn}
Notice that each Γn is finite, because
⋃
i6n Φi is finite. Moreover, for each n > 0 there
are S1 ⊆ S2 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Sn with Si ∈ Γi for all 0 < i 6 n. (Proof: For given n, there is
some model (N, S)  T  Θn by Theorem 5.3.11. Choose Si := S ∩
⋃
k6i(Φk ∪{ϕk}).
Let j 6 i 6 n be arbitrary. Since S ∩ Φj = Si ∩ Φj, ϕj has the same truth-value
in the model (N, Si) as in (N, S), by Proposition 5.2.2. Moreover, Si contains ϕj
iff S contains it; therefore Tpϕjq has the same truth-value in (N,Si) as in (N, S).
Therefore, (N, Si)  Tpϕjq↔ ϕj. Thus Si ∈ Γi.)
Now we inductively define a finitely branching, infinite tree τ whose nodes are
drawn from {∅} ∪
⋃
n>0 Γn. Let (∅) ∈ τ . If (S0, S1, . . . , Sn) ∈ τ and Sn ⊆ Sn+1 ∈
Γn+1, then (S0, S1, . . . , Sn, Sn+1) ∈ τ . Nothing else is in τ . Notice that (i) for each
n, τ contains a sequence of length n, and (ii) for each sequence (S0, S1, . . . , Sn) ∈ τ ,
we have ∅ = S0 ⊆ S1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Sn with Si ∈ Γi for i > 0. Moreover, because each
Γi is non-empty and finite, τ is a finitely branching, infinite tree. Thus, by König’s
lemma, there is an infinite path, providing us with an infinite chain S0 ⊆ S1 ⊆ . . .
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with Si ∈ Γi for all i ∈ ω. Let S =
⋃
n∈ω Sn. We will show that (N, S)  T  Θ. Let
ϕi be given. Let m > i be least such that for each Sk with k > m, no sentence in Φi
will be in Sk unless it was already in Sm. Such an m exists because Φi is finite and
the Sk are monotone. Clearly, (N, Sm)  Tpϕiq ↔ ϕi, because Sm ∈ Γm and i < m.
By choice of m, we have S ∩ (Φi ∪ {ϕi}) = Sm ∩ (Φi ∪ {ϕi}). Since ϕi depends on
Φi ∪ {ϕi}, (N, S) is a model of Tpϕiq ↔ ϕi, by Proposition 5.2.2 and the fact that
(N, Sm)  Tpϕiq↔ ϕi.
Corollary 5.3.14. If no sentence in S contains a quantifier binding a variable in
the scope of the truth predicate and the sensitivity relation restricted to S contains
no cycle, then T  S has an ω-model.
Proof. This follows from the assumption that every member of S has a finite depen-
dence set.
The above theorems show that sensitivity-graphs provide us with good information
about the paradoxicality of those sentences that have essential dependence. How-
ever, by Theorem 5.3.4 they must fail to deliver us the relevant information once
we are dealing with sentences that lack essential dependence. For example, consider
the following version of the Yablo sequence which we may call the nested Yablo
sequence:
Y ∗(n)↔ ∃x > n∀y > x¬TpY ∗(ẏ)q
The nested Yablo-sequence is just as paradoxical as the original Yablo-sequence:
Adding the T-schema for its members to PAT yields a theory that is ω-inconsistent.
But for each n, the sensitivity-graph of Y∗(n) is the empty graph—the very same
graph that is also the sensitivity-graph of the most harmless sentences, i.e. of all
thoses sentences that do not contain the T-predicate at all. The simple explanation
of this phenomenon is that each Y∗(n) lacks essential dependence: For all m > n,
Y∗(n) depends on {Y ∗(m), Y ∗(m+ 1), Y ∗(m+ 2), . . .} but it does not depend on
the intersection of these sets.
Sensitivity is a good candidate for an aboutness relation as long as we are dealing
with sentences that have essential dependence. In particular, the sensitivity concept
provides all relevant referential information for those sentences that are usually
dealt with in the literature, e.g. the liar, liar cycles, and the Yablo sequence. These
sentences contain not more than one quantifier binding a variable in the scope of
the truth predicate. The distinctive feature of what we dubbed the nested Yablo
is that it contains nested quantifiers. As we have seen above, the sensitivity-graph
fails to contain enough information about paradoxicality as soon as sentences that
lack essential dependence are involved. Given this situation, let us see if we can find
a generalization of the sensitivity concept that still works in the absence of essential
dependence.
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5.4. Kripke-games and reference-graphs
In the present section, we will introduce two games for Kripke’s fixed-point seman-
tics. We will use the strategies available in these games to derive an infinite system
of reference-graphs for each sentence. For sentences that have essential dependence,
we can single out a canonical reference-graph—the latter will coincide with the
sensitivity-graph of that sentence. The grounding game, which we define in the first
subsection, will be used to show that a sentence is grounded if and only if it has a
well-founded reference-graph. The verification game, which we introduce in the sub-
sequent section, will be used to give some interesting graph-theoretic descriptions of
the Kripke-paradoxical sentences.
Remark. Games for Kripke’s theory of truth have been developed previously, e.g.
by Martin [56] and Welch [93]. In the games of Martin and Welch, the players play
only with sentences of LT , while in our games, the players play with sentences and
sets of sentences. However, our games enjoy some kind of uniformity: the rules of
the games are the same no matter which valuation scheme we are dealing with.
5.4.1. The grounding game
For each sentence ϕ and set of sentences Φ we define an infinite game of perfect
information, the grounding game GG(ϕ,Φ) between two players (∃) and (∀), such
that (∃) has a winning strategy in GG(ϕ,Φ) iff ϕ is grounded in Φ. Below we will
extract reference-graphs for ϕ from the strategies of player (∃) in the game GG(ϕ,∅).
The rules of GG(ϕ,Φ) are the following:
• (∀) must move first and choose ϕ as his first move ϕ0.
• As her n-th move (∃) must choose some set Φn on which ϕn depends.
• If n > 0, as his n-th move (∀) must choose some sentence ϕn ∈ Φn \ Φ.
The winning conditions for GG(ϕ,Φ) are: (∃) wins a run of the game if (∀) cannot
move. (∀) wins a run of the game if it goes on forever.
ϕ0 ϕ0 ϕ1 ϕ1 ...
contains depends on containsdepends on
The most important instances of GG(ϕ,Φ) are those where Φ = ∅. We will write
GG(ϕ) for GG(ϕ,∅). For reasons of notational simplicity we will formulate the
following definition of a strategy only for the games GG(ϕ), but they can be defined
for the general case as well.
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Call any finite sequence of legal moves in GG(ϕ) a position of GG(ϕ): any position
is either an (∃)-position, i.e. a position in which (∃) is to move next, or an (∀)-
position. Thus, the set of all GG(ϕ) positions forms a tree T(ϕ) whose nodes (the
positions) are ordered by the subsequence relation.
The most important concept of game theory is that of a strategy. We could define
a strategy σ for (∃) as a set of rules (or as a function) telling (∃) how to choose
her next move in any (∃)-position of the game. But this would be uneconomic in
some sense, because we can exclude some position that can never arise as long as
(∃) plays according to σ in the first place. Thus, our definition of σ will have a
recursive character.
Formally, a strategy σ for (∃) in GG(ϕ) is a subtree of T(ϕ) such that (i) σ is not
empty, (ii) if (ϕ0,Φ0, . . . , ϕn,Φn) ∈ σ, then for all sentences ϕn such that ϕn ∈ Φn−1:
(ϕ0, Φ0, ..., Φn−1, ϕn)∈ σ, and (iii) if (ϕ0, Φ0, ..., Φn−1, ϕn)∈ σ, then for a unique
set Φn such that ϕn depends on Φn: (ϕ0, Φ0,...Φn−1, ϕn,Φn)∈ σ. Thus, σ can be
thought of as a partial function defined on the set of (∃)-positions in GG(ϕ).
Analogously a strategy τ for (∀) can be defined. In this case, roles of (ii) and (iii)
are switched and we must allow that there are (∀)-positions p in which τ does not
tell (∀) how to move next, namely if p is a winning-position for (∃). A strategy σ is
a winning strategy for (∃) in GG(ϕ) iff she wins every run of GG(ϕ) that is compatible
with σ, i.e. every run of GG(ϕ) that is a branch of the tree σ. Informally this means
that she wins every run of the game as long as she keeps to the strategy σ, regardless
of the moves of her opponent (∀). Analogously a winning strategy for (∀) is defined.
It is not hard to prove that for any ϕ the game GG(ϕ) is determined, that is, either
(∃) has a winning strategy in GG(ϕ) or (∀) has a winning strategy in GG(ϕ).4 Recall
that a set Φ is D-sound iff Φ ⊆ D(Φ), where D is Leitgeb’s dependence operator.
Lemma 5.4.1. 1. A set of sentences Φ is D-sound iff for all ψ ∈ Φ there is a
set Ψ ⊆ Φ such that ψ depends on Ψ.
2. If S is D-sound and α < β, then Dα(S) ⊆ Dβ(S).
Proof. 1: Suppose that the right-hand side holds for Φ. Let ϕ ∈ Φ. By assumption
and monotonicity of the dependence relation, ϕ depends on Φ. Hence ϕ ∈ D(Φ).
For the reverse direction assume for a contraposition-argument that there is a ϕ ∈ Φ
such that ϕ does not depends on any Ψ ⊆ Φ. In particular ϕ does not depends on
Φ. Hence ϕ /∈ D(Φ).
2: The proof is by induction on β. If β=1 then the claim holds trivially by
the definition of D-soundness. For β >1 it follows immediately from the induction
hypothesis and the first part of the lemma.
Theorem 5.4.2. Let S be a D-sound set of sentences. Then ϕ is grounded in S iff
(∃) has a winning strategy in the game GG(ϕ, S).
4But notice that for infinite games this property is not trivial.
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Proof. The proof of the direction from left to right is by induction on the rankD of
a grounded sentence ϕ, i.e. the least ordinal α such that ϕ ∈ Dα(S). Let rankD(ϕ)
= α for some ordinal α. Then ϕ depends on Φ, for some Φ ⊂ G(S) whose members
have strictly lower rankD than ϕ.
If Φ ⊆ S then (∃) can choose S as her first move in GG(ϕ, S), and this is a winning
strategy for her. Otherwise Φ 6= ∅, and by induction hypothesis (∃) has a winning
strategy in GG(ψ, S), for all ψ ∈ ϕ. Thus she plays Φ as her first move and whichever
ψ ∈ Φ (∀) chooses next, (∃) simply plays her winning strategy in GG(ψ, S). This is
a winning strategy for her in GG(ϕ, S).
The reverse direction is proved by induction on the strategy-rank of a sentence,
rankG(ϕ) = inf{rank(σ)|σ is a winning-strategy for (∃) inGG(ϕ, S)}
Here, rank(σ) = sup{ rank(τ)+1)| τ is the (∃)-substrategy of σ in GG(ψ, S), ψ is a
possible response for (∀) to (∃)’s first move in σ }. Notice that any winning strategy
for (∃) must be well-founded (as a tree), thus rank(σ) is well-defined. Suppose that
(∃) has a winning strategy σ in GG(ϕ, S). Let rankG(ϕ) = α for some ordinal α.
Without loss of generality we may assume that rank(σ) = α. Then rankG(ψ) < α,
for all ψ ∈ Ψ, where Ψ is the first move of (∃) in σ. Thus by induction hypothesis
all ψ ∈ Ψ are grounded in S. Because S is D-sound and ϕ depends on Ψ, Lemma
5.4.1 (2) yields that ϕ is grounded in S. (Observe that we could have easily proved
rankD(ϕ)= rankG(ϕ) for all grounded sentences ϕ.)
The main reason why we are interested in the grounding game is that reference-
graphs for ϕ can be easily extracted from (∃)’s strategies in GG(ϕ): Let σ be such
a strategy. We define the set of vertices of the reference-graph of σ, called Γ(σ), to
be the set of sentences occurring in σ. A sentence ψ occurs in σ iff ψ is the last
member of a position in the domain of σ, i.e. the last move played by (∀) leading to
this position. Two of its vertices ψ and χ are joined by an arc iff there is an i such
that ψ = ϕi, χ = ϕi+1 and (ϕ0,Φ0, . . . ϕi,Φi, ϕi+1) ∈ σ. Finally, call a graph H a
reference-graph of a sentence ϕ iff there is a strategy σ for (∃) in GG(ϕ) such that
H = Γ(σ).
Strategies in the game GG(ϕ) tell us something about the semantical properties
of the sentence ϕ. The function Γ(·)—one can think of it as a kind of projection
or forgetful-functor from strategies to graphs—associates to each strategy its graph,
that in turn contains some of the strategies semantic information about the sentence.
Theorem 5.4.3. A strategy σ for (∃) in GG(ϕ) is a winning strategy for (∃) iff Γ(σ)
is well-founded.
Proof. A winning strategy for (∃) is a well-founded tree.
This, together with Theorem 5.4.2, yields the following result:
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Corollary 5.4.4. A sentence ϕ is grounded iff ϕ has a well-founded reference-graph.
Let us have a closer look at the structure of the set of strategies resp. at the
structure of the set of reference-graphs of ϕ. For (∃)-strategies σ, τ in GG(ϕ) let us
write σ  τ (σ is a substrategy of τ) iff for any position (ϕ0, Φ0, ..., Φn−1, ϕn) of σ
there exists a position (ψ0, Ψ0,..., Ψn−1, ψn) of τ such that: if ϕi = ψi for all i6n
then Φi ⊆ Ψk for all i 6 n. If for any two such positions one of the ⊆-inclusions is
proper, then we write σ ≺ τ . Accordingly, for graphs G and H let us write H  G
iff H is a subgraph of G and H ≺ G iff H is a proper subgraph of G. Thus, the set
of (∃)-strategies of a sentence ϕ is partially ordered by , as well as the set of its
reference-graphs. Furthermore, σ  τ iff Γ(σ)  Γ(τ).
Let us call a strategy σ in GG(ϕ) (as well as Γ(σ)) redundant iff there is a strategy
τ in GG(ϕ) such that τ ≺ σ. We call a strategy σ the canonical strategy in GG(ϕ)
(and Γ(σ) the canonical reference-graph of ϕ) iff σ is not redundant. Clearly, a
sentence ϕ has a canonical reference-graph iff ϕ has hereditary essential dependence,
i.e. if ϕ depends essentially on some set Φ and each member of Φ in turn depends
essentially on some set, and so on. For example, the liar sentence has hereditary
essential dependence and each member of the (ordinary) Yablo sequence has hered-
itary essential dependence. As another corollary of Theorem 5.3.4 we obtain
Corollary 5.4.5. The canonical reference-graph Γmin(ϕ) of a sentence ϕ exist iff
the sensitivity-graph of ϕ is a reference-graph. If the sensitivity-graph of ϕ is a
reference-graph, it is identical to Γmin(ϕ).
Thus, for each ϕ the set of all reference-graphs of ϕ is partially orderd by  and
has a least element (that might be the empty graph) iff ϕ has hereditary essential
dependence. It has always a largest element, namely the complete graph Kω, i.e.
the graph every sentence occurs as a node of, any two of its nodes being joined by
an arc. (The reason is simply that any sentence depends on ω.)
5.4.2. The verification game
The verification game GT (ϕ, v,F) is quite similar to the grounding game GG(ϕ,Φ),
but this time the players are not dealing merely with sentences ϕ and sets of sen-
tences Φ, but with facts (ϕ, v) and sets of facts F . A fact5 is an ordered pair (ϕ, v),
consisting of a sentence ϕ and a truth value v that can be either 0 or 1. We let
F+ = {ϕ|(ϕ, 1) ∈ F} and F− = {ϕ|(ϕ, 0) ∈ F}. Thus, sets of facts are partial
interpretations of the truth predicate (in the sense of Kripke) considered as a single
set. Therefore, we sometimes identify sets of facts and partial models. We say, for
5The notion of fact was first introduced by Yablo [95]. In the sequel paper, we will say more
about how Yablo’s work relates to ours.
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instance, that F is a sound set of facts, meaning that F considered as a partial
model is sound in the sense of Kripke.6 A second difference to the grounding game
is that a run of the verification game can end in a draw. Before giving a detailed
description of the rules of the verification game, let us state a theorem that analo-
gously to Theorem 5.4.2 gives us an idea of what the players (∃) and (∀) are up to
in the game (a proof of the theorem is given later):
Theorem 5.4.6. Let F be a sound set of facts. Then:
1. ϕ is true in the fixed point of VL generated by F iff (∃) has a winning strategy
in GT (ϕ, 1,F).
2. ϕ is false in the fixed point of VL generated by F iff (∃) has a winning strategy
in GT (ϕ, 0,F).
To every position of the game GT (ϕ, v,F) a mode is associated, the mode that a run
of the game assumes in this position. This mode is either the verification mode or
the falsification mode. The rules of GT (ϕ, v,F) are:
• The game GT (ϕ, 1,F) starts in the verification mode, the game GT (ϕ, 0,F)
starts in the falsification mode.
• (∀) must move first and choose ϕ as his first move ϕ0.
• As her n-th move, (∃) must choose some pair of sets (Φ+n , Φ−n ) such that
Φ+n ∩ Φ−n = ∅, ϕn depends on Φ+n ∪ Φ−n , and V alΦ+n (ϕn) = 1 if the game is in
verification mode, and V alΦ+n (ϕn) = 0 if the game is in falsification mode.
• If n > 0, as his n-th move (∀) must choose some sentence ϕn+1 ∈ (Φ+n \F+)∪
(Φ−n \ F−). If ϕn+1 ∈ Φ+n then play continues in the verification mode. If
ϕn+1 ∈ Φ−n then play continues in the falsification mode.
The winning condition for GT (ϕ, v,F): If a player cannot move according to the
above rules, then the other player wins this run of the game. If a run of the game
goes on forever it is declared a draw.
As with the grounding game, we have a special interest in cases where the set pa-
rameter F denotes the empty set; we then write GT (ϕ, v). The following definitions
are formulated for GT (ϕ, v) but apply to the general case as well.
Strategies for the verification game can be defined analogously as for the grounding
game. A difference, however, lies in the definition of the positions of the game.
An (∃)-position, for example, will not be considered as a sequence of the form
(ϕ0, Φ0, ..., Φn−1, ϕn). Because we want to keep track of the mode of the game,
strategies will look like this instead: ((ϕ0,v0), (Φ
+
0 ,Φ
−
0 ),...,(ϕn−1, vn−1), (Φ
+
n−1,Φ
−
n−1),
6This notion of soundness must not be confused with our notion of D-soundness.
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(ϕn, vn)), where vi is either 1 or 0, according to whether the game is in verification
or falsification mode, respectively. Accordingly, we say that a fact (ψ, v) occurs in
an (∃)-strategy σ iff (ψ, v) is the last member of a position in the domain of σ. A
second difference is that in the verification game there are terminal positions for both
player, while in the grounding game it was only (∀) who could run into a position
where moving further was impossible. Keeping these two differences in mind, the
notion of a (winning) strategy in the verification game can be defined accordingly,
for (∃) as well as for (∀). In addition to the notion of a winning strategy, we also
have to define what a non-losing strategy σ for either player is, namely a strategy
that makes sure that she or he wins or draws each run of the game, as long as she
or he plays according to σ. The notion of determinacy carries over as well. Either
(∃) has a winning strategy in GT (ϕ, v) or (∀) has a non-losing strategy in GT (ϕ, v)
and vice versa. The following theorem states an important relationship between the
grounding and the verification game.
Theorem 5.4.7. Let F be a set of facts. Then player (∃) has a winning strategy in
GT (ϕ, 1,F) or in GT (ϕ, 0,F) iff (∃) has a winning strategy in GG(ϕ,F+ ∪ F−).
Proof. ⇒: Let S = F+ ∪ F− and assume that (∃) has a winning strategy σ in
GG(ϕ, S). By induction on rank(σ) = sup{ rank(τ)+1)| τ is the (∃)-substrategy of
σ in GG(ψ, S), ψ is a possible response for (∀) to (∃)’s first move in σ} we prove that
(∃) has either a winning strategy σ′ in GT (ϕ, 1,F) or in GT (ϕ, 0,F). Notice that
rank(σ) is well-defined, because as a winning strategy for (∃) it is a well-founded
tree.
Let Ψ be (∃)’s σ-response to ϕ. Then ϕ depends on Ψ and by induction hypothesis
(∃) has either a winning strategy σ′ψ in GT (ψ, 1,F) or in GT (ψ, 0,F), for all ψ ∈ Ψ.
Let Ψ+ be the set of all members of Ψ such that the first is the case and Ψ− be the
set of all members of Ψ such that the second alternative holds. If V alΨ+(ϕ)=1, then
playing (Ψ+,Ψ−) as her first move in GT (ϕ, 1,F) followed by σ′ψ as a repesponse
to (∀)’s move ψ is a winning strategy for (∃) in GT (ϕ, 1,F). If V alΨ+(ϕ)=0, then
playing (Ψ+,Ψ−) as her first move in GT (ϕ, 0,F) followed by σ′ψ as a response to
(∀)’s move ψ is a winning strategy for (∃) in GT (ϕ, 0,F).
Notice that the strategey σ′ thus defined is an orientation of the strategy σ, i.e.
for each (∃) move Ψ in σ, Ψ = Ψ+∪Ψ− holds, where (Ψ+,Ψ−) is the (∃)-move in σ′
that canonically corresponds to Ψ, while the canonically corresponding (∀) moves
in σ respectively σ′ are just identical. Moreover, σ′ is the only orientation of σ that
is a winning-strategy for (∃) in either GT (ψ, 1,F) or in GT (ψ, 0,F).
⇐: Suppose has (∀) a winning strategy τ in GG(ϕ,F+ ∪ F−). Consider the
following (∀)-strategy τ ′: If (Φ+,Φ−) is a move by (∃) in GT (ϕ, 1,F), then play the
τ -response to Φ+ ∪Φ−. This is a winning strategy in GT (ϕ, 1,F) for (∀), because τ ′
must be an endless tree: τ ′ is an orientation of τ and thus canonically isomorphic
to τ , and τ as a (∀)-winning in the grounding game is an endless tree.
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Let us define a dependence relation between facts: (ϕ, v) depends on F iff (ϕ, v)
∈ VL(F). The following Lemma as well as its proof are completely analogous to
Lemma 5.4.1.
Lemma 5.4.8. A consistent set of facts F is sound iff for all f ∈ F there is a set
E ⊆ F such that f depends on E.
In short, a set of facts is sound iff it is consistent and closed under the dependence
relation between facts.7
Now we can turn to the
Proof of Theorem 5.4.6. ⇒: Suppose ϕ is true in the fixed point of VL generated
by F . Hence ϕ is grounded in F+ ∪ F− and by Theorem 5.4.2, (∃) has a winning
strategy σ in G(ϕ,F+∪F−). Then the strategy σ′ as defined in the proof of Theorem
5.4.7 is a winning strategy for (∃) in GT (ϕ, 1,F).
⇐: Suppose (∃) has a winning strategy σ′ in GT (ϕ, 1,F). Then by Theorem 5.4.7
(∃) has a winning strategy σ in G(ϕ, F+ ∪ F−). Thus by Theorem 5.4.2, ϕ is
grounded in F+ ∪ F−. Using Lemma 5.4.8 one shows by induction on the D-rank
of ϕ that ϕ is true in the fixed-point of VL generated by F .
The proof of the second part of 5.4.6 is completely analogous.
Now let us see how we can extract signed reference-graphs from verification-
strategies. The first step is to define the unsigned reference-graph Γ(σ) of a (∃)-
strategy in GT (ϕ, v), completely analogous to the grounding-game: A sentence ϕ is
a vertex of Γ(σ) iff for v ∈ {0, 1} the fact (ϕ, v) occurs in σ. Two of its vertices
ψ and χ are joined by an arc in the reference-graph iff for vψ, vχ ∈ {0, 1} the fact
(ψ, vψ) occurs in some position of σ that is assigned to a set of facts which contains
(χ, vχ) as an element. So much for Γ(σ).
The signed reference-graph Γ+−(σ) of σ is obtained from Γ(σ) by labeling its arcs
according to the following rules: First, if there are vψ = vχ ∈ {0, 1} such that (ψ, vψ)
occurs in some position of σ that is assigned to a set of facts which contains (χ, vχ)
as an element, the we put the label ‘+’ on the arc determined by the ordered pair
((ψ, vψ), (χ, vχ)). Second, if there are vψ 6= vχ ∈ {0, 1} such that (ψ, vψ) occurs
in some position of σ that is assigned to a set of facts which contains (χ, vχ) as an
element, then we put the label ‘-’ on the arc determined by the ordered pair ((ψ, vψ),
(χ, vχ)).
In this way at least one label is assigned to every arc of Γ(σ), but unfortunately
we cannot exclude that there are cases where both ‘+’ and ‘-’ are put on the same
arc. Let us call the strategy σ incoherent if this is the case and coherent otherwise.
7 Notice that for set of facts being ‘closed under dependence’ is some kind of ‘downward-closedness‘
while being closed under the operator VL is some kind of ‘upward-closedness‘. Observe that
for any (∃)-strategy σ in the verification game the set of facts (Φ+σ , Φ−σ ) occurring in σ is closed
under the dependence relation by the definition of a strategy.
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Incoherent strategies, awkward as they might be, pose, however, not too much of
a threat to our definition of a signed reference-graphs. Analogously as we have
done for strategies in the grounding-game, we can define a substrategy-relation 
on the set of (∃)-strategies in GT (ϕ, v), comparing sets of facts instead of sets of
sentences occurring in the positions of the strategies. We can prove that for each
strategy τ there is always a strategy σ  τ such that σ is coherent. This means
that incoherence is a phenomenon due to redundency and that we can always cut
out the incoherent part, obtaining a coherent substrategy. Because a substrategy
σ  τ contains more semantic information about the sentence ϕ than τ anyway, we
can completely forget about incoherent strategies and redefine strategy as coherent
strategy.
The introduction of signed reference-graphs seems to us to be of great important
for a full understanding of the notion of paradoxicality. Obviously, the canonical
(unsigned) reference-graph of the liar is identical with the canonical (unsigned)
reference-graph of the truth-teller; but while the liar is clearly paradoxical, the
truth-teller is not. As Herzberger pointed out, both sentences suffer from some
form of semantic regress—they are both pathological—, and this is captured in our
framework by the fact that all of their (unsigned) reference-graphs contain a directed
cycle as a subgraph. However, what distinguishes the liar from the truth-teller, and
causes the former to be paradoxical, is that the liar involves some kind of negative
self-reference, while the truth-teller only exhibits some kind of positive self-reference.
We remark en passant that more parameters should be taken into account for a
full understanding of the paradoxes. For example, we believe that another thing
of utmost importance is where a cycle occurs in a reference-graph. For example,
suppose that the reference-graph of ϕ contains a directed cycle C as a subgraph.
One might speculate that ϕ is dangerous only if ϕ is a vertex of the subgraph C.
However, we have to leave these considerations open for future research.
5.4.3. Kripke-paradoxicality
Strategies in the verification game are more complex than strategies in the grounding
game, containing more information about the semantical properties of a sentence.
Aside from the nice characterization of the groundedly true sentences by Theorem
5.4.6, the main reason why we are interested in the verification game is that we
can also give a characterization of the set of the Kripke-paradoxical sentences just
in terms of strategies of the verification game. Call a (∃)-strategy σ in GT (ϕ, v)
consistent iff the set of facts Fσ occurring in σ is consistent, i.e iff F+σ ∩ F−σ = ∅.
Let us call a strategy for (∃) faithful iff it is a non-losing strategy.
Theorem 5.4.9. A sentence ϕ is has a definite truth value v in some fixed-point
(Φ+,Φ−) of VL iff there is a consistent faithful strategy σ for player (∃) in GT (ϕ, v).
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Proof. ⇒: Suppose ϕ has the truth value v in some fixed point F of VL. By Lemma
5.4.8 for each f ∈ F there is a set E ⊆ F such that ψ depends on E . Thus, using
the Axiom of Choice, we can build up a strategy σ for player (∃) in GT (ϕ, v) layer
by layer. σ is faithful by construction and consistent because F is consistent by
definition.
⇐: Let σ be a consistent faithful strategy for player (∃) in GT (ϕ, v). Let Fσ be
the set of all facts occurring in σ. Then Fσ is consistent. Because σ is a faithful
strategy, for each f ∈ Fσ there is a set E ⊆ Fσ such that ψ depends on E . Hence by
Lemma 5.4.8, Fσ is sound. Hence there is some fixed point (Φ+,Φ−) of VL extending
Fσ and ϕ has the truth-value v in (Φ+,Φ−).
Hence, a sentence ϕ is Kripke-paradoxical (with respect to VL) iff any strategy for
(∃) in GT (ϕ, 1) or in GT (ϕ, 0) is either a losing-strategy for (∃)—i.e. a strategy that
can defeated by some (∀)-strategy—or inconsistent.
Now let us apply our machinery to gain some information on the Kripke-paradoxical
sentences. We need the following preliminary theorem.
Theorem 5.4.10. Let σ be a strategy for (∃) in GT (ϕ, v). Then there is a definite
truth value v∗ and a faithful strategy σ∗ for (∃) in GT (ϕ, v∗) such that Γ(σ∗) = Γ(σ).
For a proof of this deep theorem I refer the reader again to Beringer & Schindler [7].
As a consequence, there are large classes of sentences that can easily be recognized
as not being Kripke-paradoxical (with respect to VL):
We call a signed reference-graph positive iff it has positive arcs only.8
Theorem 5.4.11. If a sentence ϕ has a faithful9 positive signed reference-graph,
then ϕ is not Kripke-paradoxical.
Theorem 5.4.12. If a sentence ϕ has a reference-graph which is a tree, then ϕ is
not Kripke-paradoxical.
Proof. Let σ be a strategy in σ for player (∃) in GT (ϕ, v), for some definite truth
value v, such that Γ(σ) is a tree. By Lemma 5.4.10 we can assume that σ is faithful.
Because Γ(σ) is a tree no sentence ψ occurring in σ can occur in both contexts (ψ, 1)
and (ψ, 0). Thus σ is consistent. By Lemma 5.4.9 ϕ has the definite truth value v
in some fixed point.
If a reference-graph is not a tree then it either contains a directed cycle as a subgraph
or it contains a type of graph as a subgraph that we may call a double path, i.e. a
8Accordingly, call a signed graph negative iff every arc bears the symbol ‘-’. Examples: The
unique orientation of the liar-graph is negative. The unique orientation of the truth-teller-
graph is positive. In the unique orientation of the ordinary Yablo-graph every arc is negative.
9A signed reference-graph is faithful if its strategy is faithful.
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graph consisting of two paths originating both from the same vertex and rejoining
in a different vertex, not touching each other in between.10
ϕ ψ
A double path between ϕ and ψ
Thus, we obtain:
Theorem 5.4.13. If a sentence ϕ is Kripke-paradoxical, then for each reference-
graph Γ of ϕ at least one of the following holds:
1. Γ contains a directed cycle.
2. Γ contains a double path.
It is worth noticing that while the directed cycle is the reference pattern underlying
the liar family, the double path is the reference pattern of any member of the Yablo
sequence. However, it can be shown that if ϕ has a reference graph with no cyles
and only finitely many double arcs, then ϕ is not Kripke-paradoxical. Unlike cycles,
double arcs must come in flocks in order to make a reference-graph dangerous. In
our paper [7] we state a conjecture according to which every reference-graph of a
Kripke-paradoxical sentence is reducible either to the liar or Yablo-graph.
10The reason for this is that reference-graphs emerge from directed trees (namely strategies) by
some collapsing operation.
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A classical untyped theory of truth cannot contain all instances of the T-schema
nor can it contain all compositional principles, on pain of contradiction. Quite a
few authors (e.g. Horwich [47], Restall [77]) have suggested that we ought to accept
those principles at least for all grounded sentences. The notion of groundedness can
be explicated by any of Kripke’s minimal fixed point theories. Kripke’s theories of
truth are semantic. They provide definitions of truth in a metalanguage (usually set
theory, but certain subsystems of second-order arithmetic suffice.) This is not quite
what we need. The main purpose of the truth predicate is to enable us to express and
reason with generalizations. Although we can derive semantic consequence relations
from Kripke’s models, such consequence relations are too complex to be useful in
actual reasoning, because of the complexity of the models. This prompts the search
for axiomatizations of Kripke’s theories of truth. Given the complexity of Kripke’s
construction, such axiomatizations cannot be complete. Thus, what we are aiming
at are axiomatic theories that are sound with respect to the models in question and
that capture important features of them.
6.1. KF and VF
Feferman [20] has given an axiomatization of the Strong Kleene fixed points, while
Cantini [11] has provided an axiomatization of the supervaluational fixed points.
Definition 6.1.1. The system KF (the acronym stands for ‘Kripke-Feferman’) is
obtained from PAT by adding the following 13 axioms:
1. ∀s∀t(T (s=. t)↔ s◦ = t◦)
2. ∀s∀t(T (s 6=. t)↔ s
◦ 6= t◦)
3. ∀t(TT. t↔ Tt◦)
4. ∀t(T¬. T. t↔ (T¬. t◦ ∨ ¬SentT (t◦)))
5. ∀x(SentT (x)→ (T¬.¬. x↔ Tx))
6. ∀x∀y(SentT (x∧. y)→ (T (x∧. y)↔ Tx ∧ Ty))
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7. ∀x∀y(SentT (x∧. y)→ (T¬. (x∧. y)↔ T¬. x ∨ T¬. y))
8. ∀x∀y(SentT (x∨. y)→ T (x∨. y)↔ Tx ∨ Ty))
9. ∀x∀y(SentT (x∨. y)→ (T¬. (x∨. y)↔ T¬. x ∧ T¬. y))
10. ∀x∀v(SentT (∀.vx)→ (T (∀.vx)↔ ∀tT (x(t/v)))
11. ∀x∀v(SentT (∀.vx)→ (T (¬. ∀.vx)↔ ∃tT (¬. x(t/v))))
12. ∀x∀v(SentT (∃.vx)→ (T (∃.vx)↔ ∃tT (x(t/v))))
13. ∀x∀v(SentT (∃.vx)→ (T (¬. ∃.vx)↔ ∀tT (¬. x(t/v))))
The system KF can be seen as being obtained by turning the inductive clauses in
the definition of the Strong Kleene fixed points into axioms (for more on that cf.
Halbach [38, p. 202-204]).
(Cons) is the following principle:
∀x(SentT (x)→ (T¬. x→ ¬Tx))
Proposition 6.1.2 (Cantini, Halbach). KF + (Cons) = KF + T −Out.
KF+(Cons) does not prove more arithmetical theorems than KF alone (cf. Cantini
[10]). KF has a very nice adequacy property:
Proposition 6.1.3. Let S be a partial model. Then S = JSK(S) iff (N, S+)  KF+
(∀x(Tx→ SentT (x))).
(Recall that S+ is the extension of the truth predicate in the partial model S; so
KF somehow captures the closed-off models.) For a proof of the above proposition,
see e.g. Halbach [38]. Feferman has calibrated the proof-theoretic strength of KF:
Theorem 6.1.4 (Feferman [20]). KF proves the same arithmetical sentences as
RAε0.
This result is probably a bit disappointing: Although KF+(Cons) proves T-Out and
thereby satisfies the generalizing function of truth (see section 4.1), its deductive
power is less than that of the Tarskian hierarchy. KF is able to define the truth
predicates of RT up to the level ε0 (as Halbach [38, chap. 15.3] has shown) but
it cannot recover the whole Tarskian hierarchy. However, in a sense it is not the
truth-theoretic axioms of KF that are to blame but rather the fact that PAT does
not contain enough transfinite induction. If one adds more induction to KF, the
extended system can define more levels of the Tarskian hierarchy. Cantini’s system
VF, on the other hand, is impredicative and therefore much stronger than RTε0 .
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Definition 6.1.5. The system VF (the acronym stands for ‘Van Frassen’) is obtained
from PAT by adding the following axioms:
1. ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(Tpϕ(ẋ1, . . . , ẋn)q→ ϕ(x1, . . . , xn))
2. ∀s∀t(T (s=. t)↔ s◦ = t◦)
3. ∀s∀t(T (s 6=. t)↔ s
◦ 6= t◦)
4. ∀x(SentT (x) ∧ ProvPAT (x)→ Tx)
5. ∀x∀v(SentT (∀.vx)→ (∀tT (x(t/v))→ T (∀.vx)))
6. ∀x(Tx→ TpT ẋq)
7. ∀x(T¬. T. ẋ→ T¬. x)
8. ∀x∀y(SentT (x∧. y)→ (T (x→. y)→ (Tx→ Ty)))
9. ∀x(T (pT ẋ→ ¬T¬. ẋq))
In contrast to KF, the axioms of VF do not mirror the inductive process which gen-
erates the fixed points. Several authors have criticised VF because its axioms seem
somewhat unrelated or arbitrary. Halbach has remarked (private communication)
that the axioms of VF rather look like axioms of a modal theory than those of a
truth theory (for example, axiom 5 is just the predicate analogon of the Barcan
formula, axiom 6 that of the S4 axiom, axiom 8 that of the K axiom, axiom 4 is
a restricted version of the necessitation rule etc.). Nevertheless, VF captures the
supervaluational fixed points to a certain extent:
Theorem 6.1.6 (Cantini [11]). Let S be a partial model. If S = JFV (S) is consis-
tent, then (N, S+)  VF.
The converse does not hold, due to complexity of the underlying jump operator.
Theorem 6.1.7 (Cantini [11]). VF proves the same arithmetical sentences as ID1.
The system ID1 has the same proof-theoretic ordinal (namely, the so-called Bachmann-
Howard ordinal1) as the system Π11-CA
−
0 (where the minus indicates that no set pa-
rameters are allowed in the comprehension axioms). They are both impredicative
theories.2
In what sense can KF or VF be viewed as theories of grounded truth? As we have
seen in the last chapters, a set of grounded sentences is generated by an inductive
1Cf. Pohlers [66, chap. 9].
2For a definition of the system ID1, see the appendix.
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process: one starts with a certain set of sentences—say, the set of T-free sentences
or the set of T-free sentences plus all tautologies in the full language LT—and then
one repeatedly adds sentences that semantically depend on (or are grounded in)
the sentences of the previous level until a fixed point is reached. A set generated
in this way is closed under certain operations (depending on the chosen valuation
scheme); normally, they will be closed under (introduction of) negation, conjunction,
disjunction etc. At first sight, neither KF nor VF seem to mirror these closure
conditions. However, Feferman [20, p. 20] noticed the following. One can define a
predicate, G(x), by stipulating
G(x)↔ (SentT (x) ∧ (Tx ∨ T¬. x) ∧ ¬(Tx ∧ T¬. x))
Then the following principles are provable from KF:
1. G(x)→ G(¬. x)
2. G(x)→ G(T. x)
3. G(x) ∧G(y)→ G(x∧. y)
4. G(x) ∧G(y)→ G(x∨. y)
5. ∀tG(x(t/v))→ G(∀.vx))
Thus, one can derive from KF axioms that mirror the closure conditions of the set
of grounded sentences. Feferman also mentions that, instead of using a system like
KF, one could work in a language containing besides a truth predicate T also a
primitive grounding predicate G, which is then axiomatized by principles such as
above. In [20], he is reluctant to do so, saying that the resulting system would be
“formally weaker”, but in [21] he actually proposed such a theory, called DT (the
acronym stands for ‘determinate truth’). DT contains besides grounding axioms all
the compositional truth axioms relativized to G. For example, instead of
Tx∧. y ↔ Tx ∧ Ty
one has
G(x) ∧G(y)→ (Tx∧. y ↔ Tx ∧ Ty)
Simultaneous axiomatizations of groundedness and truth seem to be an interesting
way of axiomatizing Kripke fixed points.
First, one might find a more ‘uniform’ method of axiomatizing minimal Kripke
fixed points; one just has to look at the closure conditions that a certain fixed point
satisfies (usually, these closure conditions can be easily read off of the truth tables
of the valuation scheme in question) and then turn these conditions into axioms for
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groundedness. In particular, in this way we might be able to find an axiomatization
for Leitgeb’s theory of truth.
Second, this approach might be interesting for disquotationalists. KF and VF are
compositional theories of truth and have therefore been rejected by disquotational-
ists such as Horwich. Nevertheless, Horwich flirts with the idea of restricting the
T-schema to grounded sentences in order to block the liar paradox.
The intuitive idea is that an instance of the equivalence schema will be acceptable,
even if it governs a proposition concerning truth [...], as long as that proposition is
grounded [...] ([47, p. 81])
And
A well-known worked-out approach based on the notion of grounding is given in
Saul Kripke’s “Outline of a Theory of Truth” [...], but in a way that invokes Tarski-
style compositional principles. The present suggestion is that such principles can be
avoided, offering a solution that squares with minimalism. ([47, p. 82, fn 11])
Now, one possiblity would be to give axioms for the predicate G and then to adopt,
in addition, the relativized T-schema
G(pϕq)→ (T (pϕq)↔ ϕ)
Similar ideas can also be found in the writings of other authors. For example, Leitgeb
begins his paper by raising the following question: “What kinds of sentences with
truth predicate may be inserted plausibly and consistently into the T-scheme? We
state an answer in terms of dependence: those sentences which depend directly
or indirectly on non-semantic states of affairs (only).” ([55, p. 155]) See also the
discussion by Field [26, chapt. 7.4 and 7.6].
6.2. Simultaneous axiomatizations of groundedness
and truth
In this section we suggest a list of possible axioms for a theory of grounded truth.
We start with an axiom that identifies the concept of grounding in terms of truth:
G0 ∀x(SentT (x)→ (G(x)↔ (Tx ∨ T¬. x)))
This axiom says that the grounded sentences are exactly those that are true or have
a true negation. This is exactly the definition of grounding that Kripke gave: truth
comes first, and grounding is derived. Thus the predicate G is eliminable. However,
on Leitgeb’s approach the order is reversed: grounding is conceptually prior to truth.
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First the grounding hierarchy is defined, then the truth hierarchy is defined based
on the grounding hierarchy. Whether one adopts the predicate G as a primitive
or considers it as an abbreviation according to G0 won’t play a huge role in our
investigations, but let us assume for definiteness that G is a primitive.
We continue with some base and closure axioms. These mirror (1)-(7) of Propo-
sition 5.2.6 stated earlier for Leitgeb’s theory. We discuss the axioms in more detail
after we have presented all of them.
Base Axioms.
G1 ∀x(SentPA(x)→ G(x))
G2 ∀x(SentT (x)→ (ProvPAT (x)→ G(x)))
Closure Axioms.
G3 ∀x(SentT (x)→ (G(T. x)↔ G(x)))
G4 ∀x(SentT (x)→ (G(x)↔ G(¬. x)))
G5 ∀x∀y(SentT (x∨. y)→ (G(x) ∧G(y)→ G(x∨. y)))
G6 ∀x∀y(SentT (x∧. y)→ (G(x) ∧G(y)→ G(x∧. y)))
G7 ∀x∀v(SentT (∀.vx)→ (∀tG(x(t/v))→ G(∀.vx)))
Jump Axiom.
Let Rel(x, y) represent the relation that holds between a closed LT -formula ϕ and
a (finite) sequence of LPA-formulae 〈ψ1(x), . . . , ψn(x))〉 iff every subformula of ϕ of
the form Tt occurs in the context ψi(t) ∧ Tt within ϕ for some i 6 n. We write
∀σ instead of ∀x(seq(x) → . . .), where seq(x) expresses that x is (the code of) a
sequence. We write lh(σ) for the length of σ, and σ(i) for the i-th member of the
sequence σ.
G8 ∀x∀σ(Rel(x, σ) ∧ ∀i < lh(σ)∀v(Sat(v, σ(i))→ G(v))→ G(x))
Here, Sat(x, y) := Ts.(y, x), where s. represents the function s that applied to the
code of a formula ϕ(x) and a number n yields the code of ϕ(n) (cf. section 2.1).3
In a more readable form, G8 simply says that
If for all i 6 n, ψi ⊆ G, then ϕ(ψ1,...,ψn) is grounded
3It would be more natural just to relativize (in the usual sense) all quantifiers to ϕ; however,
the present formulation is more convenient for the proof of proposition 6.3.5 below. Given an
axiom to the effect that G is closed under arithmetical equivalence (as considered in remark 6
below) both formulations would amount to the same.
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where ϕ(ψ1,...,ψn) is the result of relativizing ϕ to the sequence (ψ1, . . . , ψn).
Axioms for Conditional Dependence.
G9 ∀x∀y(SentT (x∨. y)→ (T (x)→ G(x∨. y)))
G10 ∀x∀y(SentT (x∧. y)→ (T (¬. x)→ G(x∧. y)))
G11 ∀x∀y(SentT (x∨. y)→ (T (x∨. y) ∧ T (¬. x)→ G(y)))
G12 ∀x∀y(SentT (x∧. y)→ (T (x∧. y)→ G(x) ∧G(y)))
Axioms of Truth
T1 ∀s∀t(T (s=. t)↔ s◦ = t◦)
T2 ∀t(G(t◦)→ (TT. t↔ Tt◦))
T3 ∀x(SentT (x)→ (G(x)→ (T¬. x↔ ¬Tx))
T4 ∀x∀y(SentT (x∧. y)→ (G(x) ∧G(y)→ (T (x∧. y)↔ Tx ∧ Ty))
T5 ∀x∀y(SentT (x∨. y)→ (G(x) ∧G(y)→ (T (x∨. y)↔ Tx ∨ Ty))
T6 ∀x∀v(SentT (∀.vx)→ (G(∀.vx)→ (T (∀.vx)↔ ∀tT (x(t/v))))
T7 ∀t1 . . . ∀tn(Gpϕ(t1. , . . . , tn. )q→ (Tpϕ(t1. , . . . , tn. )q↔ ϕ(t
◦
1, . . . , t
◦
n)))
Axiom G1 states that all T -free sentences are grounded; this axiom is satisfied in any
Kripke fixed point. Axiom G2 states that all theorems of PAT are grounded. This
captures the thought that everything that is already decided by the base theory is
grounded. We could have added that also all sentences that are refuted by the base
theory are grounded, but this is redundant, because it will follow from the negation
axiom. G2 is sound with respect to the supervaluations and the Leitgeb valuation
scheme, but it is not sound with respect to the Kleene schemes, since, for example,
the disjunction λ ∨ ¬λ is neither grounded under the Strong nor the Weak Kleene
scheme (where λ is again the Liar sentence).
Axioms G3−G7 give closure conditions. This is why most of them have the form
of a conditional rather than a biconditional. The result of adding the right-to-left
direction of G5−G7 is not sound with respect to the Leitgeb and supervaluations
scheme. For example, λ ∨ ¬λ (where λ is the Liar sentence) is grounded relative
to the Leitgeb and the supervaluational scheme, but none of its disjuncts is. In the
case of Strong Kleene, one might add axioms such as:
∀x∀y(SentT (x∨. y)→ (G(x∨. y)→ G(x) ∨G(y)))
If one intends to axiomatize Kripke’s construction with the Weak Kleene scheme,
then one might add even stronger axioms like:
∀x∀y(SentT (x∨. y)→ (G(x∨. y)↔ G(x) ∧G(y))) (G5c)
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Notice that G5c + G2 + T7 is inconsistent over PAT.
The idea underlying the jump axiom G8 is that a sentence that attributes truth
or falsity to some subset(s) of G is itself grounded. For example, if we already know
that the predicate ψ(x) holds only of grounded sentences, then intuitively statements
like ∃x(ψ(x) ∧ Tx) are grounded too. In the statement of the axiom, the formulae
ψi must be arithmetical (i.e. T -free), since otherwise an inconsistency would occur.
Notice that G8 is not sound with respect to the Weak Kleene scheme (roughly, the
conditions for a quantified statement to be true are so strong under WK that they
don’t allow for relativization).
As pointed out (cf. section 5.2), axioms G9−G12 are not satisfied by the Leitgeb’s
scheme; rather, they apply only to the Strong Kleene and supervaluations scheme.
Notice that replacing G(x) ∧ G(y) by G(x∨. y) in the antecedent of T5 would be
unsound with respect to the Leitgeb and supervaluations scheme. For example,
while λ ∨ ¬λ is grounded relative to the Leitgeb and the supervaluations scheme,
none of its disjuncts is. For similar reasons, the antecedent of T4 can not be replaced
by G(x∧. y). For this reason, T7 cannot be derived from T1−T6. However, given
the Strong or Weak Kleene schema, such a replacement is indeed sensible. In that
event, T7 will be derivable and does not have to be assumed as an axiom.
One might consider the idea of adding a further axiom that states that G is closed
under PAT-equivalence:
∀x∀y(ProvPAT (x↔. y) ∧G(x)→ G(y))
This is indeed sound with respect to the Leitgeb and the supervaluational scheme,
but it does not hold under any of the Kleene schemes. The above formula would give
a more unified picture, but would not add anything to the proof-theoretic strength.
Let us quickly present a fairly simple model of G0 + G1 + G3-G8 + T1-T7.
Notice that models now have the form (N, X, Y ), where X ⊆ ω interprets G and
Y ⊆ ω interprets T . Again, we identify sentences with their codes.
Let Σ0 := LPA, and let Σα+1 ⊆ FmT be the smallest superset of Σα such that (i)
whenever ϕ, ψ ∈ Σα, then ϕ∧ψ, ϕ∨ψ,¬ϕ, Tpϕq ∈ Σα+1, (ii) whenever ϕ(t) ∈ Σα for
all t, then ∀xϕ ∈ Σα+1, (iii) whenever ψ1(x), . . . , ψn(x) are T -free formulae each of
which (elementarily) defines a subset of Σα and ϕ is relativized (in the above sense)
to the sequence of ψi(x)’s, then ϕ ∈ Σα+1. At limit points, we take unions. Let Σ
be the fixed-point of this hierarchy. This will serve as our grounding hierarchy.
The set of grounded truths is extracted as usual: let Γ0 := ∅, put Γα+1 := {ϕ ∈
Σα+1|(N,Γα)  ϕ}, and take unions at limit points. Let Γ be the fixed-point of this
hierarchy. Then (N,Σ,Γ)  G0 + G1 + G3-G8 + T1-T7, as is easily verified.
One might also start with Σ0 := LPA ∪ {ϕ|PAT ` ϕ}, thus obtaining a model of
G0-G8 + T1-T7. I assume that the models so obtained are proper subsets of the
minimal Leitgeb fixed point, but I have no proof of this.
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Ignoring for a moment the special Weak Kleene axiom G5c, it is easily seen that
the Leitgeb fixed points satisfy all axioms except those for conditional dependence.
The Strong Kleene fixed points satisfy all axioms except G2, which states that all
theorems of PAT are grounded. The supervaluational fixed points satisfy all of the
axioms presented above:4
Definition 6.2.1. 1. LG := PAT + G0-G8 + T1-T7
2. WKG := PAT + G0-G1 + G3-G7 + G5c + T1-T7
3. SKG := PAT + G0-G1 + G3-G12 + T1-T7
4. VFG := PAT + G0-G12 + T1-T7
We might also consider subsystems of the above theories that are obtained by drop-
ping the compositional truth axioms. A theory which should be acceptable from
a minimalist point of view is given by PAT + G1 + G8 + T7. G1 says that all
T -free sentences are grounded, while G8 says that the result of attributing truth or
falsity to sets of grounded sentences yields again a grounded sentence. T7 is just
the relativized T-schema. Let us call this theory MG. It is easily seen that TB is a
subtheory of MG. In fact, MG contains the theory UTB, i.e. the theory that extends
PAT by all instances of the (strong) uniform T-schema
Tpϕ(t1. , . . . , tn. )q↔ ϕ(t
◦
1, . . . , t
◦
n)
where ϕ is a T -free sentence. The acronym stands for ‘uniform Tarski-biconditionals’.
As we will see in the next section, MG actually interprets ε0-many iterations of UTB.
The following is obvious:
Theorem 6.2.2. 1. If S = JL(S), then (N,JL(S)+)  LG.
2. If S = JWK(S), then (N,JWK(S)+) WKG.
3. If S = JSK(S), then (N,JSK(S)+)  SKG.
4. If S = JFV (S), then (N,JFV (S)+)  VFG.
Under the Leitgeb and the supervaluational scheme, we start with the same initial
set of grounded sentences —the arithmetical sentences plus all all theorems of PAT.
But the supervaluational hierarchy grows more in width —it satisfies the axioms
for conditional dependence, whereas Leitgeb’s does not. This is why (N,J∞L (∅)+)
does not satisfy the claim that Modus Ponens preserves truth (cf. section 5.2). The
4In the above definition, we assume that PAT now comprises induction axioms for the full language
(including the new predicate G).
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minimal Strong Kleene fixed point, on the other hand, satisfies the same growth
axioms as the supervaluational one, but it starts with a smaller initial set—it only
satisfies G1 but not G2; this is why the Strong Kleene fixed point does not satisfy
the global reflection principle for PAT.
6.3. Proof-theoretic analysis
(N,J∞SK(∅)+) is usually axiomatized by the Kripke-Feferman system KF, which
has the same proof-theoretic strength as the system of Ramified Analysis up to ε0,
RAε0 , while (N,J∞FV (∅)+) is usually axiomatized by Cantini’s VF, which has the
same proof-theoretic strength as the system ID1 of elementary inductive definitions.
What can be said about the proof-theoretic strength of the systems LG, WKG, SKG,
VFG and MG?
Proposition 6.3.1. Assume PAT as background theory. Then:
1. G1 + T7 ` ∀t1 . . . tn(Tpϕ(t1. , . . . , tn. )q↔ ϕ(t
◦
1, . . . , t
◦
n)), for all ϕ ∈ LPA.
2. G0 + T7 ` ∀t1 . . . ∀tn(Tpϕ(t1. , . . . , tn. )q→ ϕ(t
◦
1, . . . , t
◦
n)), for all ϕ ∈ LT .
3. G0 +G4 + T3 ` ∀x(SentT (x)→ (T¬. x→ ¬Tx)).
4. G0 +G4 + T3 ` ∀x(SentT (x)→ (T¬.¬. x↔ Tx)).
5. G0 +G7 + T6 ` ∀x∀v(SentT (∀.vx)→ (∀tT (x(t/v))→ T (∀.vx))).
6. G0 + T6 ` ∀x∀v(SentT (∀.vx)→ (T (∀.vx)→ ∀tT (x(t/v)))).
7. G0 +G11 + T3 + T5 ` ∀x∀y(SentT (x→. y)→ (T (x→. y)→ (Tx→ Ty))).
8. G0 +G12 + T4 ` ∀x∀y(SentT (x∧. y)→ (T (x∧. y)↔ Tx ∧ Ty)).
9. G0 +G3 + T2 ` ∀t(TT. t↔ Tt◦).
10. G0 + G4 + G9 + G11 + T3 + T5 + T7 ` Tpϕq ∨ Tp¬ϕq → ((ϕ → Tpψq) ↔
(Tpϕ→ ψq)).
11. PAT ` ϕ⇒ G2 + T7 ` Tpϕq .
Proof. Straightforward. For example, in order to prove (7), assume that Tx and
T (x→. y), i.e. T (¬. x∨. y) holds. Tx and (4) imply T¬.¬. x. An application of grounding
axiom G11 yields Gy. By axiom G4 we also get that G¬. x. Thus by our initial
assumption and truth axiom T5 we have T¬. x∨ Ty. But from T¬.¬. x and axiom T3
we get ¬T¬. x. Thus Ty must hold, as desired.
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Theorem 6.3.2. PAT + G0-G2 + G4 + G7 + G9 + G11 + T1-T7 relatively
interprets IDAcc1 .
Proof. Cantini [11] has shown that properties (1), (2), (5), (7), (10) and (11) of
Proposition 6.3.1 suffice to establish the desired result. See also Halbach [34, chap.
26].
Since IDAcc1 and ID1 prove the same arithmetical theorems, we obtain:
Corollary 6.3.3. VFG proves all arithmetical theorems of ID1.
Next, we will show that that the systems LG and SKG are at least as strong as the
systems of ramified analysis up to ε0. In order to do so, we show that both LG and
SKG are able to define all truth-predicates of the system of Ramified Truth RTε0 .
We first define sublanguages Lα of LT for each α ≺ ε0. Those sublanguages of LT
can be seen as a translation of the Tarskian hierarchy of truth. This translation
goes back to an idea of Kripke [53, p. 710], but seems to have made its first formally
precise appearance in a paper by Halbach [35].
Definition 6.3.4. The sublanguages Lα of LT are defined by recursion over the
ordinals up to ε0. L0 is just LPA. For 0 ≺ α ≺ ε0, ϕ is a formula of the language Lα
iff there are β1, . . . βn ≺ α such that every occurrence of a subformula Tt of ϕ occurs
in the context Sent(βi, t) ∧ Tt for some 0 < i 6 n, where Sent(βi, x) represents the
set of Lβi-sentences.
We can define ‘x is a sentence of Lα’ as follows, using Kleene’s recursion theorem
(where OT (x) expresses that x is an ordinal term):
Sent(α, x)↔ [OT (α) ∧ ∃σ, τ < x(lh(σ) = lh(τ) ∧Rel(x, σ)∧
∧∀u < lh(τ)(OT (τ(u)) ∧ τ(u) ≺ α ∧ σ(u) = pSent(τ(u̇), v0)q))]
Using transfinite induction, one can then show that the languages Lα for α ≺ ε0 are
provably grounded:
Proposition 6.3.5. For all δ ≺ ε0,
PAT +G1 +G8 + T7 ` ∀ζ ≺ δ∀x(Sent(ζ, x)→ G(x)).
Proof. Let ϕ(v) be the formula ∀x(Sent(v, x) → G(x)). PAT proves transfinite
induction for every δ ≺ ε0, i.e. for all δ ≺ ε0 PAT proves:
∀α(∀β ≺ αϕ(β)→ ϕ(α))→ ∀ζ ≺ δϕ(ζ).
So assume
∀β ≺ α∀x(Sent(β, x)→ G(x)). (I.H.)
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Then it suffices to show that
∀x(Sent(α, x)→ G(x)).
Therefore let x be given and assume Sent(α, x). Then PA proves
OT (α) ∧ ∃σ, τ < x(lh(σ) = lh(τ) ∧Rel(x, σ)∧
∧∀u < lh(τ)(OT (τ(u)) ∧ τ(u) ≺ α ∧ σ(u) = pSent(τ(u̇), v0)q)).
Let σ, τ < x and u < lh(τ) = lh(σ) be as above. Because the formula Sent(τ(u), v0)
is arithmetical and PAT + G1 + T7 proves the uniform T-biconditionals for all
LPA-formulae, we get
∀u∀v0(TpSent(τ(u̇), v̇0)q↔ Sent(τ(u), v0)). (6.1)
Since τ(u) ≺ α, (I.H.) yields
∀z(Sent(τ(u), z)→ G(z)). (6.2)
Because σ(u) = pSent(τ(u̇), v0)q, (6.1) and (6.2) yield
∀z(Ts.(σ(u), z)→ G(z)).
Since this holds for all u < lh(σ), Axiom G8 yields G(x).
In what follows, we write ϕα(t) for the formula Sent(α, t) ∧ Tt.
Proposition 6.3.6. For all α ≺ ε0, PAT + G1 + G3-G8 + T1-T7 proves:
1. ∀s∀t(ϕα(s=. t)↔ s◦ = t◦)
2. ∀x(Sent(α, x)→ (ϕα(¬. x)↔ ¬ϕα(x)))
3. ∀x∀y(Sent(α, x∧. y)→ (ϕα(x∧. y)↔ ϕα(x) ∧ ϕα(y)))
4. ∀x∀y(Sent(α, x∨. y)→ (ϕα(x∨. y)↔ ϕα(x) ∨ ϕα(y)))
5. ∀x∀v(Sent(α, ∀.vx)→ (ϕα(∀.vx)↔ ∀tϕα(x(t/v))))
6. ∀t(Sent(β, t◦)→ (ϕα(ϕβ. (t))↔ ϕβ(t
◦))) for β ≺ α
7. ∀t∀β ≺ α(Sent(β, t◦)→ (ϕα(ϕβ. (t))↔ ϕα(t
◦)))
Proof. (1) is just a restriction of T1. (2) follows from T3 and the fact that every
sentence of Lα is grounded by Lemma 6.3.5. For (3), just observe that if x ∧ y is a
sentence of Lα, then both x and y are also sentences of Lα. Thus, the claim follows
by Lemma 6.3.5 and T4. (4) and (5) are proved in the same manner. For (6), use
T7 and Lemma 6.3.5; for (7), use T2 and Lemma 6.3.5.
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An application of the recursion theorem then shows that both LG and SKG relatively
interpret RTε0 . (Proposition 6.3.6 alone does not establish the truth definability of
the Tarskian hierarchy, because the predicates ϕα apply to syntactically different
sentences.)
Proposition 6.3.7. The recursion theorem for primitive recursive functions yields
the existence of a primitive recursive translation function τ : Lε0T → LT such that:
τ(ψ) =

s = t, if ψ := s = t
ϕα(τ. (t)) if ψ := Tαt
¬τ(χ) if ψ := ¬χ
τ(χ) ∧ τ(δ) if ψ := χ ∧ δ
∀xτ(χ) if ψ := ∀xχ
where τ. is a function symbol for τ in LT .
Using Proposition 6.3.6, one can then show:
Proposition 6.3.8. For all α ≺ ε0 and ϕ ∈ Lε0T :
If RTα` ϕ, then PAT + G1 + G3−G8 + T1−T7 ` τ(ϕ).
As an immediate consequence we get:
Theorem 6.3.9. Both LG and SKG define all truth predicates of RTε0.
Thus, SKG is at least as strong as KF, and VFG is as least as strong as VF. Hence,
nothing is lost (in proof-theoretic strength) when we pass from KF to SKG or from
VF to VFG. The system LG for Leitgeb’s theory proves all arithmetical sentences
of KF. Let us next investigate the system WKG. We need the following result by
Fujimoto.
Theorem 6.3.10 (Fujimoto [29]). Let S ⊇ PA be an LT -theory that derives the
following, for some formula D(x).
1. D(x)↔ (Tx↔ ¬T¬. x)
2. ∀s∀t(T (s=. t)↔ s◦ = t◦)
3. ∀s∀t(T (s 6=. t)↔ s
◦ 6= t◦)
4. (D(x) ∧D(y))→ (D(¬. x) ∧D(x∧. y) ∧D(x→. y))
5. D(x∨. y)→ (T (x∨. y)↔ (Tx ∨ Ty))
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6. D(x→. y)→ (T (x→. y)↔ (Tx→ Ty))
7. D(∀.vx)→ (T (∀.vx)↔ ∀tTx(t/v))
8. Transfinite induction in LT up to (but not necessarily including) α.
Then S defines all truth predicates of RTα.
Theorem 6.3.11. WKG defines all truth predicates of RTε0.
Proof. It suffices to show that WKG satisfies Theorem 6.3.10, taking the predicate
G(x) for D(x) and ε0 for α. By G0 and T3 it follows that G(x) satisfies item 1.
Item 2+3 follow from G1+T7. Item 4 is an immediate consequence of G4-G6. Item
5 follows from G5c+T5. Item 6 follows from G5c + T3 + T5. We give the proof in
some detail. Notice that T (x→. y) is defined as T (¬. x∨. y).
1. G(¬. x∨. y) Premise 1
2. T (¬. x∨. y) Premise 2
3. Tx Premise 3
4. G¬. x ∧Gy 1, Axiom G5c
5. ¬T¬. x 3, 4, Axiom G4, T3
6. T¬. x ∨ Ty 2, 4, Axiom T5
7. Ty 5, 6, Modus Ponens
8. G(¬. x∨. y)→ (T (¬. x∨. y)→ (Tx→ Ty)) 1-7
1. G(¬. x∨. y) Premise 1
2. Tx→ Ty Premise 2
3. ¬Tx ∨ Ty 2, definition →
4. G¬. x ∧Gy 1, Axiom G5c
5. ¬Tx↔ T¬. x 4, Axiom T3
6. T¬. x ∨ Ty 3, 5, logic
7. T (¬. x∨. y) 4, 6, Axiom T5
8. G(¬. x∨. y)→ ((Tx→ Ty)→ T (¬. x∨. y)) 1-7, logic
Item 7 follows from G0+T6. Item 8 is satisfied because PAT is a subtheory of
WKG.
Finally, let us have a look at the minimalist theory MG. Let IUTBα be the result
of iterating the typed disquotational theory UTB α-many times. More precisely,
IUTBα is the theory in the language of the Tarskian truth hierarchy Lα+1T that is
obtained from PAT by adding typed uniform T-biconditionals
∀t1 . . . ∀tn(Tαpϕ(t1. . . . tn. )q↔ ϕ(t
◦
1 . . . t
◦
n)
for every formula ϕ ∈ LαT . The acronym IUTB stands for ‘iterated uniform Tarski-
biconditionals’. Proposition 6.3.5 implies:
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Proposition 6.3.12. For every ϕ ∈ Lα with α ≺ ε0 we have:
MG ` ∀t1 . . . ∀tn(Tpϕ(t1. . . . tn. )q↔ ϕ(t
◦
1 . . . t
◦
n)
Corollary 6.3.13. MG defines all truth predicates of IUTBε0.
I conjecture that MG is conservative over PAT, although I have no proof of this.
However, by adding uniform reflection principles to MG, one can obtain a strong
theory. Halbach [37] has shown that reflecting on UTB already yields the axioms of
the typed compositional theory CT. One might conjecture that uniform reflection
for MG yields the Tarskian hierarchy RT up to the ordinal ε0.
6.4. Comparison
We conclude with some final remarks. All of the compositional systems introduced
above prove the consistency axiom (Cons). It can be consistently added to KF, but
is usually not a part of it, because it differs in character from the other axioms of
KF.5 Here we have it as a consequence. Furthermore, T-Out and the claim that
Modus Ponens preserves truth are also consequences of our theories, but they are
again no part of KF in its usual setting, even though they can be consistently added;
in fact, they are consequences of KF + (Cons).
The systems LG and VFG prove the weak T-rule (property (11) of Proposition
6.3.1). As far as I can see, it is not possible to derive the stronger global reflection
principle for PAT in these systems. It is possible to prove that all axioms of predicate
logic are true, that all axioms of PA are true and that the usual inference rules of
predicate logic are truth-preserving. However, the most straightforward proof that
all instances of induction containing the truth predicate are true requires that the
truth predicate is complete, i.e. that for all x, either Tx or T¬. x. And this is not
a theorem of LG or of VFG.6 Of course, the reflection principle can consistently
be added to both LG and VFG (it can also consistently be added to SKG, but the
principle is not sound with respect to the Strong Kleene fixed points). I refrained
from doing so because it differs in character from the other axioms.
Notice that VFG plus global reflection for PAT proves axioms V1−V8 of Cantini’s
VF. As we have already remarked, some authors complain that the axioms of VF
seem somewhat unrelated and lack a common denominator. I hope the present
axiomatization shows that it is possible to reformulate VF in a way that has the
appearance of a theory of grounded truth.
The disquotational theory MG might be of interest to authors such as Horwich.
In his paper [47], Horwich proposes to restrict the T-schema to sentences that are
5Cf. the discussion in Feferman [20], pp. 19−20.
6Notice that the completeness axiom is inconsistent with T-Out.
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grounded. However, he explicitly rejects Kripke’s approach because it “invokes
Tarski-style compositional rules” (p. 82, fn 11). Horwich therefore suggests that the
concept of grounding may be adapted in such a way that it squares with minimalism.
He proposes to regard a sentence ϕ as grounded iff
[ϕ or its negation ¬ϕ] is entailed either by the non-truth-theoretic facts, or by those
facts together with whichever truth-theoretic facts are ‘immediately’ entailed by them
(via the already legitimized instances of the equivalence schema), or ... and so on.
[47, p. 81]
We might try to formalize this proposal as follows. Let H0 := Th(N) be the theory
of the standard model of arithmetic, i.e. the set of arithmetical truths. Let Γn :=
Hn + T  Hn, where T  Hn denotes the T-schema restricted to members of Hn.
Then let
Hn+1 := {ϕ ∈ LT |Γn  ϕ or Γn  ¬ϕ}
where  is first-order consequence. Then we may let H := Hω :=
⋃
nHn be the set
of grounded sentences (in the sense of Horwich).
Notice that H satisfies axioms G1, G2, G3, G4, G5 and G6, but not G7 or
G8. So the problem with Horwich’s proposal is that there will be many intuitively
grounded sentences that won’t count as grounded according to his definition. For
example, while both Tpϕq, Tp¬ϕq will be in H for every LPA-sentence ϕ, the sentence
∀x(SentPA(x)→ Tx ∨ T¬. x) won’t be in H, because such universal statements are
not logically implied (in first-order logic) by their instances. Furthermore, iterating
the above construction into the transfinite is of no use, because anything entailed by
Hω is already entailed by some Hn, by the compactness of first-order logic (notice
that in the above definition, we would get an extensionally equivalent definition if
we replace  by `). But a notion of grounding according to which the statement
‘All sentences of the base language have a definite truth-value’ is not grounded is
hardly convincing.
We have seen (section 4.2) that Horwich flirts with the idea of the ω-rule. So
suppose that we would replace  by `ω in the above defintion. Then, first, we
could iterate the hierarchy into the transfinite (i.e. the fixed point would lie well
beyond ω) and second, axioms G7 and G8 would be satisfied too.
So it seems that MG—in fact, the extension of MG by axioms G2-G7—is a theory
not involving “Tarski-style compositional rules” and minimalists might embrace it.
In chapter 9, we will propose disquotational theories similar in spirit to MG that are
deductively much stronger than any of the theories considered so far.
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Part III.
Truth, Definability, and
Comprehension

7. Truth-sets and second-order
structures
We have seen in chapter 1.2 that truth (or satisfaction) and set-theoretic membership
are closely related. Given the uniform T-biconditional
∀x(Tpϕ(ẋ)q↔ ϕ(x))
we can interpret the syntactic object pϕ(x)q as the set {x|ϕ(x)}. The objective of
this and the following chapters is to investigate this relationship in a more system-
atic manner. We will first show how to canonically associate, with any extension
(interpretation) of the truth predicate (which we call a ‘truth-set’), a structure (in-
terpretation) for the language of second-order arithmetic. Second, we will give a
translation of the language of second-order arithmetic into the language of truth.
We will show that the translation of a second-order sentence is true in a truth-set if
and only if the original sentence is true in the second-order structure associated with
the truth-set. This correspondence can be used for quite a few interesting purposes.
We will show that if S = (S+, S−) is the minimal Kripke fixed point under an appro-
priate valuation scheme V , then S+ is Π11-hard and that (N, S+) is a model of (the
translation of) the impredicative theory ID1. For the minimal fixed points under
the Strong Kleene and the supervaluational scheme, these results have already been
shown by Cantini (cf. [10], [11]). The main innovation here is that our proof also
applies to Leitgeb’s theory of truth. We also show that any Kripke fixed point of
an appropriate valuation scheme satisfies the disquotational theory PUTB and that
PUTB, when taken over logic alone, interprets Robinson arithmetic Q. In chapter
8 we show, using similar techniques, that the sets definable over standard model of
the Tarskian hierarchy RT are exactly the hyperarithmetic sets. In chapter 9 we
utilize the correspondence to establish the consistency of disquotational theories of
truth that are obtained by translating comprehension axioms into T-biconditionals.
These results also show that disquotational theories of truth can be much stronger
than our best compositional theories of truth.
7.1. The Translation Lemma
Let us first introduce the language of second-order arithmetic.
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Definition 7.1.1. 1. The language L2 of second-order arithmetic is obtained
from LPA by adding the binary relation symbol ∈ plus set variables X0, X1, X2, . . .
(Let us call v0, v1, . . . number variables.) This gives us new formulae of the
form t ∈ X and ∀Xϕ. L2 is a two-sorted first-order language with usual (first-
order) rules for both set and number quantifiers. A formula ϕ of L2 is called
arithmetical if does not contain bound set variables. (Free set variables are
allowed.)
2. Standard models for L2 have the form (N,M), where M ⊆ ℘(ω) and the set
variables Xi range over the elements of M.
Recall that standard models of LT have the form (N, S), where N interprets the
arithmetical vocabulary and S ⊆ ω interprets the truth predicate T . Let us call S
a truth-set . Any truth-set S ⊆ ω gives rise to a canonical second-order structure
(N,MS) as follows:
Definition 7.1.2. Let S ⊆ ω and ϕ ∈ Form1T (=an LT -formula with exactly one
free variable).
1. Sϕ = {n|#ϕ(n) ∈ S} ⊆ ω
2. MS = {Sϕ|ϕ ∈ Form1T} ⊆ ℘(ω)
3. MtotS = {Sϕ|ϕ ∈ Form1T , ϕ S-total} ⊆ ℘(ω)
Here, a formula ϕ(x) is called S-total iff (N, S)  ∀x(Tpϕ(ẋ)q∨Tp¬ϕ(ẋ)q). As before,
we occasionally identify expression with their codes. Accordingly, we also write Sk
for Sϕ, provided that k = #ϕ.
(N,MS) and (N,MtotS ) are structures for the language of second-order arithmetic,
L2. In the terminology of Cantini [10], [11], MS is the envelope of S, and MtotS is
the section of S. We note the following:
Proposition 7.1.3. If S = (S+, S−) is a Kripke fixed point, then MS+ coincides
with the collection of sets that are weakly definable in S, and MtotS+ coincides with
the collection of sets that are strongly definable in S.
Proof. If S is a Kripke fixed point, then
(S+)ϕ = {n|#ϕ(n) ∈ S+}
= {n|V (S)(Tpϕ(n)q) = 1}
= {n|V (S)(ϕ(n)) = 1}
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Furthermore, we observe the following:
Proposition 7.1.4. If MS contains all Π1n-sets (Σ1n-sets), then S is Π1n-hard (Σ1n-
hard).
Proof. By definition, S is Π1n-hard iff for every Π
1
n-set P there is a recursive function
such that n ∈ P iff f(n) ∈ S. Let P be given. Then by assumption P = Sϕ ∈ MS
for some ϕ(x). Set f(n) := #ϕ(n).
Consider the following translation function from the language L2 to the truth lan-
guage LT .
Definition 7.1.5. The function ∗ : L2 → LT is defined as follows:
v∗i = v2i, X
∗
i = v2i+1
0
∗
= 0, f(t1, . . . , tn)
∗ = f(t∗1, . . . , t
∗
n)
(s = t)∗ = (s∗ = t∗), (¬ϕ)∗ = ¬ϕ∗, (ϕ ∧ ψ)∗ = ϕ∗ ∧ ψ∗
(t ∈ Xi)∗ = Ts.(v2i+1, t∗)
(∀viϕ)∗ = ∀v2iϕ∗
(∀Xiϕ)∗ = ∀v2i+1(Fm1T (v2i+1)→ ϕ∗)
Here, the predicate Fm1T (x) naturally represents the set of (codes of) formulae of
LT that contain exactly one free variable; the function symbol s. represents the
substitution function described in the introduction. On the above translation, the
formula t ∈ X is translated as
The result of substituting t for the free variable in (the formula) X∗ is true
Sometimes it is convenient to add set constants to L2. GivenMS, we let Sϕ denote
the set Sϕ. We expand our above translation function by letting
(t ∈ Sϕ)∗ = Ts.(pϕq, t∗)
If h is a variable assignment for (N,MS), define the assignment h∗ for (N, S) by
h∗(v2i) = h(vi) and h
∗(v2i+1) = min{k | Sk = h(Xi), k ∈ Form1T}.
Proposition 7.1.6. Let h be an assignment for (N,MS). Then t(N,MS),h = t∗(N,S),h
∗
for all number terms t of L2.
The following important proposition shows that the translation of a second-order
sentence is true in a truth-set if and only if the original sentence is true in the
second-order structure associated with that truth-set.
Proposition 7.1.7 (Translation Lemma). Let S ⊆ ω, let ϕ(~y, ~X, ~Sγ) ∈ L2, and let
h be an assignment for (N,MS). Then:
(N,MS), h  ϕ⇔ (N, S), h∗  ϕ∗
103
7. Truth-sets and second-order structures
Proof. By induction on the complexity of formulae. The case s = t is trivial.
Consider t ∈ Xi, where t is any term. Let t(N,MS),h = n and h(Xi) = A. There’s
a k such that k = min{m | Sm = A}. Then
(N,MS), h  t ∈ Xi ⇔ n ∈ A
⇔ n ∈ Sk
⇔ s(k, n) ∈ S
⇔ (N, S)  Ts.(k, n)
⇔ (N, S), h∗  Ts.(v2i+1, t∗)
Consider t ∈ Sγ, where t is any term. Let t(N,MS),h = n. Then
(N,MS), h  t ∈ Sγ ⇔ n ∈ Sγ
⇔ s(#γ, n) ∈ S
⇔ (N, S)  Ts.(pγq, n)
⇔ (N, S), h∗  Ts.(pγq, t∗)
The cases ¬ψ, ψ ∧ χ and ∀xψ follow easily from the I.H.
Finally, consider ∀Xiψ and let M = {k|∀m(Sm = Sk → k 6 m)}.
(N,MS), h  ∀Xiψ ⇔ ∀A ∈MS : (N,MS), h(A : Xi)  ψ (7.1)
⇔ ∀k ∈ Form1T : (N,MS), h(Sk : Xi)  ψ (7.2)
⇔ ∀k ∈M : (N,MS), h(Sk : Xi)  ψ (7.3)
⇔ ∀k ∈M : (N, S), h∗(k : v2i+1)  ψ∗ (7.4)
⇔ ∀k ∈ Form1T : (N, S), h∗(k : v2i+1)  ψ∗ (7.5)
⇔ (N, S), h∗  ∀v2i+1(Fm1T (v2i+1)→ ψ∗) (7.6)
The implication from (7.3) to (7.2) follows from the definition of M and the exten-
sionality of sets. The equivalence between (7.3) and (7.4) is given by the inductive
hypothesis, since [h(Sk : Xi)]
∗ = h∗(k : v2i+1) for every minimal k. The step from
(7.4) to (7.5) is justified because in translated formulae, such as ψ∗, v2i+1 occurs
only in contexts of the form Ts.(v2i+1, t). By the definition of the sets Sk, if Sm = Sk
then
(N, S), h′  Ts.(k, t)↔ Ts.(m, t),
for any term t and assignment h′.
We briefly introduce a second translation function. The LT -predicate tot(x) is de-
fined as Fm1T (x) ∧ ∀y(Tx(ẏ) ∨ T¬. x(ẏ)).
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Definition 7.1.8. The function ∗∗ : L2 → LT is defined as the function ∗ except for
the following clause:
(∀Xiϕ)∗∗ = ∀v2i+1(tot(v2i+1)→ ϕ∗∗)
If h is a variable assignment for (N,MtotS ), define the assignment h∗∗ for (N, S) by
h∗∗(v2i) = h(vi) and h
∗∗(v2i+1) = min{k | Sk = h(Xi), k ∈ Form1T , k is S-total}.
Proposition 7.1.9 (Translation Lemma II). Let S ⊆ ω, let ϕ(~y, ~X, ~Sγ) ∈ L2, and
let h be an assignment for (N,MtotS ). Then:
(N,MtotS ), h  ϕ⇔ (N, S), h∗∗  ϕ∗∗
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 7.1.7.
7.2. Complexity of fixed-point theories
The Translation Lemmata can be used to establish lower bounds on the recursion-
theoretic complexity of certain semantical theories of truth. We will first relate
Kripke fixed points to inductive sets.
We briefly recall some concepts and results from Moschovakis [62]. Suppose that
ϕ(x,X) is an arithmetical L2-formula (with all free variables displayed) in which X
occurs only positively. The operator Γϕ : ℘(ω)→ ℘(ω) given by ϕ is defined by
Γϕ(S) = {n|N  ϕ(n, S)}
This operator is monotone in the sense that, whenever S ⊆ S ′, then Γ(S) ⊆ Γ(S ′).
Let I0ϕ = ∅, Iα+1ϕ = Γϕ(Iαϕ), and Iγϕ =
⋃
α<γ I
α
ϕ , when γ is a limit ordinal. Let
Iϕ := I
κ
ϕ where κ is least with I
κ
ϕ = I
κ+1
ϕ .
If P is a Π11-set then there is an LPA-formula ψ(x) such that for all n, n ∈ P iff
〈〈∅〉, n〉 ∈ Iϕ, where ϕ(x,X) is
Seq((x)0) ∧ (ψ(x) ∨ ∀t〈(x)0 a t, (x)1〉 ∈ X)
Here, Seq(u) expresses that u is the code of a (finite) sequence of natural numbers,
u a t denotes the concatenation of the sequence u with the sequence 〈t〉, 〈∅〉 denotes
the empty sequence, 〈〉 is some pairing function, and (x)i refers to the i-th argument
of x.
Now, given an arithmetical L2-formula ϕ(v0, X0) with exactly the displayed vari-
ables free and X0 occurring positively, let ιϕ := pϕ∗(v0, s22. (v1, v1))q and Iιϕ :=
s22. (ιϕ, ιϕ). Observe that
Iιϕ = s
2
2. (ιϕ, ιϕ)
= pϕ∗(v0, s22. (ιϕ, ιϕ))q
= pϕ∗(v0, Iιϕ)q
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The definition of the term Iιϕ is due to Cantini [10]. Observe that ϕ
∗(v, Iιϕ) is
Seq((v)0) ∧ (ψ(v) ∨ ∀tTs.(Iιϕ, 〈(v)0 a t), (v)1〉)
Definition 7.2.1. A valuation scheme V is nice iff the following conditions hold:
1. if ψ ∈ LPA and N  ψ then V (S)(ψ ∨ ϕ) = 1
2. if V (S)(ϕ) = 1 and ψ ∈ LPA then V (S)(ψ ∨ ϕ) = 1
3. a conjunction is true under V if both conjuncts are true under V
4. if for all n, f(n) ∈ S, then V (S)(∀xTf. (x)) = 1
5. an LPA-sentence is true (false) under V iff it is true (false) in the standard
model
6. V is classically sound.
Recall that a valuation scheme is classically sound if every sentence that has a
definite truth value in a partial model has the same truth value in its close-off. The
Strong Kleene scheme, the Leitgeb scheme and all supervaluational schemes are nice.
The Weak Kleene scheme, however, is not nice, as it does not satisfy property (1)
and (2).
Theorem 7.2.2. Assume that V is nice and that ϕ(x,X) is as above. Then for all
α ∈ ON we have:
Iαϕ = (J αV (∅)+)ϕ∗ := {n|V (J αV (∅))(Tpϕ∗(n, Iιϕ)q) = 1}
Proof. By transfinite induction on α.
α = 0: Since J 0V (∅) = ∅, we get (J αV (∅)+)ϕ∗ = ∅ = I0ϕ.
α = β + 1: By I.H. (J βV (∅)+)ϕ∗ = Iβϕ . Let n ∈ (J
β+1
V (∅)+)ϕ∗ , that is,
n ∈ {m|V (J β+1V (∅))(Tpϕ
∗(m, Iιϕ)q) = 1}
By definition of Kripke jump, V (J βV (∅))(ϕ∗(n, Iιϕ)) = 1. By classical soundness
of V , we have (N,J βV (∅)+)  ϕ∗(n, Iιϕ). Then the I.H. and the Translation Lemma
yield N  ϕ(n, Iβϕ), whence n ∈ Iβ+1ϕ .
For the other direction, assume that N  ϕ(n, Iβϕ), whence by I.H. and Translation
Lemma (N,J βV (∅)+)  ϕ∗(n, Iιϕ). This implies N  Seq((n)0), and by property (5)
of a nice valuation this also holds under V . Furthermore,
(N,J βV (∅)
+)  ψ(n) ∨ ∀tTs.(Iιϕ, 〈(n)0 a t, (n)1〉)
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By property (3) of a nice valuation, it suffices to show that
V (J βV (∅))(ψ(n) ∨ ∀tTs.(Iιϕ, 〈(u)0 a t, (n)1〉)) = 1
Now, either (N,J βV (∅)+)  ψ(n), so the result follows from property (1) of a nice
valuation. On the other hand, if (N,J βV (∅)+)  ∀tTs.(Iιϕ, 〈(u)0 a t, (n)1〉), then the
claim follows from property (4) and (2) of a nice valuation.
α is a limit ordinal: by I.H. and definition we get:
(J αV (∅)+)ϕ∗ =
⋃
β<α
{n|V (J βV (∅))(Tpϕ
∗(n, Iιϕ)q) = 1} =
⋃
β<α
Iβϕ = I
α
ϕ
Corollary 7.2.3. If V is nice and S = (S+, S−) = J∞V (∅) then
1. MS+ ⊇ {P |P is Π11}
2. S+ is Π11 − hard
Proof. If P is a Π11-set then for all n, n ∈ P iff (〈∅〉, n) ∈ Iϕ, so (1) follows from the
previous theorem.
(2) follows from (1) and Proposition 7.1.4.
Notice the following:
Corollary 7.2.4. If V is nice, S = (S+, S−) = J∞V (∅) and S+ is itself Π11, then
S+ is Π11-complete and MS+ = {P |P is Π11}.
Proof. It suffices to show that MS+ ⊆ {P |P is Π11}. This follows, under the as-
sumptions, from the fact that every set weakly definable over S is elementary on
S.
The above results imply that the extension of the minimal fixed points under the
Strong Kleene scheme, the Leitgeb scheme and all supervaluational schemes are
Π11-complete. For the minimal fixed points under the Strong Kleene and the super-
valuational scheme, these results have already been shown by Cantini (cf. [10], [11]).
The main innovation here is that our proof also applies to Leitgeb’s theory of truth.
The above results imply that the close-off of minimal fixed points of nice valuations
satisfy the (translation of the) axioms of the system ID1, to which we now turn.
Definition 7.2.5. The language of ID1 extends the language LPA by a predicate
constant Iϕ for every arithmetical L2-formula ϕ(v0, X0) (with exactly the displayed
variables free) in which the free set variable X0 occurs only positively (i.e. it does
not appear in the scope of an odd number of negation signs). We may identify
expressions of the form Iϕ(t) with t ∈ Iϕ and regard Iϕ as a set constant. On the
intended interpretation, the set constant Iϕ is interpreted by the least fixed point
generated (or the inductive relation defined) by the formula ϕ.
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Definition 7.2.6. ID1 is the theory in LID1 that contains in addition to the axioms
of PA and full induction in LID1 all axioms of the form
∀x(ϕ(x, Iϕ)→ Iϕ(x))
and
∀x(ϕ(x, ψ)→ ψ(x))→ ∀x(Iϕ(x)→ ψ(x))
Here, ϕ(x, ψ) is obtained from ϕ(x,X) by replacing every occurrence of t ∈ X by
ψ(t) and of ¬(t ∈ X) by ¬ψ(t). The system ÎD1 is the theory in LID1 that contains
in addition to the axioms of PA and full induction in LID1 all axioms of the form
∀x(ϕ(x, Iϕ)↔ Iϕ(x))
In order to translate ID1 into LT , expand the above translation function ∗ by letting
(Iϕ)
∗ = Iιϕ and (t ∈ Iϕ)∗ = Ts.(Iιϕ, t∗).
Corollary 7.2.7. If V is nice and S = (S+, S−) = J∞V (∅), then (N, S+)  (ID1)∗.
Now we will relate the Kripke fixed points to the hyperarithmetical sets. A set P
is hyperarithmetical iff both P and its complement are inductive on N (i.e. both P
and its complement are Π11). Call a valuation scheme V negation-normal iff either
both ϕ,¬ϕ have definite opposed truth values or neither has a definite truth value.
Theorem 7.2.8. If S = (S+, S−) = J∞V (∅)+ and V is nice and negation-normal,
then
MtotS = {X ⊆ ω|X is ∆11} = HY P.
Proof. “⊆”: Assume that ϕ is S-total. We have to show that Sϕ is ∆11. Under
the assumptions, Corollary 7.2.4 implies that both Sϕ and S¬ϕ are Π
1
1. Now by
negation-normality, ¬ϕ is S-total too, therefore S¬ϕ is the complement of Sϕ, which
means that Sϕ must be Σ
1
1. Thus Sϕ is both Σ
1
1 and Π
1
1, hence it is ∆
1
1.
“⊇”: If Y is hyperarithmetical then
n ∈ Y ↔ ϕ(〈〈∅〉, n〉, Iϕ)
for some ϕ and
n /∈ Y ↔ χ(m, Iψ)
↔ ¬ϕ(〈〈∅〉, n〉, Iϕ)
for some m and χ. This implies that ϕ∗(〈〈∅〉, x〉, Iιϕ) is S-total, and the latter
defines Y in S.
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Definition 7.2.9. ∆11 − CA0 is the theory in L2 that contains in addition to the
axioms of PA all comprehension axioms
∀~Y ∀~y∀x(ϕ(x, ~y, ~Y )↔ ψ(x, ~y, ~Y ))→ ∀~Y ∀~y∃X∀x(x ∈ X ↔ ϕ(x, ~y, ~Y )),
where ϕ(x, ~y, ~Y ) ∈ L2 is a Π11-formula and ψ(x, ~y, ~Y ) ∈ L2 is a Σ11-formula, and the
induction axiom
∀X(0 ∈ X ∧ ∀x(x ∈ X → x+ 1 ∈ X)→ ∀x(x ∈ X)).
The minimal ω-model of the system ∆11 − CA0 is the structure (N, HY P ).
Let Stot consist of the codes of those sentences ϕ(n) such that ϕ(x) is S-total and
#ϕ(n) ∈ S. Notice that MtotS =MStot .
Corollary 7.2.10. Let S be the extension of the truth predicate in the minimal
fixed-point under the Weak Kleene, the Strong Kleene, the FV supervaluations or
the Leitgeb valuation scheme. Then
1. (N, Stot)  (∆11 − CA0)∗.
2. (N, S)  (∆11 − CA0)∗∗.
Proof. Ad 1. SinceMtotS = HY P by Theorem 7.2.8 and (N, HY P )  ∆11−CA0, the
claim follows from the Translation Lemma 7.1.7.
Ad 2. SinceMtotS = HY P by Theorem 7.2.8 and (N, HY P )  ∆11−CA0, the claim
follows from the Translation Lemma II 7.1.9.
The correspondence between truth-sets and second-order models that we have es-
tablished in this chapter seems to me to be a good way to measure the amount of
second-order quantification that a semantic theory of truth is able to mimick. The
theorems of this section indicate then, I think, a certain lower bound on the proof-
theoretic strength that we should expect from a good axiomatization of the minimal
Kripke fixed points. For example, a semantic theory that encodes all inductive sets
should be axiomatized by a theory that formalizes the theory of inductive defini-
tions, ID1. Looking back at the systems introduced so far, only VF and VFG meet
this requirement, while KF, SKG, LG etc. fall short of our expectations.1 Burgess
has given a variant of KF, called KFB (the acronym stands for ‘Kripke-Feferman-
Burgess’) that does have the same strength as ID1. The additional strength over
KF is obtained by adding a minimality axiom scheme which basically says that if
ϕ(x) satisfies the KF axioms, then all true sentences fall under the extension of ϕ(x)
(cf. Halbach [38, chap. 17] for details). Another way to strengthen KF, which has
1But note that KF is not intended as an axiomatization of the minimal SK fixed point but of all
fixed points; not all of them satisfy ID1.
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already been pointed out by Cantini [10, p. 105], is to add the translation of the
second axiom scheme of ID1 to KF, that is
KF + (∀x(ϕ(x, ψ)→ ψ(x))→ ∀x(Iϕ(x)→ ψ(x)))+ ` (ID1)+
Theorem 7.2.7 shows that the resulting system is still sound with respect to the
minimal Strong Kleene fixed point.
7.3. Positive disquotation
Before closing this chapter, we briefly mention some results on positive disquotation.
Definition 7.3.1. PUTB is the theory in LT that extends PAT by all sentences of
the form
∀t1 . . . ∀tn(Tpϕ(t1. , . . . , tn. )q↔ ϕ(t
◦
1, . . . , t
◦
n))
where ϕ is T -positive.
Cantini has shown that PUTB proves the existence of fixed points for elementary
positive operators of LPA.
Theorem 7.3.2 (Cantini [10]). PUTB ` (ÎD1)∗.
Proof. Since ϕ is X-positive, ϕ∗ is T -positive, so the following is an axiom of PUTB:
∀t1∀t2(Tpϕ∗(t1. , t2. )q↔ ϕ
∗(t◦1, t
◦
2))
Letting t2 = Iιϕ we get
∀t1(Tpϕ∗(t1. , Iιϕ)q↔ ϕ
∗(t◦1, Iιϕ))
which implies
∀v0(Tpϕ∗(v̇0, Iιϕ)q↔ ϕ∗(v0, Iιϕ))
The latter is short for
∀v0(Ts.(pϕ∗(v0, Iιϕ)q, v0)↔ ϕ∗(v0, Iιϕ))
Since Iιϕ = pϕ∗(v0, Iιϕ)q, substitution of identicals yields
∀v0(Ts.(Iιϕ, v0)↔ ϕ∗(v0, Iιϕ))
which is the translation of ∀v0(v0 ∈ Iϕ ↔ ϕ(v0, Iϕ)).
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We have already seen that the close-offs of minimal fixed points of nice valuations
satisfy (ID1)
∗ and therefore (ÎD1)
∗. But do all of them also satisfy PUTB? If the
valuation schemes are ‘strong’ in the sense below, the answer is ‘yes’. In fact, this
applies not only to the minimal fixed points but to all of them.
Definition 7.3.3. A valuation scheme V is strong iff the following conditions hold:
1. a T-free statement is true (false) under V iff it is true (false) in the standard
model N
2. if ϕ is true under V , then ϕ ∨ ψ is true under V
3. if for all n, ϕ(n) true under V , then ∀xϕ is true under V
4. If tN ∈ S+ then V (S)(Tt) = 1.
5. V is classically sound.
Observe that every strong valuation scheme is nice, but not necessarily the other
way round. The Strong Kleene and all supervaluational schemes are nice. The Weak
Kleene scheme and the Leitgeb scheme are not nice, because both violate condition
(2).
Proposition 7.3.4. Suppose that V is strong and S = (S+, S−). Let ϕ be a T-
positive formula (i.e. T does not occur in the scope of an odd number of negation
signs). Then
(N, S)  V ϕ⇔ (N, S+)  ϕ
Here, the expression (N, S)  V ϕ is short for V (S)(ϕ) = 1. Notice that (N, S) 2 V ϕ
means that either V (S)(ϕ) = 0 or V (S)(ϕ) = 1
2
.
Proof. The left-to-right direction follows from the classical soundness of V . The
right-to-left direction is proved by induction on the build-up of the T-positive for-
mula ϕ. If ϕ is of the form s = t or s 6= t, this follows from property (1) of a strong
valuation scheme. If ϕ is of the form Tt, this follows from property (4) of a strong
valuation. If ϕ is a disjunction, the claim follows from the induction hypothesis and
property (2) of a strong valuation, and similarly for a quantified statement, using
property (3). (Since ϕ is T-positive, the negation case does not occur.)
Theorem 7.3.5. If V is strong and S = (S+, S−) is any fixed point of JV , then
(N, S+)  PUTB.
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Proof. Let ϕ be a T-positive sentence and assume that (N, S+)  ϕ. Then Propo-
sition 7.3.4 shows that (N, S)  V ϕ, which implies by the fixed point property that
(N, S)  V Tpϕq. So by the classical soundness of V we get (N, S+)  Tpϕq. Now as-
sume that (N, S+) 2 ϕ. Since V is classically sound, ϕ has value 0 or 1
2
in the partial
model S and consequently, ϕ /∈ S+. So (N, S+)  ¬Tpϕq. So (N, S+)  ϕ↔ Tpϕq for
all T-positive ϕ, whence by standardness (N, S+)  PUTB.
Question 7.3.6. If S is the minimal (any) fixed point of the Leitgeb valuation
scheme VL, do we have (N, S+)  PUTB?
We close this section with an interesting ‘ontological’ result. Let us denote by
PUTB− the theory, formulated in LT , that contains as axioms all sentences of the
form
∀x1 . . . ∀xn(Tpϕ(ẋ1, . . . , ẋn)q↔ ϕ(x1, . . . , xn))
where ϕ is T -positive, plus first-order logic. No non-logical axiom of PA is an axiom
of this theory. The next theorem shows that positive disquotation, on its own, forces
the existence of infinitely many objects.
Theorem 7.3.7. PUTB− relatively interprets Robinson arithmetic Q.
Proof. By a result of Montagna & Mancini [61], it suffices to show that PUTB−
interprets adjunctive set theory, AS, i.e. interprets the following two claims:
∃y∀x¬(x ∈ y)
and
∀z∀w∃y∀x(x ∈ y ↔ x ∈ w ∨ x = z)
We show that both claims are derivable by interpreting x ∈ y as Ts.(y, x). Now,
since x 6= x is a T -positive formula, the following is an axiom of PUTB−:
∀x(Tpẋ 6= ẋq↔ x 6= x)
Written out in full this is:
∀x(Ts.(px 6= xq, x)↔ x 6= x)
from which we deduce in pure logic
∃y∀x¬Ts.(y, x)
For the second axiom of AS, note that the formula Ts.(w, x) ∨ x = z is T -Positive,
so we have as an axiom:
∀z∀w∀x(TpTs.(ẇ, ẋ) ∨ ẋ = żq↔ Ts.(w, x) ∨ x = z)
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Let ϕ := Ts.(w, x) ∨ x = z. So the axiom really says:
∀z∀w∀x(Ts.(s22. (s.
3
3(pϕq, z), w), x)↔ Ts.(w, x) ∨ x = z)
Instantiating the quantifiers ∀z∀w to z, w, we get:
∀x(Ts.(s22. (s.
3
3(pϕq, z), w), x)↔ Ts.(w, x) ∨ x = z)
By existential weakening,
∃y∀x(Ts.(y, x)↔ Ts.(w, x) ∨ x = z)
Now we re-introduce the universal quantifers and get
∀z∀w∃y∀x(Ts.(y, x)↔ Ts.(w, x) ∨ x = z)
as desired.
The above theorem should bear some relevance on discussions about deflationism
and conservativity. According to (some versions of) deflationism, truth is a ‘thin’
notion that does not contribute anything to our knowledge of the world. Horsten
[44], Ketland [49] and Shapiro [84] have argued then that conservativness over the
arithmetical base theory is essential to deflationism. Special attention (cf. Field
[23]) has been paid to the role of mathematical induction, because most theories of
truth are conservative over their base theory if induction is not allowed for formulae
containing the truth predicate, while many truth theories prove new arithmetical
statements if full induction is available. In particular, uniform positive disquotation,
if formulated over PAT, relatively interprets the theory ÎD1, while, if formulated over
PA, does not prove any new arithmetical statements (as Cantini [10] has shown).
However, even if uniform positive disquotation conservatively extends PA (if full in-
duction is dropped), this does not mean that positive disquotation is metaphysically
‘light’, being highly non-conservative over logic.
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8. Hyperarithmetic sets and ramified
truth
In this section we consider the Tarskian hierarchy up to the level ωCK1 . The main
goal of this section is to prove that the sets definable in that hierarchy are exactly
the hyperarithmetical sets. This was first proved by Halbach [33]. We give slightly
different proofs due to the present author, using the methods introduced in the last
chapter.
Definition 8.0.8. The standard model of RTωCK1 is defined as follows. Let
R0 = {#ϕ|N  ϕ, ϕ ∈ LPA}
and let
Rα+1 = {#ϕ|(N, (Rβ)β6α)  ϕ, ϕ ∈ Lα+1T }
Let Rγ be the union of the Rα for α < γ if γ is a limit ordinal.
In the above definition, Rβ ⊆ ω interprets the truth predicate Tβ. Similar to the
preceeding chapter, the truth-set Rβ can be seen as encoding a collection of sets of
natural numbers as follows. The following definition is not restricted to the Rβ but
applies to any interpretation of the language of ramified truth that respects the type
restrictions.
Definition 8.0.9. For any sequence (Sα)α<ωCK1 with Sα ⊆ L
α
T and ϕ ∈ LαT let
(Sα)ϕ = {n|#ϕ(n) ∈ Sα}
and
MSα = {(Sα)ϕ|ϕ ∈ LαT}
Then MSα ⊆ ℘(ω). Hence
(N, (MSα)α<ωCK1 ) = (N,MS0 ,MS1 , . . . ,MSα ,MSα+1 , . . .)
is a structure for Lω
CK
1
2 , the language of predicative (ramified) analysis.
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The Rα−hierarchy defined in 8.0.8 is monotone. Moreover:
Proposition 8.0.10. Let α < β and ϕ ∈ LαT . Then the following holds for all
n ∈ ω :
#ϕ(n) ∈ Rβ ⇔ #ϕ(n) ∈ Rα
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Definition 8.0.8.
Corollary 8.0.11. Let ϕ ∈ LαT . Then for all β > α:
(Rα)ϕ = (Rβ)ϕ
The goal of this section is to prove that the standard model of RT encodes exactly
the hyperarithmetical sets, that is HYP = MR
ωCK1
. Kleene has shown that the
hyperarithmetical sets are exactly those that are definable in the language of ramified
analysis, Lω
CK
1
2 (see below).
Definition 8.0.12. For α 6 ωCK1 let Lα2 = LPA ∪ {X
β
i |β < α, i ∈ ω}, where X
β
i is
a unary second-order predicate variable.
We first translate the formulae of ramified analysis into formulae of the language of
the Tarskian hierarchy. As before, the main idea is to translate t ∈ Xβ as the result
of substituting t for the free variable in the formula x is true at level β.
Definition 8.0.13. The translation function ∗ : Lω
CK
1
2 → L
ωCK1
T is defined as follows:
(xi)
∗ = x5i , (X
α
i )
∗ = x3n5i , where n = pαq
0∗ = 0, f(t1, . . . , tn)
∗ = f(t∗1, . . . , t
∗
n)
(s = t)∗ = (s∗ = t∗), (¬ϕ)∗ = ¬ϕ∗, (ϕ ∧ ψ)∗ = ϕ∗ ∧ ψ∗
(t ∈ Xαi )∗ = Tαs.((Xαi )∗, t∗)
(∀xϕ)∗ = ∀x∗ϕ∗
(∀Xαi ϕ)∗ = ∀(Xαi )∗(Fmα((Xαi )∗)→ ϕ∗)
Here, Fmα(x) expresses that x is a formula of LαT with exactly one free variable.
If h is a variable assignment for (N, (MSβ)β6α), define the assignment h∗ for (N, (Sβ)β6α)
by h∗(x5i) = h(xi) and h
∗(x3pβq5i) = min{#ϕ | (Sβ)ϕ = h(Xβi )}.
Proposition 8.0.14. Let h be an assignment for (N, (MSβ)β6α). Then
t(N,(MSβ )β6α),h = t∗(N,(Sβ)β6α),h
∗
for all number terms t of Lα+12 .
We have:
Proposition 8.0.15 (Translation Lemma III). For all α < ωCK1 , ϕ ∈ Lα+12 :
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(N, (MSβ)β6α), h  ϕ iff (N, (Sβ)β6α), h∗  ϕ∗
Proof. By induction on the complexity of formulae. The case s = t follows from the
previous proposition.
Consider t ∈ Xγi , where t is any term and γ 6 α. Let n be the denotation of t
under h in N. and h(Xγi ) = (Sγ)ψ. There’s a χ s.t. #(χ) = min{#ϕ | (Sγ)ϕ =
(Sγ)ψ}. Then
(N, (MSβ)β6α), h  t ∈ X
γ
i ⇔ n ∈ (Sγ)ψ
⇔ n ∈ (Sγ)χ
⇔ #χ(n̄) ∈ Sγ
⇔ (N, (Sβ)β6α)  Tγpχ(n̄)q
⇔ (N, (Sβ)β6α)  Tγs.(pχq, n̄)
⇔ (N, (Sβ)β6α), h∗  Tγs.(x3pγq5i , t∗)
The cases ¬ψ, ψ ∧ χ and ∀xψ follow easily from the I.H.
Finally, consider ∀Xγi ψ, where γ 6 α, and let Mνγ be the set of formulae χ of L
γ
T
whose code #(χ) is the smallest generating (Sγ)χ, i.e. for any formula ζ of LγT , if
(Sγ)ζ = (Sγ)χ then #χ 6 #ζ.
(N, (MSβ)β6α), h  ∀X
γ
i ψ ⇔ ∀A ∈MSγ : (N, (MSβ)β6α), h(A : X
γ
i )  ψ (8.1)
⇔ ∀χ ∈ LγT : (N, (MSβ)β6α), h((Sγ)χ : X
γ
i )  ψ (8.2)
⇔ ∀χ ∈Mνγ : (N, (MSβ)β6α), h((Sγ)χ : X
γ
i )  ψ (8.3)
⇔ ∀χ ∈Mνγ : (N, (Sβ)β6α), h∗(pχq : x3pγq5i)  ψ∗ (8.4)
⇔ ∀χ ∈ LγT : (N, (Sβ)β6α), h
∗(pχq : x3pγq5i)  ψ
∗ (8.5)
⇔ (N, (Sβ)β6α), h∗  ∀x3pγq5i(Fmγ(x3pγq5i)→ ψ∗) (8.6)
The implication from (8.3) to (8.2) is due to the extensionality of sets. The equiva-
lence between (8.3) and (8.4) is given by the inductive hypothesis, since [h((Sγ)χ :
Xγi )]
∗ = h∗(pχq : x3pγq5i) for every minimal χ. The step from (8.4) to (8.5) is jus-
tified because in translated formulae, such as ψ∗, x3pγq5i occurs only in the context
of Tγs.(x3pγq5i , t). By the definition of the truth-sets (Sγ)ϕ, if #(ϕ) > #(χ) and
(Sγ)ϕ = (Sγ)χ then
(N, (Sβ)β6α), h∗  Tγs.(pϕq, t)↔ Tγs.(pχq, t)
for any term t and assignment h∗.
Definition 8.0.16 (Ramified Analytical Sets). The setsRAα are defined as follows.
RA0 = the collection of arithmetically definable sets. RAα+1 = the set of X ⊆ ω
such that there is a ϕ ∈ Lα+12 and ϕ defines X in (N, (RAβ)β6α) (where we assume
that the variables Xβ take values in RAβ for β 6 α). At limits we take unions.
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Notice that this hierarchy is monotone. The hierarchy can be iterated beyond the
ordinal ωCK1 . Monotonicity will then yield an ordinal such that RAα = RAα+1.
The least such α is called β0 and is well beyond ω
CK
1 . The hierarchy of ramified
analytical sets is the second-order version of Gödel’s constructible hierarchy. We
have RAα = Lα ∩ ℘(ω), where Lα refers to the α-th level of the constructible
hierarchy. I mention here that (N,RAβ0) is a model of classical analysis Z2, i.e. of
full second-order arithmetic. (More on this can be found in the Appendix.) This will
be important in the next chapter. For now we are only interested in the following
important result, which is due to Kleene.
Theorem 8.0.17 (Kleene [51]). RAωCK1 = HYP.
In order to prove our main result, we need the following preliminary lemma.
Proposition 8.0.18. Let α < ωCK1 and ϕ ∈ LαT . Assume that RAβ = MRβ for
all β < α. Then there is a ψ ∈ LαT such that ψ is in the range of the translation
function ∗ and (Rα)ϕ = (Rα)ψ (i.e. ϕ and ψ define the same set over the standard
model of the Tarskian hierarchy).
Proof. This is proved by an induction on the build-up of ϕ. The claim is trivial if ϕ
is an equation. So let ϕ(x) := Tβf(x), where β < α and f(x) is some term of LPA.
Halbach [34, p. 122] has shown that there is a formula χ(x) ∈ Lα2 such that
(N, (Rγ)γ6β)  Tβv ⇔ (N, (RAγ)γ6β)  χ(v)
(Roughly, χ(x) is a definition of the Tarskian truth predicate of level β.) Since by
assumption RAγ = MRγ for all γ < α, the translation lemma together with the
above equivalence implies
(N, (Rγ)γ6β)  Tβf(x)⇔ (N, (Rγ)γ6β)  χ∗(f(x))
So χ∗(f(x)), which is in the range of the translation function, defines the same
set as Tβf(x). If ϕ(x) is not atomic, the claim follows easily from the induction
hypothesis.
Theorem 8.0.19. RAα =MRα for all ordinals α < ωCK1 .
Proof. By transfinite induction. It is easily checked that MR0 = the collection of
arithmetically definable sets = RA0.
Successor case:
Let X ∈ RAα+1. Thus X = {n|(N, (RAβ)β6α)  ϕ(n)} for some ϕ(x) ∈ Lα+12 .
Hence
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n ∈ X ⇔ (N, (RAβ)β6α)  ϕ(n)
⇔ (N, (MRβ)β6α)  ϕ(n) by I.H.
⇔ (N, (Rβ)β6α)  ϕ∗(n) by Prop. 8.0.15
⇔ #ϕ∗(n) ∈ Rα+1 since ϕ∗ ∈ Lα+1T
Thus X = (Tα+1)ϕ∗ ∈MTα+1 .
For the other direction, let X = (Tα+1)ϕ = {n|#ϕ(n) ∈ Tα+1} ∈ MRα+1 , where
ϕ ∈ Lα+1T . Notice first that n ∈ X ⇔ #ϕ(n) ∈ Rα+1 ⇔ (N, (Rβ)β6α)  ϕ(n). Since
by induction hypothesis MRγ = RAγ for all γ 6 β, Proposition 8.0.18 implies that
there is a ψ ∈ Lα+12 such that ϕ defines the same set as ψ∗. Thus
n ∈ X ⇔ #ϕ(n) ∈ Rα+1
⇔ (N, (Rβ)β6α)  ϕ(n)
⇔ (N, (Rβ)β6α)  ψ∗(n)
⇔ (N, (MRβ)β6α)  ψ(n) by Prop. 8.0.15
⇔ (N, (RAβ)β6α)  ψ(n) by I.H.
Hence X ∈ RAα+1.
Limit case:
Let X ∈ RAλ. Thus X ∈ RAα for some α < λ. By I.H. RAα = MTα .
Hence X = {n|#ϕ(n) ∈ Tα} = (Tα)ϕ for some ϕ ∈ LαT . By Corollary 8.0.11,
X = (Tα)ϕ = (Tλ)ϕ ∈MTλ .
For the other direction, let X ∈ MTλ . So X = (Tλ)ϕ for some ϕ ∈ LαT , where
α < λ. By Corollary 8.0.11, X = (Tα)ϕ ∈MTα = RAα ⊆ RAλ.
As an immediate consequence we get:
Theorem 8.0.20. The sets definable in L
ωCK1
T over the standard model (N, (Rα)α6ωCK1 )
are exactly the hyperarithmetical sets.
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9. Stratified truth
Many philosophers have noted that there are certain similarities (but also differ-
ences) between the semantic and the class paradoxes. In this chapter we have a
look at some solutions to the class paradoxes, in the hope that they might help
us with blocking the semantic paradoxes. In partcular, I think that Russell’s work
might help us a bit. Russell had a logical notion of class: ‘a class may be defined
as all the terms satisfying some propositional function.’ Examples of propositional
functions include ‘x is a prime number’ or ‘x is human’. Since we can write down
a formula characterizing the ordinal numbers, it seems that the ordinal numbers do
form a logical collection. The logical notion of class leads itself very easily to the
naive comprehension axiom scheme that causes paradox. Russell saw basically two
possibilities to react to that situation:
The first one is to deny that every propositional function determines a class. Ac-
cordingly, the task is to restrict the comprehension axiom scheme in a plausible
way. The difficulty then is to seperate the legitimate from the non-legitimate in-
stances of comprehension. This is more or less the same problem that truth theorists
are confronted with: we have to find restrictions on the legitimate instances of the
T-schema.
The alternative is to dispense with classes altogether. This leads in the direction
of the no-classes theory that we considered in section 1.2
Both routes are explored in Russell’s [79] paper On Some Difficulties in the The-
ory of Transfinite Numbers and Order Types (1905). Concerning the first option,
Russell suggests two ways to adress the problem of dividing the bad from the good
propositional functions. The first approach is the so-called zigzag theory. The sec-
ond is the theory of limitation of size. Roughly, the zigzag theory places restrictions
on the complexity of propositional functions, while the limitation of size approach
bans classes that are in some sense too big. Since the limitation of size approach
does not seem to be applicable to the semantic paradoxes, we will only consider the
zigzag approach here.
9.1. Zigzag theories
The general idea behind the zigzag approach is that only syntactially ‘simple’ for-
mulae determine an extension. It is natural to think of the set of simple formulae as
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being closed under negation. Thus, if a class u exists, then so does its complement
u. Now if ψ is a condition that does not determine a class and u is an arbitrary class,
then there must be members of u that do not satisfy ψ or there are members of u
that do satisfy ψ. (For otherwise there would be an u such that x ∈ u↔ ψ(x), and
hence ψ would determine a class, contrary to our assumption.) This is the zigzag
property which gives the theory its name. Since there are certain seemingly simple
conditions (such as x = x) that are satisfied by all terms, zigzag theories do not
blame the size of certain classes for the paradoxes: the existence of the universal
class is provable in such theories.
Russell tried to give an axiomatization of the predicate ‘x is a simple propositional
function’ but was never quite satisfied with his results. We therefore have a look at
Quine’s [73] NF and then at Esser’s [17] positive set theory. These might be called
zigzag theories insofar as both settle on instances of the comprehension scheme that
satisfy simple syntactic constraints.1
Russell’s substitutional theory of classes (cf. section 1.2) has led him to the dis-
covery of the theory of logical types. However, set theorists have rejected typing
as an approach to the class paradoxes very much like truth theorists have rejected
typing as a solution to the semantic paradoxes. Quine’s idea is to drop all indices
from the language, thus working with an untyped language, but to allow compre-
hension only for formulae that can be viewed as a ‘translation’ of a typed formula.
More precisely, we call a formula ϕ stratified iff there is a function f that assigns
natural numbers to the variables in ϕ in such a way that whenever x = y is a sub-
formula of ϕ, then f(x) = f(y), and whenever x ∈ y is a subformula of ϕ then
f(y) = f(x) + 1. NF contains as axioms (besides an axiom of extensionality) all
instances of the comprehension scheme
∃y∀x(x ∈ y ↔ ϕ(x))
where ϕ is stratified (and y does not occur free in ϕ).
In positive set theory [17], comprehension is allowed for positive (and generalized
positive) formulae. Here, a formula is called positive if it belongs to the smallest class
containing ⊥, x = y and x ∈ y and is closed under disjunction, conjunction, and
universal and existential quantification. Generalized positive formula are obtained
by allowing bounded quantification. (The theory contains, in addition, a closure
axiom and an axiom of infinity.)
Positive set theory and NF are both mathematically rich theories; given the strong
connections between set theory and truth theory, one might flirt with the idea of
zigzag theories of truth. Indeed, the theory PUTB that we have introduced in chapter
1However, in positive set theory the admissible instances are not closed under negation (something
which is constitutive of zigzag theories as Russell understands it); hence the label zigzag theory
applies here only in a derivative sense.
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7 can be seen as a successful example of a zigzag theory of truth. This motivates us
to investigate systems of stratified truth.
One difference between Russell’s type theory of classes and Tarski’s type theory
of truth is that the former attaches indices not to the membership symbol but to
the variables, whereas the latter attaches indices to the truth predicates but not to
the variables. Dropping the indices from the Tarskian hierarchy does not work; the
resulting system would simply be inconsistent. What we are looking for is something
like the following.
Let L be some ordinary first-order language and S some theory in that language.
Let LSat be the extension of L that is obtained by adding a binary satisfaction
predicate Sat and a denumerably infinite set of variables vni , one for each i, n ∈ ω,
where the superscript indicates the type or level of the variable. (We identify the
variables of type 0 with the variables of the base language L.) Let us say that
Sat(vn, vk) is well-formed iff k = n+1. So LSat is a multi-sorted first-order language.
Let us also introduce, for each formula ϕ with exactly one free variable, a name
(individual constant) ϕ. Let us define the type of ϕ as the maximum of the types
of the terms occurring in ϕ plus 1. (So a universal quantifer ∀xn may only be
instantiated to ϕ if the latter is of type n.) The theory S+ consists of the axioms of
S plus all sentences of the form
∀xn(Sat(xn, ϕ)↔ ϕ(xn))
assuming that ϕ is of type n + 1. Then the resulting system is a typed theory of
truth (or rather, satisfaction), which basically is—as is easily seen—just a version of
simple type theory. Now let L′Sat be the single-sorted first-order language obtained
from LSat by deleting all variables of type n > 0. Let S‡ be the theory in L′Sat
consisting of the axioms of S plus all sentences of the form
∀x(Sat(x, ϕ)↔ ϕ(x))
where ϕ is obtained from a formula of LSat by dropping the type indices. Then S‡
is an untyped theory of stratified truth (or satisfaction) and we might hope that it
is consistent.
Let us restrict our attention for a second to a version of LSat with only variables
of type 0 and 1. Now, letting L = LPA, it is easily seen that LSat is basically
just the language of second-order arithmetic, L2, augmented with set constants. In
order to arrive at our desired arithmetical theory of stratified truth, we will identify
L′Satwith LT , by stipulating that Sat(x, y) is defined as Ts.(x, y) and the names ϕ are
replaced by the Gödelnumerals pϕq, but otherwise following the procedure outlined
above. This means that a theory of stratified truth is obtained by adopting the
uniform T-biconditionals for translations of second-order formulae.
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9.2. Some systems of stratified truth
The predicate Ts.(x, y) can be viewed as a satisfaction predicate, ‘y satisfies x’. There
is a close relation between the liar and Russell’s paradox. Consider the formula
¬Ts.(x, x) and let n = #¬Ts.(x, x). Then PA ` s.(n, n) = p¬Ts.(n, n)q, that is we
have produced a term t such that PA ` t = p¬Ttq. The uniform T-biconditional for
the formula ‘x does not satisfy x’ gives rise to a contradiction:
∀x(Tp¬Ts.(ẋ, ẋ)q↔ ¬Ts.(x, x))
is inconsistent over PA.
As indicated in section 9.1, an appropriate translation of higher-order formulae
into formulae of LT induces a stratification of the formulae that lie in the range of
the translation function. Such a stratification will rule out the liar predicate as a
legitimate instance of the T-schema. We first study a simple disquotational theory
of truth that is obtained by adopting T-sentences for translations of second-order
formulae. Though simple, that theory has remarkable deductive power. Later on,
we consider some ramifications of that theory that have even more expressive power.
In order to simplify the consistency proof, we will make some assumptions about
the behavior of the substitution function when applied to numbers that are not codes
of formulae. So let us assume that s is a p.r. binary function with the following
properties. (i) If k is the code of an LT -formula ϕ with exactly vi free and n an
arbitrary number, then s(k, n) is the code of the formula which results from ϕ by
substituting the numeral of n for all free occurrences of the variable vi. (ii) If k is
the code of a closed LT -formula, then s(k, n) = k. (iii) If k is not the code of an
LT -formula, then s(k, n) is not the code of an LT -formula. (iv) If neither k1 nor k2
are codes of LT -formula, then s(k1, n1) = s(k2, n2) implies k1 = k2 and n1 = n2.
Now we introduce the following translation:
Definition 9.2.1. The function ∗ : L2 → LT is defined as follows:
v∗i = v2i, X
∗
i = v2i+1
0
∗
= 0, f(t1, . . . , tn)
∗ = f(t∗1, . . . , t
∗
n)
(s = t)∗ = (s∗ = t∗), (¬ϕ)∗ = ¬ϕ∗, (ϕ ∧ ψ)∗ = ϕ∗ ∧ ψ∗
(t ∈ Xi)∗ = Ts.(v2i+1, t∗)
(∀viϕ)∗ = ∀v2iϕ∗
(∀Xiϕ)∗ = ∀v2i+1ϕ∗
Notice that here we depart from the standard way of dealing with the set quantifiers,
which usually get relativized in the translation, as in the previous chapters. (This
is the reason why we need to make some assumptions about the behavior of s when
applied to non-codes.) We are now in a position to formulate our first theory of
stratified truth.
124
9.2. Some systems of stratified truth
Definition 9.2.2. UTB(Z−2 ) is the theory in LT whose axioms comprise those of
PAT and all instances of the following axiom scheme:
∀x1 . . . ∀xn(Tpϕ(ẋ1, . . . , ẋn)q↔ ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)),
where ϕ is the translation of an L2-formula ψ that contains no free set variables,
and x1, . . . , xn is an exhaustive list of all the free variables in ϕ.
We will show in section 9.3 that UTB(Z−2 ) is ω-consistent. However, if we allow ψ (in
the above definition) to contain free set variables, then the resulting system would
be inconsistent. For example, if x is an odd and y an even variable, then ¬Ts.(x, y)
is the translation of a second-order formula of the form ¬(y ∈ X). Thus
∀x∀y(Tp¬Ts.(ẋ, ẏ)q↔ ¬Ts.(x, y))
would be an axiom of the truth theory. But the above axiom is inconsistent over
PAT, because both quantifiers can be instantiated to the term p¬Ts.(x, x)q.
In order to measure the proof-theoretic strength of UTB(Z−2 ), we need the following
definition.
Definition 9.2.3. Z−2 is the theory in L2 that contains in addition to the axioms
of PA all comprehension axioms
∀~y∃X∀x(x ∈ X ↔ ϕ(~y, x)),
where ~y = y1, . . . , yn and ϕ(~y, x) is a formula of L2 without free set variables, and
the induction axiom
0 ∈ X ∧ ∀x(x ∈ X → x+ 1 ∈ X)→ ∀x(x ∈ X).
UTB(Z−2 ) derives the uniform T-biconditionals for (the translation of) any parameter-
free second-order formula. (In particular, it derives the uniform T-biconditionals for
all sentences of LPA.) But the uniform T-biconditionals imply the corresponding
comprehension axioms. We therefore get:
Proposition 9.2.4. If ϕ is a theorem of Z−2 , then UTB(Z
−
2 ) ` ϕ∗.
Proof. It suffices to show that every axiom of Z−2 is provable in UTB(Z
−
2 ). The claim
is trivial if ϕ is a first-order axiom of PA. Now we derive the comprehension axioms
of Z−2 in UTB(Z
−
2 ). Therefore, let ϕ(~z, u) ∈ L2, with exactly ~z, u free. Let ϕ∗(~z∗, u∗)
be the translation of ϕ(~z, u). The following is an axiom of UTB(Z−2 ):
∀~z∗∀u∗(Tpϕ∗(~̇ ∗z, u̇∗)q↔ ϕ∗(~z∗, u∗)).
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Instantiating the outmost quantifiers we get
∀u∗(Tpϕ∗(~̇ ∗z, u̇∗)q↔ ϕ∗(~z∗, u∗))),
which is equivalent to
∀u∗(Ts.(pϕ(~̇ ∗z, u∗)q, u∗)↔ ϕ∗(~z∗, u∗))).
Existential weakening yields
∃w∀u∗(Ts.(w, u∗)↔ ϕ∗(~z∗, u∗))),
where w is an odd variable. Now we re-introduce the universal quantifiers:
∀~z∗∃w∀u∗(Ts.(w, u∗)↔ ϕ∗(~z∗, u∗)).
But this is just the translation of the comprehension axiom for ϕ(~z, u). The induc-
tion axiom of Z−2 translates as follows:
Ts.(x, 0) ∧ ∀y(Ts.(x, y)→ Ts.(x, y + 1))→ ∀yTs.(x, y),
where x is an odd and y is an even variable. And this is simply an instance of
induction in PAT. Notice that UTB(Z−2 ) also proves the translation of the second-
order induction scheme.
Proposition 9.2.4 shows that Z−2 is proof-theoretically reducible to UTB(Z
−
2 ). So far,
the strongest systems that we have seen were Cantini’s system VF and my variant
VFG, which have the same arithmetical consequences as the system ID1. The proof-
theoretic ordinal of ID1 is the Bachmann-Howard ordinal, which is also the ordinal
of Kripke-Platek set theory with an axiom of infinity anf that of parameter-free Π11-
comprehension (Π11−CA−0 ). And Z−2 does not only contain Π11−CA−0 , but Π1n−CA−0
for every n ∈ ω. Therefore, UTB(Z−2 ) exceeds all of the truth theories in deductive
power by far.
Even though most (model-theoretic) arguments in formal philosophy are carried
out with Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ZF as the background theory, most of these
arguments can actually be carried out in comparatively weak subsystems of Z2. This
applies in particular to the model constructions of Kripke [53], Herzberger [42] or
Field [24]. (For example, Field’s construction can be carried out within Π13 − CA.
Cf. Welch [92].)
Thus, the main appeal of strong theories of truth like UTB(Z−2 ) (and extensions
of it that we will consider in a moment) stems from the fact that they allow us to
really engage in semantics—within the object language. By this I mean that we are
able to formalize important semantic concepts from the literature on truth within
the object language LT and prove relevant facts about them. We illustrate this with
a very simple example:
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Proposition 9.2.5. UTB(Z−2 ) proves the existence of the minimal Strong Kleene
fixed-point.
Proof. There is a second-order formula ζ(x, Y ) with exactly x and Y free (and
without any bound set variables) such that Y is a Kripke fixed point iff ∀x(x ∈
Y ↔ ζ(x, Y )). (For details, see Halbach [38], pp. 203-204.) Thus the formula
∀Y (∀x(x ∈ Y ↔ ζ(x, Y ))→ ζ(u, Y ))
expresses that u is a member of the minimal Kripke fixed point. (Cf. Moschovakis
[62] for details on fixed points of positive inductive definitions.) The displayed
formula is a parameter-free Π11-formula. Thus Z
−
2 proves the existence of the minimal
Kripke fixed point, i.e. it proves
∃X∀u(u ∈ X ↔ ∀Y (∀x(x ∈ Y ↔ ζ(x, Y )→ ζ(u, Y ))),
and by Proposition 9.2.4, UTB(Z−2 ) proves the translation of the last formula.
Thus, we can formalize within UTB(Z−2 ) that x is grounded (in the sense of Kripke),
because, by definition, x is grounded iff x is in the minimal Kripke fixed-point.
Despite its enormous expressive power, UTB(Z−2 ) fails to prove certain sentences
that we expect a good truth theory to prove. For example, it does not prove the T-
biconditional for the simple sentence Tp1 = 1q (because the latter is not a translation
of a second-order formula). We can improve our theory as follows.
Definition 9.2.6. Let A be the smallest set X such that (i) whenever ϕ is an L2-
formula without free set variables, then #ϕ∗ ∈ X, (ii) whenever ϕ is a theorem of
PAT, then #ϕ ∈ X, and (iii) whenever #ϕ,#ψ ∈ X, then #Tpϕq,#¬ϕ,#(ϕ∧ψ) ∈
X. Let UTB(Z−2 )
+ be PAT plus all instances of the relativized uniform T-schema:
ψ(pϕ(~x)q)→ ∀~x(Tpϕ(~̇x)q↔ ϕ(~x)),
where ψ(x) is an LPA-formula that defines A, ϕ is an LT -formula and ~x = x1, . . . , xn
is an exhaustive list of all the free variables in ϕ.
Clearly, UTB(Z−2 ) is a subtheory of UTB(Z
−
2 )
+ and the latter overcomes the problem
of the former. Since 1 = 1 is an element of A, Tp1 = 1q will also be an element of A,
hence TpTp1 = 1qq ↔ Tp1 = 1q will be an axiom of UTB(Z−2 )+. Of course, we can
also prove the T-sentence for sentences that result from iterated applications of the
truth predicate to 1 = 1 (or any other arithmetical sentence).
We have critizised Horwich’s notion of grounding (cf. section 6.4) because it does
not render ∀x(SentPA(x) → Tx ∨ T¬. x) as a legitimiate instance of the T-schema.
UTB(Z−2 )
+ shares that deficiency. There are at least two ways in which we can
further improve our theories. First, since we can formalize second-order notions
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within our object language, we might relativize the T-schema to sets that are no
longer arithmetically definable but have higher complexity. For example, we have
seen (Proposition 9.2.5) that the notion ‘x is grounded’ (in the Strong Kleene sense)
can be formalized within a theory that contains the T-biconditionals for translations
of second-order formulae. Thus we might add to such a theory all instances of the
relativized uniform T-schema
pϕ(~x)q is grounded→ ∀~x(Tpϕ(~̇x)q↔ ϕ(~x)).
Although that seems to be an interesting option, I won’t explore it any further
here. Another option would be to add a primitive predicate Acc(x), intended to
express ‘x is an acceptable instance of the T-schema’, and to give a simultaneous
axiomatization of acceptability and truth, similar to our axiomatizations of grounded
truth (chapter 6). In what follows, we give an example of such a theory. We need
the following definitions.
Let Rel represent the binary relation that holds between (the code of) a closed
LT -formula ϕ and (the code of) a sequence of LPA-formulae (ψ1(x), . . . , ψn(x)) iff
every subformula of ϕ of the form Tt occurs in the context ψi(t) ∧ Tt within ϕ for
some 0 < i 6 n. Let seq(x) express that x is (the code of) a sequence. We write
∀σ instead of ∀x(seq(x) → . . .). We write lh(σ) for the length of σ and σ(u) for
the u-th member of σ. Let FmT (x) represent the set (of codes) of LT -formulae and
let ProvPAT (x) be a standard provability predicate for PAT. Finally, let Trsl(x)
represent the set of (codes of) translations of second-order formulae without free set
variables.
Definition 9.2.7. We adopt the following axioms of acceptability :
1. ∀x(FmT (x)→ (ProvPAT (x)→ Acc(x))),
2. ∀x(FmT (x)→ (Trsl(x)→ Acc(x))),
3. ∀x(FmT (x)→ (Acc(x)→ Acc(T. x))),
4. ∀x(FmT (x)→ (Acc(x)→ Acc(¬. x))),
5. ∀x∀y(FmT (x∧. y)→ (Acc(x) ∧ Acc(y)→ Acc(x∧. y))),
6. ∀x∀σ(Rel(x, σ) ∧ ∀u < lh(σ)∀z(Ts.(σ(u), z)→ Acc(z))→ Acc(x)).
Definition 9.2.8. UTB(Z−2 )
‡ is the theory in LAccT whose axioms comprise those of
PAT (with induction expanded to the full language), Axioms 1-6 of Definition 9.2.7,
and all instances of the following axiom scheme:
Acc(pϕ(~x)q)→ ∀~x(Tpϕ(~̇x)q)↔ ϕ(~x)),
where ϕ(~x) is an LT -formula with exactly ~x = x1, . . . , xn free.
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UTB(Z−2 )
‡ proves the T-biconditional for ∀x(SentPA(x) → Tx ∨ T¬. x). More gen-
erally, let us show that all sentences of the Tarskian hierarchy of truth (i.e. their
translations) are acceptable. The formulae of RT can be translated into LT in a
straightforward way.
Definition 9.2.9. The sublanguages Lα of LT are defined by recursion over the
ordinals up to ε0. L0 is just LPA. For 0 < α < ε0, ϕ is a formula of the language Lα
iff there are β1, . . . βn < α such that every occurrence of a subformula Tt of ϕ occurs
in the context Sent(βi, t) ∧ Tt for some 0 < i 6 n, where Sent(βi, x) represents the
set of Lβi-sentences.
We can define ‘x is a sentence of Lα’ as follows, using Kleene’s recursion theorem
(where OT (x) means that x is an ordinal term):
Sent(α, x)↔ [OT (α) ∧ ∃σ, τ < x(lh(σ) = lh(τ) ∧Rel(x, σ)∧
∧∀u < lh(τ)(OT (τ(u)) ∧ τ(u) ≺ α ∧ σ(u) = pSent(τ(u̇), v0)q))]
Using transfinite induction, one can then show:
Proposition 9.2.10. For all δ < ε0,
UTB(Z−2 )
‡ ` ∀ζ ≺ δ∀x(Sent(ζ, x)→ Acc(x)).
Proof. Let ϕ(v) be the formula ∀x(Sent(v, x) → Acc(x)). PAT proves transfinite
induction for every δ ≺ ε0, i.e. for all δ ≺ ε0 PAT proves:
∀α(∀β ≺ αϕ(β)→ ϕ(α))→ ∀ζ ≺ δϕ(ζ).
So assume
∀β ≺ α∀x(Sent(β, x)→ Acc(x)). (I.H.)
Then it suffices to show that
∀x(Sent(α, x)→ Acc(x)).
Therefore let x be given and assume Sent(α, x). Then PA proves
OT (α) ∧ ∃σ, τ < x(lh(σ) = lh(τ) ∧Rel(x, σ)∧
∧∀u < lh(τ)(OT (τ(u)) ∧ τ(u) ≺ α ∧ σ(u) = pSent(τ(u̇), v0)q)).
Let σ, τ < x and u < lh(τ) = lh(σ) be as above. Because the formula Sent(τ(u), v0)
is arithmetical and UTB(Z2)
‡ proves the uniform T-biconditionals for all LPA-formulae,
we get
∀u∀v0(TpSent(τ(u̇), v̇0)q↔ Sent(τ(u), v0)). (9.1)
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Since τ(u) ≺ α, (I.H.) yields
∀z(Sent(τ(u), z)→ Acc(z)). (9.2)
Because σ(u) = pSent(τ(u̇), v0)q, (9.1) and (9.2) yield
∀z(Ts.(σ(u), z)→ Acc(z)).
Since this holds for all u < lh(σ), Axiom 6 of Definition 9.2.7 yields Acc(x).
The ramifications introduced so far add more truth-theoretic content but, most
likely, these systems do not prove more arithmetical sentences than our first theory,
UTB(Z−2 ). A theory with higher proof-theoretic strength might be obtained by
adopting T-biconditionals for (translations of) sentences of higher-order arithmetic.
Definition 9.2.11. 1. Lω is the language of Peano arithmetic augmented with a
binary relation symbol ∈ plus countably many indexed set variablesXn1 , Xn2 , Xn3 , . . .,
for every index n ∈ ω \ {0}. This gives us new formulae of the form t ∈
X1, Xn ∈ Xn+1, and ∀Xnϕ. Lω is a many-sorted first-order language with
usual quantifier rules.
2. The language Lω can be regarded as a sublanguage of LT by the following
stipulation. Let (a, b) be the code of the ordered pair a, b under the Cantor
pairing function. Let ϕ ∈ Lω. Replace any occurrence of vi by v(0,i), every
occurrence of Xnk by v(n,k), and every occurrence of ∈ by Ts.(·, ·). We denote
the result of this replacement by ϕ∗∗.
3. Z−ω consists of the axioms of PA with induction extended to Lω plus all formulae
of the form
∀~Z∃Xn+1∀Xn(Xn ∈ Xn+1 ↔ ϕ(Xn, ~Z)),
where ϕ is an Lω-formula which does not contain Xn+1 free and in which no
free variable occurs on the right-hand side of the symbol ∈. (For n = 0 we
assume that Xn is some number variable vi).
The system Zω is obtained from Z
−
ω by allowing free set parameters on the right-hand
side of the symbol ∈; this system is roughly equivalent to the simple theory of types
with an axiom of infinity. The latter is basically a simplified version of Russell and
Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica.
Definition 9.2.12. UTB(Z−ω ) is the theory in LT whose axioms are those of PAT
plus all sentences of the form
∀x1 . . . ∀xn(Tpϕ(ẋ1, . . . , ẋn)q↔ ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)),
where ϕ is the translation of an Lω-formula ψ, x1, . . . , xn is an exhaustive list of all
the free variables in ϕ, and no free variable in ψ occurs on the right-hand side of
the symbol ∈.
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Allowing ψ (in the above definition) to contain free variables on the right-hand side
of the symbol ∈ renders the system inconsistent. For in that event, the formula
¬Ts.(x, p¬Ts.(x, x)q)
(which is a translation of the second-order formula p¬Ts.(x, x)q ∈ X1) would be a
legitimate instance of the T-schema.
Proposition 9.2.13. If ϕ is a theorem of Z−ω , then UTB(Z
−
ω ) ` ϕ∗∗.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 9.2.4.
9.3. Consistency
The goal of this section is to prove the existence of standard models for the theories
UTB(Z−2 ) and UTB(Z
−
2 )
‡ (and therefore for UTB(Z−2 )
+ too).2 In order to do so, we
again associate second-order structures with truth-sets. We need to generalize our
old definitions.
Definition 9.3.1. Let S ⊆ ω.
1. Sk = {n|s(k, n) ∈ S}
2. MS = {Sk|k ∈ ω}.
The main difference between this and our old definition (7.1.2) is that the sets Sk
are now also defined for k that do not code a formula. (The reason why we need to
do this lies in the fact that this time we did not relativize the set quantifiers in the
translation of L2 into LT .) Note that if k = #ϕ for some formula ϕ, then our above
definition of Sϕ coincides with our earlier definition. Again, we obtain a Translation
Lemma.
If h is a variable assignment for (N,MS), define the assignment h∗ for (N, S) by
h∗(v2i) = h(vi) and h
∗(v2i+1) = min{k | Sk = h(Xi)}.
Proposition 9.3.2. Let h be an assignment for (N,MS). Then t(N,MS),h = t∗(N,S),h
∗
for all number terms t of L2.
Proposition 9.3.3. (Translation Lemma) Let S ⊆ ω, let ϕ(x, ~y, ~X) ∈ L2, and let
h be an assignment for (N,MS). Then:
(N,MS), h  ϕ⇔ (N, S), h∗  ϕ∗
2I do not know whether UTB(Z−ω ) is consistent, although I assume so.
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Proof. By induction on the complexity of formulae. The case s = t is trivial.
Consider t ∈ Xi, where t is any term. Let t(N,MS),h = n and h(Xi) = A. There’s
a k such that k = min{m | Sm = A}. Then
(N,MS), h  t ∈ Xi ⇔ n ∈ A
⇔ n ∈ Sk
⇔ s(k, n) ∈ S
⇔ (N, S)  Ts.(k, n)
⇔ (N, S), h∗  Ts.(v2i+1, t∗)
The cases ¬ψ, ψ ∧χ and ∀xψ follow easily from the I.H. Finally, consider ∀Xiψ and
let M = {k|∀m(Sm = Sk → k 6 m)}.
(N,MS), h  ∀Xiψ ⇔ ∀A ∈MS : (N,MS), h(A : Xi)  ψ (9.3)
⇔ ∀k ∈ ω : (N,MS), h(Sk : Xi)  ψ (9.4)
⇔ ∀k ∈M : (N,MS), h(Sk : Xi)  ψ (9.5)
⇔ ∀k ∈M : (N, S), h∗(k : v2i+1)  ψ∗ (9.6)
⇔ ∀k ∈ ω : (N, S), h∗(k : v2i+1)  ψ∗ (9.7)
⇔ (N, S), h∗  ∀v2i+1ψ∗ (9.8)
The implication from (9.5) to (9.4) follows from the definition of M and the exten-
sionality of sets. The equivalence between (9.5) and (9.6) is given by the inductive
hypothesis, since [h(Sk : Xi)]
∗ = h∗(k : v2i+1) for every minimal k. The step from
(9.6) to (9.7) is justified because in translated formulae, such as ψ∗, v2i+1 occurs
only in contexts of the form Ts.(v2i+1, t). By the definition of the sets Sk, if Sm = Sk
then
(N, S), h′  Ts.(k, t)↔ Ts.(m, t),
for any term t and assignment h′.
Now we may prove:
Proposition 9.3.4. UTB(Z−2 ) has an ω-model.
Proof. Let RA be the collection of ramified analytic sets (up to level β0, which is
countable). It is well-known that (N,RA) is a countable L2-structure that is closed
under second-order definability with parameters from RA, hence a model of Z2 and
therefore of Z−2 (cf. [69]). Let enum : (ω \ FmLT )→ RA be bijective.
Let s(k, n) ∈ S iff
1. k does not code an LT -formula and n ∈ enum(k); or
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2. ϕ(x) is an L2-formula with exactly x free, k the code of ϕ∗(x∗), and (N,RA)  ϕ(n).
Then it is easily seen that MS = RA. We now show that (N, S) validates the
theory UTB(Z−2 ).
Let ϕ be an L2-formula without free set variables. Assume that ~y, x is an exhaus-
tive list of all free variables in ϕ. Let ~m be given. We have to show that
(N, S)  ∀x∗(Ts.(pϕ∗(~m, x∗)q, x∗)↔ ϕ∗(~m, x∗)).
Let n be given and assume (N, S)  ϕ∗(~m, n). By Proposition 9.4.6, (N,MS) 
ϕ(~m, n). Since MS = RA, we have s(#ϕ∗(~m, x∗), n) ∈ S by (ii). Thus
(N, S)  Ts.(pϕ∗(~m, x∗)q, n). The argument for the other direction of the claim is
similar.
We close this section by outlining a consistency proof for one of the more expressive
systems.
Proposition 9.3.5. UTB(Z−2 )
‡ has an ω-model.
Proof. (Sketch) The predicate Acc will be interpreted by the fixed point of an in-
clusive hierarchy that is defined by transfinite induction as follows. Let Θ0 be the
set consisting exactly of (the codes of) all theorems of PAT and all translations of
second-order formulae that do not contain free set variables. Let Θα+1 be the small-
est superset X of Θα such that (i) whenever #ϕ,#ψ ∈ Θα then #¬ϕ,#(ϕ∧ψ) and
#Tpϕq ∈ X, and (ii) whenever ψ1, . . . , ψn are LPA-formulae with ψNi ⊆ Θα (for all
i 6 n) and ϕ is relativized to (ψ1, . . . , ψn), then #ϕ ∈ X. At limit points we take
unions. Let Θ denote the fixed point of that hierarchy. Every code #ϕ in Θ will be
assigned an ordinal rank denoting the least level at which #ϕ enters the hierarchy.
Let S0 = S ∪ {#ϕ|ϕ ∈ LT ,PAT ` ϕ}, where S is defined as in the proof of
Proposition 9.3.4. It is not hard to prove that (N, S0) validates the T-biconditionals
for all sentences of rank 0 (i.e. translations of second-order formulae without free set
variables plus all theorems of PAT). Let Sα+1 be the set of all sentences #ϕ ∈ Θα+1
that are true in (N, Sα). At limit points we take unions. The fixed point of the Sα-
hierarchy will validate the T-biconditionals for all acceptable sentences (and since
the model is standard, it will therefore validate the uniform T-biconditionals for all
acceptable formulae). For one can show (for each α) that all sentences #ϕ ∈ Θα
have the same truth value in all (N, Sβ) for all β > α. In order to show this, one
may verify that for all α,MSα = RA. This guarantees that all sentences of rank
0 have the same truth value in all models (N, Sα). Sentences of rank > 0 preserve
their truth value because they depend (in the sense of Leitgeb [55]) on the set of
sentences of lower rank.
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9.4. Comprehension with parameters
Can we design theories of truth that are able to derive comprehension axioms for
formulae that contain free set variables? There is indeed such a method, although
I don’t think that the resulting systems are very attractive. For the sake of com-
pleteness, we sketch the method. For simplicity, we focus on the question of how to
interpret ACA (see the appendix for a definition) in a disquotational theory.3 The
method can be generalized to yield an interpretation of Z2.
A natural thought is to relativize the higher-order quantifiers in the translation,
in order to exclude the liar predicate from the range of the quantifiers. First, let
us show that the predicate Fm1T (x)—‘x is a formula of LT with exactly one free
variable’—won’t do the job.
Proposition 9.4.1. The following schema is inconsistent with PA.
∀~z∀~y(Fm1T (~y)→ ∀x(Tpϕ∗(ẋ, ~̇z, ~̇y)q↔ ϕ∗(x, ~z, ~y))) (9.9)
where ϕ(x, ~z, ~Y ) ∈ L2 is arithmetical and ϕ∗ is its translation, where now set quan-
tifiers get relativized to the predicate Fm1T (x).
Proof. Consider the L2-formula ¬(x ∈ Y ). This is arithmetical, and its translation
is ¬Ts.(y, x). Let n be p¬Ts.(z, z)q. Notice that PA proves Fm1T (n). Applying (9.9)
to ¬Ts.(y, x) and unpacking notation we get
∀y(Fm1T (y)→ ∀x(Ts.(s.(p¬Ts.(y, x)q, y), x)↔ ¬Ts.(y, x)))
Then:
Ts.(s.(p¬Ts.(y, x)q, y), x)↔ ¬Ts.(y, x)
Ts.(s.(p¬Ts.(y, x)q, n), x)↔ ¬Ts.(n, x)
Ts.(p¬Ts.(n, x)q, x)↔ ¬Ts.(n, x)
Ts.(p¬Ts.(n, x)q, n)↔ ¬Ts.(n, n)
Tp¬Ts.(n, n)q↔ ¬Ts.(n, n)
Tp¬Ts.(n, n)q↔ ¬Tp¬Ts.(n, n)q
Let L+2 be the minimal extension of L2 that is closed under the following rule:
if ϕ ∈ L+2 is a formula with exactly x0 free, then L+2 contains a set constant Sϕ
(with t ∈ Sϕ being an atomic formula of L+2 ). More precisely, we define L02 = L2,
Ln+12 = L
n
2 ∪ {Sϕ|ϕ ∈ Ln2}. Then we let L+2 =
⋃
n∈ω Ln.
3I thank Lavinia Picollo for her help in clarifying some of the issues in this section.
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Proposition 9.4.2. The recursion theorem for primitive recursive functions yields
the existence of a primitive recursive translation function τ : L+2 → LT such that:
τ(ϕ) =

x2i, if t is xi
x2i+1, if t is Xi
f(τ(t1), . . . , τ(tn)), if t is f(t1, . . . , tn)
#τ(ϕ), if t is Sϕ
τ(s) = τ(t), if ϕ := s = t
Ts.(x2i+1, τ(t)) if ϕ := t ∈ Xi
Ts.(pτ(ϕ)q, τ(t)) if ϕ := t ∈ Sϕ
¬τ(ψ) if ϕ := ¬ψ
τ(ψ) ∧ τ(χ) if ϕ := ψ ∧ χ
∀x2iτ(ψ) if ϕ := ∀xiψ
∀x2i+1(∃y(x2i+1 = τ. (y) ∧ Fm1T (x2i+1))→ τ(ψ)) if ϕ := ∀Xiψ
where τ. is a function symbol for τ in LT .
The above function is well-defined. For τ is well-defined on L02 = L2, and assuming
that τ is well-defined on Ln2 , it is easy to show that τ is well-defined on L
n+1
2 , too.
We abbreviate ∃y(x = τ. (y) ∧ Fm1T (x)) by Trsl(x).
Definition 9.4.3. The theory UTB(ACA) is given by the axioms of PAT plus all
instances of the following scheme:
∀~y∀~z(Trsl(~y)→ ∀x(Ts.(pτ(ϕ)(x, ~̇z, ~̇y)q, x)↔ τ(ϕ)(x, ~z, ~y))) (9.10)
where ϕ(x, ~z, ~Y ) ∈ L2 is arithmetical.
Proposition 9.4.4. ACA is relatively interpretable in UTB(ACA).
Proof. Let ϕ ∈ L2. We have to show that the translation of the comprehension
axiom for ϕ is a theorem of UTB(ACA). We instantiate the quantifiers in (9.10) and
rename variables to get:
Trsl(~y)→ ∀x(Ts.(pτ(ϕ)(x, ~̇z, ~̇y)q, x)↔ τ(ϕ)(x, ~z, ~y))
Since PA proves that pτ(ϕ)(x, ~̇z, ~̇y)q is the code of a formula of LT that has exactly
x free, we get:
Trsl(~y)→ (Fm1T (pτ(ϕ)(x, ~̇z, ~̇y)q) ∧ ∀x(Ts.(pτ(ϕ)(x, ~̇z, ~̇y)q, x)↔ ϕ(x, ~z, ~y)))
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We have, provably in PA,
Trsl(~y)→ τ.p(ϕ)(x, ~̇z, τ−1~̇y)q = pτ(ϕ)(x, ~̇z, ~̇y)q
This implies:
Trsl(~y) ∧ (Trsl0(pτ(ϕ)(x, ~̇z, ~̇y)q)→ ∀x(Ts.(pτ(ϕ)(x, ~̇z, ~̇y)q, x)↔ ϕ(x, ~z, ~y))))
and, by logic:
Trsl(~y)→ ∃v(Trsl(v) ∧ ∀x(Ts.(v, x)↔ ϕ∗(x, ~z, ~y)))
Now we re-introduce universal quantifiers:
∀~z∀~y((Trsl(~y)→ ∃v(Trsl(v)→ ∀x(Ts.(v, x)↔ ϕ∗(x, ~z, ~y))))
This is the translation of the comprehension axiom for ϕ.
Definition 9.4.5. For S ⊆ ω and ϕ(x0) ∈ L+2 , let S#τ(ϕ) = {n| #τ(ϕ)(n̄) ∈ S}. Let
MS = {S#τ(ϕ)|ϕ ∈ L+2 }. Then (N,MS) is a structure for L+2 , where the constants
Sϕ are interpreted by S#τ(ϕ).
If h is a variable assignment for (N,MS), define the assignment h∗ for (N, S) by
h∗ (x2i) = h (xi) and h
∗ (x2i+1) = min{#τ(ϕ) |S#τ(ϕ) = h (Xi)}.
As before, we can prove:
Proposition 9.4.6. Let S ⊆ ω, let ϕ(x, y1, . . . , yr, X1, . . . , Xl) ∈ L+2 , and let h be
an assignment for (N,MS). Then:
(N,MS) , h  ϕ⇔ (N, S) , h∗  τ(ϕ)
Proposition 9.4.7. The theory UTB(ACA) has an ω-model.
Proof. Let X0 = {τ(ϕ)|ϕ ∈ LPA,N  ϕ}. Let
Xn+1 = {τ(ϕ)|ϕ ∈ Ln, ϕ arithmetical, (N,MXn)  ϕ}
Finally, let S = Xω =
⋃
nXn. There are a couple of things to notice:
• MXn = {X ⊆ ω|X is Π0ω} for all n
• Xn ⊆ Xn+1
• if ϕ ∈ Ln is arithmetical, then (Xn+1)#τ(ϕ) = {m|(N,MXn)  ϕ(m)}
• if ϕ ∈ Ln, then (Xk)#τ(ϕ) = (Xm)#τ(ϕ) for all n 6 k 6 m
Hence, for every arithmetical ϕ and natural number n,
(N,MXω)  n ∈ S#τ(ϕ) ↔ ϕ(n)
whence by the translation lemma and standardness (N, Xω)  UTB(ACA).
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Appendix

10. Ordinal notations
The truth predicates of the Tarskian hierarchy are not indexed by ordinals them-
selves but rather by ordinal notations, that is by some subset of natural numbers
equipped with some recursive ordering of suitable order type. This section surveys
the relevant background material on ordinal notations needed for this book. In our
exposition, we largely follow chapter 3 of Pohlers [66].
Definition 10.0.8. If X ⊆ ON is a class of ordinals, we denote by enX its enu-
merating function, i.e. the function which enumerates the members of X in order
of increasing magnitude.
Definition 10.0.9. The class H of principal or additively indecomposable ordinals
is defined as follows. H := {α ∈ ON |α 6= 0 ∧ ∀ζ, η < α(ζ + η < α)}.
Proposition 10.0.10. The principal ordinals are exactly those of the form ωα.
Thus: ωα = enH(α).
ω0 = 1, ω1 = ω, ω2 = ω · ω.
Definition 10.0.11. α is an ε-number iff α = ωα. The least such ordinal is called
ε0.
Thus ε0 is the least fixed point of the function enH.
Proposition 10.0.12 (Cantor Normal Form). For every α 6= 0 there are uniquely
determined ordinals β1 > . . . > βn such that α = ωβ1 + . . .+ ωβn.
Proof. If α ∈ H, then α = ωβ for some β 6 α and we are done. If α /∈ H,
then there are ζ, η < α with α = ζ + η. By I.H. we have ζ = ωbeta1 + . . . + ωβn
and η = ωγ1 + . . . + ωγm . Let j 6 n be maximal such that βj > γ1. Then α =
ωβ1 + . . .+ ωβj + ωγ1 + . . .+ ωγm .
Proposition 10.0.13. If α = ωβ1 + . . .+ ωβm and γ = ωζ1 + . . .+ ωζn, then α < γ
iff one of the following conditions hold:
1. m < n and βi = ζi for all i 6 m,
2. there is j < m such that βi = ζi for all i < j and βj < ζj.
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10.1. Notation for ordinals below ε0
It follows from Cantor’s Normal Form theorem that every ordinal α < ε0 can be
written in the form ωβ1 +. . .+ωβn with α > β1 > . . . > βn. This opens the possibility
of a notation system (Gödelcoding) for ordinals < ε0.
Definition 10.1.1. We simultaneously define the set OT1 ⊆ ω and the function
|| : OT1 → ON as follows.
0 ∈ OT1 and |0| = 0.
If a1, . . . , an ∈OT1 and |a1| > . . . > |an| then (a1, . . . , an) ∈OT1 and |(a1, . . . , an)| =
ω|a1| + . . .+ ω|an|.
We set a ≺1 b iff (a, b ∈ OT1 and |a| < |b|).
In the above definition, (a1, . . . , an) is a code for the sequence a1 . . . an (using prime
numbers or Cantor’s pairing function etc).
Proposition 10.1.2. Both OT1 and the relation ≺1 are primitive recursive.
Proof. By simultaneous course-of-value recursion:
x ∈ OT1 ↔ Seq(x)∧ (x = 0∨ ∀i < lh(x)((x)i ∈ OT1 ∧ (i+ 1 < lh(x)→ (x)i+1 41
(x)i))), and
x ≺1 y ↔ x, y ∈ OT1 ∧ ((x = 0 ∧ y 6= 0) ∨ (lh(y) = 1 ∧ x 41 (y)0)∨
∃j < min{lh(x), lh(y)}∀i < j((x)i = (y)i ∧ (x)j ≺1 (y)1)∨
(lh(x) < lh(y) ∧ (∀i < lh(x)((x)i = (y)i))).
Proposition 10.1.3. Every notation a ∈ OT1 denotes an ordinal < ε0. Conversely,
every ordinal < ε0 has a notation a ∈ OT1.
Proof. By induction.
Example 10.1.4. We have 0 ∈ OT1 and |0| = 0, (0) ∈ OT1 and |(0)| = ω0 = 1,
(0, 0) ∈ OT1 and |(0, 0)| = ω0 + ω0 = 1 + 1 = 2, etc. ((0)) ∈ OT1 and |((0))| =
ω|(0)| = ω1 = ω, ((0), 0) ∈ OT1 and |((0), 0)| = ω|(0)| + ω|0| = ω1 + ω0 = ω + 1.
If |a| = α, we set #α := a. Notice that there is some finite ordinal n such that
#n > #ω. We sometimes identify α with its code #α. We write the numeral of the
code of α simply as α instead of #α. We reserve α, β, ζ for variables ranging over
ordinal terms.
Gentzen has shown that PA proves transfinite induction for every δ up to but
exluding ε0.
Theorem 10.1.5 (Gentzen). For all ϕ and δ ≺ ε0:
PA ` ∀α(∀β ≺ αϕ(β)→ ϕ(α))→ ∀ζ ≺ δϕ(ζ).
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10.2. Notation for ordinals below Γ0
Since ε0 is a fixed point of the function ω
α, Cantor’s normal form does not auto-
matically generate a gödelization of ε0. To get a notation system for ordinals > ε0
we need a decomposition for additively indecomposable ordinals too.
If f is a function from the ordinals to the ordinals, let Fix(f) denote the class of
fixed-points of f . The α-critical ordinals are defined as follows.
Definition 10.2.1. Let Cr(0) = H, Cr(α+1) = Fix(enCr(α)), Cr(λ) =
⋂
α<λCr(α).
Furthermore, define the Veblen-function ϕα as enCr(α).
Every set Cr(α) is a subset of H, and the Cr(α) are decreasing.
Example 10.2.2. ϕ0 is the enumerating function of the additively indecomposoable
ordinals H, that is ϕ0(α) = enH(α) = ωα. ϕ1 is the enumerating function of the
fixed points of ϕ0, that is, the enumerating function of the ε-numbers, that is ϕ1 =
enCr(1) = enFix(enH) and therefore ϕ1(α) = εα. Notice that ε0 = ϕ0(ε0) = ϕ1(0).
An ordinal α is called strongly critical iff α ∈ Cr(α). We denote the least strongly
critical ordinal by Γ0. This is the so-called Feferman-Schütte ordinal. Every ordinal
α < Γ0 can be written in the form ϕζ1(β1) + . . .+ ϕζn(βn) with βi, ζi < α.
Notice that 0 /∈ Cr(0) = H = {ω0, ω1, . . .}. Furthermore, 1 /∈ Cr(1) = {ε0, ε1, . . .}.
Thus ε0 /∈ Cr(2), and therefore Γ0 > ε0.
Proposition 10.2.3. For every additively indecomposable ordinal α that is not
strongly critical we find β, γ < α such that α = ϕβ(γ).
The preceeding lemma, combined with Cantor’s normal form theorem, provides
us with a means to gödelize all ordinals < Γ0.
Definition 10.2.4. We simultaneously define sets PT, OT2 ⊆ ω and the function
|| : OT2 → ON as follows.
0 ∈ OT2 and |0| = 0.
If a1, . . . , an ∈ PT and |a1| > . . . > |an| then (1, a1, . . . , an) ∈OT2 and |(1, a1, . . . , an)| =
|a1|+ . . .+ |an|.
If a1, . . . , a2 ∈ OT2 then (2, a1, a2) ∈ PT and |(2, a1, a2)| = ϕ|a1|(|a2|).
PT ⊆ OT2.
We set a ≺2 b iff (a, b ∈ OT2 and |a| < |b|).
Proposition 10.2.5. Both OT2 and the relation ≺2 are primitive recursive.
Proposition 10.2.6. Every notation a ∈ OT2 denotes an ordinal < Γ0. Conversely,
every ordinal < Γ0 has a notation a ∈ OT2.
Example 10.2.7. We have 0 ∈ OT2 and |0| = 0; hence (2, 0, 0) ∈ PT and
|(2, 0, 0)| = ϕ0(0) = ω0 = 1, hence (1, (2, 0, 0), (2, 0, 0)) ∈ OT2 and |(1, (2, 0, 0), (2, 0, 0))| =
ϕ0(0) +ϕ0(0) = 1 + 1 = 2, etc. Notice that OT1 and OT2 give different codes to the
ordinal 2. We have ε0 = ϕ1(0) = |(2, (2, 0, 0), 0)|.
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10.3. Kleene’s O
In order to formalize the whole Tarskian hierarchy (as in chapter 8) we need an even
more encompassing notation system.
Definition 10.3.1 (Kleene’s O). 0 ∈ O and |0| = 0.
If i ∈ O and |i| = α, then 2i ∈ O and |2i| = α + 1 and i <O 2i.
Suppose {e} is the e-th partial recursive function. If e is total, with range con-
tained in O, and for every natural number n we have {e}(n) <O {e}(n + 1), then
3 · 5e ∈ O, {e}(n) <O 3 · 5e for each n and |3 · 5e| = supk|{e}(k)|, i.e. 3 · 5e is
a notation for the limit of the ordinals γk where |{e}(k)| = γk for every natural
number k.
<O is transitive.
Definition 10.3.2. ωCK1 := sup{ot(≺)| ≺ ⊆ ω × ω is primitive recursive}
Proposition 10.3.3. Every notation a ∈ O denotes an ordinal < ωCK1 . Conversely,
every ordinal < ωCK1 has a notation a ∈ O.
Proposition 10.3.4. O is Π11-complete.
Proposition 10.3.5. For any p, the set {q|q <O p} is recursively enumerable, and
in fact uniformely so.
That is, there is a recursive function f such that for all n ∈ O,
{m|m <O n} = {m|∃z{f(n)}(z) = m},
where {f(n)} denotes the recursive partial function with index f(n).
Proposition 10.3.6 (Jockusch). There exists a Π11 path through O each initial
segment of which is recursive.
Then Tarski hierarchies can be understood in the following way (due to Halbach
[33]).
Definition 10.3.7. 1. Let X be a subset of ω and ≺ a well-ordering of X. The
Tarski hierarchy over X,≺ is the set of languages LkT for k ∈ X, where LkT is
LPA expanded by all truth predicates Tn for n ≺ k.
2. A Tarski hierarchy over X,≺ is called boundedly recursive iff all initial seg-
ments of ≺ are recursive.
3. A Tarski hierarchy over X,≺ is called recursive iff ≺ is recursive.
Proposition 10.3.8. There is a boundedly recursive Tarski hierarchy of height ωCK1 .
For every α < ωCK1 there is a recursive Tarski hierarchy of height α.
Proof. The first claim follows from Proposition 10.3.6. The second is obvious.
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In order to give a definition of the hyperarithmetical sets, and to state certain
important relationships between these and certain subsystems of analysis, we survey
some concepts from recursion theory. Most definitions in this section are only given
for sets, i.e. unary relations, but they can be generalized to arbitrary relations in a
straightforward way.
11.1. Indices
Let f be a recursive partial function (of one argument). Let
Subn(#ϕ(x1, . . . , xn), a1, . . . , an) = #ϕ(a1, . . . , an)
For given f , we find a recursive total predicate R such that Gf (x, y)⇔ ∃wR(y, w, x).
Let ϕ(~z) be a formula that defines R. Such a ϕ exists because R is recursive. Notice
that (a1, a2, a3) ∈ R iff PA ` ϕ(a1, a2, a3). Let e = #ϕ(~z). Hence (a1, a2, a3) ∈ R iff
∃vProof(v, sb3(e, a1, a2, a3)). Thus
∃wR(y, w, x)⇔ ∃w∃vProof(v, Sub3(e, y, w, x))
By contraction of quantifiers, the right-hand side of the above biconditional is the
case iff ∃zProof(z0, Sub3(e, y, z1, x)).
But then f(x) ' (µz(Proof(z0, Sub3(e, z1, z2, x))))0. We write
T1(e, x, z)↔ Proof(z0, Sub3(e, z1, z2, x)))
Thus f(x) ' (µz(T1(e, x, z))0. We say that e is an index of f and set {e} = f .
A number e is an RE-index of a set P iff P (x) ↔ ∃zT1(e, x, z). If e satisfies this
equation, we set W 1e = P . Thus W
1
e is the domain of the e-th recursive partial
function.
11.2. The Arithmetical and the Analytical Hierarchy
Definition 11.2.1. 1. A formula ϕ ∈ LPA is called ∆00 iff it contains no un-
bounded quantifier.
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2. A formula ϕ ∈ LPA is Π0n(Σ0n) iff its has the form Q1x1 . . . Qnxnψ, where
ψ is ∆00, Q1 . . . Qn is a string of alternating quantifiers, and Q1 is universal
(existential).
Definition 11.2.2 (The Arithmetical Hierarchy). A set X ⊆ ω is Π0n(Σ0n) iff X =
{n|N  ϕ(n)}, where ϕ(x) is a Π0n(Σ0n) formula with exactly x free. A set X ⊆ ω is
∆0n iff X is both Π
0
n and Σ
0
n.
Proposition 11.2.3. ∆00 = ∆
0
1 =recursive sets. Σ
0
1 =recursively enumerable sets.
Definition 11.2.4. 1. A formula ϕ ∈ L2 is called arithmetical iff it contains no
second-order quantifiers. Note that such a formula might contain free second
order variables.
2. A formula ϕ ∈ L2 is Π1n(Σ1n) iff its has the form Q1X1 . . . QnXnψ, where ψ is
arithmetical, Q1 . . . Qn is a string of alternating second order quantifiers, and
Q1 is universal (existential).
Definition 11.2.5 (The Analytical Hierarchy). A set X ⊆ ω is Π1n(Σ1n) iff X =
{n|(N, ℘(ω))  ϕ(n)}, where ϕ(x) is a Π1n(Σ1n) formula with exactly x free. A set
X ⊆ ω is ∆1n iff X is both Π1n and Σ1n.
Definition 11.2.6. A set X is called Π1n-hard iff every Π
1
n-set Y is many-one re-
ducible to X, i.e. there is a recursive function f such that n ∈ Y iff f(x) ∈ X. A
set X is called Π1n-complete iff X is Π
1
n-hard and X is a Π
1
1-set.
11.3. Hyperarithmetical sets
Definition 11.3.1. We inductively define a set of H-indices as follows. Recall the
definition of W 1e as the domain of the e-th partial recursive function.
• For each e, (0, e) is an H-index.
• If e is an H-index, then (1, e) is an H-index.
• If every number in W 1e is an H-index, then (2, e) is an H-index.
For each H-index i we define a set Ji as follows.
• If i = (0, e), then Ji = W 1e .
• If i = (1, e), then Ji = (ω \W 1e ).
• If i = (2, e), then Ji =
⋃
k∈W 1e
Jk.
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Definition 11.3.2. A set X ⊆ ω is hyperarithmetical iff P = Ji for some H-index i.
We call i the H-index of P . The collection of all hyperarithmetical sets is denoted
by HYP.
Thus, the hyperarithmetic sets are constructed by starting with the recursively
enumerable sets and repeatedly taking complements and certain countable unions,
namely unions of sets where there is a recursive enumeration of the H-index of the
sets in question.
Alternatively, we might define iterated Turing jumps along Kleene’s O by stipu-
lating that ∅0 = ∅, ∅α+1 = TJ(∅α), and ∅λ = {〈n, i〉|i ∈ ∅λn}. Then we say that
a set X is hyperarithmetical iff X is Turing-reducible to ∅α for some α < ωCK1 .
Proposition 11.3.3. X ∈ HYP iff X is ∆11.
For a proof see Schoenfield [83], chapter 7.
Proposition 11.3.4. (N, HY P ) is the minimal ω-model of ∆11 − CA0.
For a proof see Simpson [85], chapter VIII.
11.4. The Ramified Analytical Hierarchy
The language of ramified analysis has variables for numbers and sets of numbers.
The variables for the latter are indexed by ordinals, which denote the order of
the set. It is thus a ramified language as in Russell and Whitehead’s Principia
mathematica. Let ω1 be the first uncountable ordinal. This language is used to
describe the predicative sets (of natural numbers).
Definition 11.4.1. For α < ω1 let Lα2 = LPA ∪ {X
β
i |β < α, i ∈ ω}, where X
β
i is a
unary second order predicate variable. Lω12 is the union of all Lα2 .
This is not a recursive language. But for every α < ωCK1 it is. An interpretation
for Lα2 is of the form (N, (Aβ)β<α), where Aβ ⊆ ℘(ω), and the quantifiers ∀Xβ,∃Xβ
range over Aβ.
Definition 11.4.2 (Ramified Analytical Sets). The setsRAα are defined as follows.
RA0 = the collection of arithmetically definable sets. RAα+1 = the set of X ⊆ ω
such that there is a ϕ ∈ Lα+12 and ϕ defines X in (N, (RAβ)β6α) (where we assume
that the variables Xβ take values in RAβ for β 6 α). At limits we take unions. The
collection RA of ramified analytic sets is the union of all RAα.
Notice that this hierarchy is monotone. Thus there is a point such that RAα =
RAα+1. The least such α is called β0. The hierarchy of ramified analytical sets is the
second-order version of Gödel’s constructible hierachy. We have RAα = Lα ∩ ℘(ω),
where Lα refers to the α-th level of the constructible hierarchy.
We owe to Cohen, Putnam et al. [69] the following result:
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Theorem 11.4.3 (Cohen, Putnam et al.). (N,RAβ0) is the minimal β-model of Z2.
Here, a model (N,M) (where M⊆ ℘(ω)) is called a β-model iff every Π11-sentence
that is true in the model is true in the standard model (N, ℘(ω)). We owe to Kleene
the following important result:
Theorem 11.4.4 (Kleene). RAωCK1 = HYP.
Feferman [18] gives an axiomatization RA of the ramified analytical hierarchy for
levels < Γ0. In [20] he shows that the Kripke-Feferman theory of truth KF interprets
all levels < ε0 of RA.
11.5. Subsystems of second-order arithmetic
Definition 11.5.1. The language L2 of second-order arithmetic is obtained from
LPA by adding the binary relation symbol ∈ plus set variables X0, X1, X2, . . . (Let
us call v0, v1, . . . number variables.) This gives us new formulae of the form t ∈ X
and ∀Xϕ. L2 is a two-sorted first-order language with usual (first-order) rules for
both set and number quantifiers. A formula ϕ of L2 is called arithmetical if does
not contain bound set variables. (Free set variables are allowed.)
Definition 11.5.2. Z2 is the theory in L2 that contains in addition to the axioms
of PA all comprehension axioms
∀~Y ∀~y∃X∀x(x ∈ X ↔ ϕ(x, ~y, ~Y )),
where ϕ(x, ~y, ~Y ) is a formula of L2 with all free variables displayed, and the induction
axiom
∀X(0 ∈ X ∧ ∀x(x ∈ X → x+ 1 ∈ X)→ ∀x(x ∈ X)).
Notice that Z2 proves the induction axiom scheme
ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x(ϕ(x)→ ϕ(S(x))→ ∀xϕ(x),
where ϕ(x) is an L2-formulae possibly containing free number and set variables.
Z2 is an axiomatic first-order theory in a two-sorted language; it must not to be
confused with the set of second-order sentences that are true in the standard model
of second-order arithmetic, (N, ℘(ω)). We denote by Z−2 the subsystem of Z2 that is
obtained by restricting the comprehension axioms to formulae that do not contain
free set variables (bound set variables are allowed).
Definition 11.5.3. ACA0 is the theory in L2 that contains in addition to the axioms
of PA all comprehension axioms
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∀~Y ∀~y∀x(ϕ(x, ~y, ~Y )↔ ψ(x, ~y, ~Y ))→ ∀~Y ∀~y∃X∀x(x ∈ X ↔ ϕ(x, ~y, ~Y )),
where ϕ(x, ~y, ~Y ) ∈ L2 is an arithmetical formula, and the induction axiom
∀X(0 ∈ X ∧ ∀x(x ∈ X → x+ 1 ∈ X)→ ∀x(x ∈ X)).
The subscript 0 indicates that induction is restricted. We denote by ACA the system
obtained from ACA0 by adding all instances of the induction axiom scheme.
Definition 11.5.4. ∆11 − CA0 is the theory in L2 that contains in addition to the
axioms of PA all comprehension axioms
∀~Y ∀~y∀x(ϕ(x, ~y, ~Y )↔ ψ(x, ~y, ~Y ))→ ∀~Y ∀~y∃X∀x(x ∈ X ↔ ϕ(x, ~y, ~Y )),
where ϕ(x, ~y, ~Y ) ∈ L2 is a Π11-formula and ψ(x, ~y, ~Y ) ∈ L2 is a Σ11-formula, and the
induction axiom
∀X(0 ∈ X ∧ ∀x(x ∈ X → x+ 1 ∈ X)→ ∀x(x ∈ X)).
Definition 11.5.5. The language of ID1 extends the language LPA by a predicate
constant Iϕ for every arithmetical L2-formula ϕ(v0, X0) (with exactly the displayed
variables free) in which the free set variable X0 occurs only positively (i.e. it does
not appear in the scope of an odd number of negation signs). We may identify
expressions of the form Iϕ(t) with t ∈ Iϕ and regard Iϕ as a set constant. On the
intended interpretation, the set constant Iϕ is interpreted by the least fixed point
generated (or the inductive relation defined) by the formula ϕ.
Definition 11.5.6. ID1 is the theory in LID1 that contains in addition to the axioms
of PA and full induction in LID1 all axioms of the form
∀x(ϕ(x, Iϕ)→ Iϕ(x))
and
∀x(ϕ(x, ψ)→ ψ(x))→ ∀x(Iϕ(x)→ ψ(x))
Here, ϕ(x, ψ) is obtained from ϕ(x,X) by replacing every occurrence of t ∈ X by
ψ(t) and of ¬(t ∈ X) by ¬ψ(t). The system ÎD1 is the theory in LID1 that contains
in addition to the axioms of PA and full induction in LID1 all axioms of the form
∀x(ϕ(x, Iϕ)↔ Iϕ(x))
The proof-theoretic ordinal of ID1 is the Bachmann-Howard ordinal. Cf. Pohlers
[66, ch. 9]. The Bachmann-Howard ordinal is also the proof-theoretic ordinal of the
system Π11 − CA−0 .
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12. Graph theory
A directed graph (short:a digraph or simply a graph ) G consists of a set V (G), the
vertices (or nodes) of G, and of a set A(G) of ordered pairs of vertices, called arcs
of G. If x, y ∈ V (G) we denote an arc from x to y by (x, y); we call x its tail and
y its head. For any vertex x call y an out-neighbour of x iff (x, y) ∈ A(G) and an
in-neighbour iff (y, x) ∈ A(G). A graph H is a subgraph of G iff V (H) ⊆ V (G) and
A(H) ⊆ A(G). In this case we also say that G contains H and write H ⊆ G.
A non-empty graph P (i.e. a graph with at least one vertex) is called a path (from
a to b, of length n− 1) iff there is an enumeration (v0, v2, ..., vn) of V (P ) such that
for all 0 ≤ i, j ≤ n (vi, vj) ∈ A(P ) iff j = i+ 1 with a = v0 and b = vn. Note that a
graph with one vertex and no arcs is a path of length 0. We call such a path trivial.
A graph D is called a double-path (from a to b) iff there are non-trivial pathes P1,
P2 from a to b such that V (P1) ∩ V (P2) = {a, b} and V (D) = V (P1) ∪ V (P2) and
A(D) = A(P1) ∪ A(P2). A graph C is called a cycle (of length n + 1) iff there is
a (possibly trivial) path P of length n from a to b such that V (C) = V (P ) and
A(C) = A(P ) ∪ {(b, a)}. A cycle of length 1 is called a loop.
For any graph G, call an infinite sequence of vertices (v0, v2, ...) of V (G) an infinite
walk in G iff for all i ∈ ω(vi, vi+1) ∈ A(G). Analogously we can define a finite walk.
Note that one and the same vertex may occur more than once in a walk, while the
sequence enumerating the vertices of a path P contains, by definition, every vertex
of P only once. A graph G is called well-founded iff there is no infinite walk in G.
We call a graphH a subdivision ofG iff is the result of replacing each (x, y) ∈ A(G)
by some path from x to y (possibly of length 1).
Call a graph G strongly connected iff any two distinct vertices x, y of G are joint
by a path P ⊆ G from x to y or from y to x. A graph is a tree iff it is strongly
connected and contains no cycle.
A graph H is an induced subgraph of a graph G iff H is a subgraph of G and each
arc of G between two vertices of H is also an arc of H. In this case we also say that
V (H) spans H in G and write H = G[V (H)].
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Löb’s derivability conditions, 20
Leigh, Graham, ix
Leitgeb scheme, 67
Leitgeb, Hannes, viii, 13, 62, 63, 66, 69,
87
liar paradox, 3
limitation of size, 121
logic of paradox, 44
LP, 44
Maudlin, Tim, 54
McGee’s trick, 59
McGee, Vann, 59
Meadows, Toby, ix, 66
minimal Kripke fixed point, 29
minimalism, 8
monotonic, 28
159
INDEX
Moore’s principle, 55
Murzi, Julien, ix
naive truth, 23
nested Yablo sequence, 72
New foundations, 122
no-classes theory, 9
norms of assertion, 54
ordinals, 17
paracomplete, 30
paraconsistent logic, 44
partial model, 27
partial valuation, 27
Peano arithmetic, 15
Picollo, Lavinia, viii, x, 60, 71, 134
PL, 45
Pohlers, Wolfram, 139, 147
position, 74
positive disquotation, 110
positive set theory, 122
Priest, Graham, 9, 44, 45, 60
primitive recursive functions, 15
propositional function, 121
pure disquotationalism, 8
Quine, W.V.O., 4, 6, 9, 32, 122
ramified analysis, 26
ramified analytic sets, 117
ramified analytical sets, 145
ramified truth, 26
Ramsey, Frank, 4
reference-graphs, 75
relative interpretation, 17
Restall, Greg, 83
revenge, 31, 54
Ripley, David, ix, 46
Russell, Bertrand, 4, 9, 11, 121, 122, 130
Schoenfield, Joseph, 145
section, 102
semantic dependence, 63
sensitivity, 67
sensitivity-graph, 70
set variables, 102, 146
Shapiro, Steward, 38
Shapiro, Stewart, 113
Sheard, Michael, 3
Simpson, Stephen, 145
Soames, Scott, 30
sound, 29
Speck, Jönne, ix
Speranski, Stanislav, viii, 65
ST, 46
standard models, 17
Stern, Johannes, viii
strategy, 74
stratified formula, 122
stratified truth, 122
strict-tolerant logic, 46
Strong Kleene scheme, 28
strongly definable, 102
substitution function, 16
substitutional theory of classes and rela-
tions, 9
substructural logic, 46
supervaluational scheme, 28
T-In, 59
T-positive formula, 111
T-schema, 3
Takeuti, Gaisi, 25
Tarski’s hierarchy, 3
Tarski, Alfred, 3, 12, 23, 24
transfinite induction, 17
translation function, 103
truth definability, 17
truth-set, 102
typed truth predicate, 3
typing, 123
uniform T-schema, 16
160
INDEX
valuation scheme, 27
Vaught, Robert, 5
verification game, 76
Weak Kleene scheme, 28
weakly definable, 102
Weir, Alan, 9
Welch, Philip, ix, 65, 73, 126
Yablo’s paradox, 60
Yablo, Stephen, 60, 72
zigzag theories, 121
161
